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Surveying & Built Environment

THE HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF SURVEYORS

A Special Commemorative Issue

Marking the 80th Anniversary of the Battle of Hong Kong

8 December to 25 December 1941

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香港測量師學會
www.hkis.org.hk

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Editorial Board

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Editorial

EITHER FIFTH COLUMNISTS OR INDIFFERENT? MANY FOUGHT!

Lawrence W.C. Lai & Vincent N.H. Chan with Stephen N.G. Davies

Post war English writings on the Battle of Hong Kong (the Battle) and the ensuing occupation sometimes give a false impression that the ethnic Chinese citizens (hereinafter "local Chinese") in the colony were largely indifferent or fifth columnists (**St. Croix 2018**).

There were surely traitors, who were ethnic Chinese citizens of Hong Kong, since there is clear evidence of some.

However, many local Chinese persons fought the enemy in various military and ancillary formations during and after the Battle, notably the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) and the Hong Kong Chinese Regiment, and during the rest of the Second World War notably the Volunteer Company[1], the British Army Aid Group (B.A.A.G.), and the East River Column. Some local Chinese had also joined the regular units of the Nationalist-led Chinese Revolutionary Army (Nationalist Army) though numbers and names seem not to be known.

Kwong (**2018**: **86-87**) referred to a Royal Corps of Signals' post-war (year not given) survey stating that, at the time of Japanese invasion in 1941, there were 1,073 Chinese soldiers[2] and auxiliaries in the British Forces in Hong Kong. They were 200 sappers, 200 artillery men, 47 serving the Hong Kong (Chinese) Regiment Infantry, 200 in the HKVDC infantry, gunners, medical offers, and a few hundreds with the Navy and Air Force Auxiliaries. What "Chinese" meant is not certain.

Another useful, if incomplete listing can be found in Tony Banham's online Hong Kong War Diary list of the garrison.[3] Banham's very useful site also lists the many non-combatant Chinese, who were "uniformed civilians", who played a recorded part in the battle such as the Hong Kong Police and Police Reserve (31), Auxiliary Medical Corps (1), Auxiliary Nursing Service (<40), St John's Ambulance Brigade (63), as well as a few of the non-uniformed civilians in the main government elements involved in the battle (<10), which adds at least an additional 150.

From **Stewart**'s (**1991**: **74-99**) work, a total of 512 volunteers can be identified with Chinese names. **Appendix 1** shows these names. 98 of them entered POW camps and survived; 332 escaped imprisonment, 1 got a medal after the war and 29 were killed in action (1, L/Cpl K.C. Hung, got a mention posthumously); 2 transferred to other units before battle; 12 after the surrender joined units like the B.A.A.G. or Indian Army; 5 got medals and 3 mentioned in dispatches after the war. A total of 28 persons with Chinese names (around 1/3 of a total of 66 persons) did not mobilize.

The names of Chinese soldiers in regular British Forces fighting the Battle of Hong Kong is an under-researched area. Well known individuals include the late Peter Choy.

Ride (**1981**) **and Ride and Ride** (**2004**) document the names, ranks, roles and other details of 756 Chinese members of the B.A.A.G. They comprised of members of regular British forces, the HKVDC and civilians. (**Appendix 2**)

Only a few who served in the Nationalist Army are known, named people. **Appendix 3** shows only three but others would likely be identified with more research.

Chan (**2009: 67**) reported the strength of

1 "The volunteer company was initially made up of 128 Chinese members of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, 49 Chinese members of the British Army, as well as a number of members from the Air Transport Auxiliary, Air Raid Precautions, and other personnel that escaped from Japanese occupied Hong Kong to Free China. Escapees were assisted by the British Army Aid Group, and transported to Assam, and then to Calcutta by the Royal Air Force. By February 1943, the Hong Kong Volunteer Company was put into service with the Chindits in Burma. They were later deployed to Japanese-occupied Malaya conducting special reconnaissance behind enemy lines." (**Hong Kong Volunteer Company**)

2 Peter Choi (蔡彼得) 17 A.A. Battery, Royal Artillery passed away on 6 August 2020 in Hong Kong.

3 See Banham (http://www.hongkongwardiary.com/searchgarrison.html) under the "Search Garrison" tab.

the Hong Kong and Kowloon Independent Brigade East River Column: "By mid-1943, the Hong Kong and Kowloon Independent Brigade had nearly 5,000 full-time soldiers who were divided into six *duis*, or detachments, with from 100-odd to over 600 full-time soldiers. They were the Lantau *zhong dui* (column), Shataukok *zhong dui*, Sai Kung *zhong dui*, Marine *zhong dui*, Urban *zhong dui* and the Yuen Long *zhong dui*." We have not found any published accounts of their names or independent corroboration of the rather high numbers.

Whichever way one comes at this, it is quite clear that Hong Kong's indigenous Chinese population contributed significantly to the defence of Hong Kong, and suffered accordingly. No exact number of those involved directly in the battle and in the subsequent protracted war is known, but from the above, a ball park would be of the order of several thousand.

As much or more to the point, we need to remember the almost entirely forgotten and ignored Hong Kong victims of the Battle of Hong Kong and subsequent Japanese Occupation. Only in recent work by **Banham** (**2019**) has the appalling figure of 320,000-360,000 deaths, or over 25% of the refugee inflated immediate pre-war population, been estimated. In Singapore 50,000 deaths have an impressive national memorial. In Hong Kong, six times the number have no memorial at all. They are nowhere recorded. They have been officially forgotten.

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Appendix 1:

Prisoners of War at the Time of the Japanese Surrender

Name	No	Rank
Hong B	3726	Pte
Lee	3183	Pte
Lee A T	DR 55	L/Bdr
Lee E F	4536	Gnr
Lee F	DR 38	Pte
Lee J H B	2757	Gnr
Lee R	4132	Spr
Lee R E	DR 82	L/Cpl
Low T B	4287	Gnr
Lui T C	3846	Gnr
Tsenin E A	3182	Gnr
Young K P	DR 76	Cpl

Released by the Japanese

Name	No	Rank
Au Sze Ho	4755	Pte
Au Young R	3295	Pte
Chan A	4088	Gnr
Chan Ah Kheng	5050	Pte
Chan C	2659	L/Bdr
Chan Chi Wing	3492	Gnr
Chan Hoi Kee	3470	L/Bdr
Chan Kwong Luen	3488	Gnr
Cheah Phee Chuan	5051	Pte
Cheng Po Yee	5180	Gnr
Cheung J	5173	Pte
Cheung Shiu Ling	4110	Pte
Cheung T	3373	L/Cpl
Cheung Yan Sing	2800	Gnr
Chiang Lee Hin	5006	Pte
Chin H	5046	Pte
Chin Yew Ping	5052	Pte
Choy Chung Lun	3824	Gnr
Eng Wah Sun	4137	Gnr

Fong S	4138	Gnr
Goh Kim Toon	2882	L/S
Ho Chai Nam	4648	Gnr
Ho F	4762	Pte
Ho Mang Hung	5004	Pte
Hor Ah Lam	5008	Pte
Hoy Poy B H A	4629	Gnr
Hu Kwok Leung	2649	Sgt
Ip Wing	3472	Gnr
Khoo Kay Hean	5111	Pte
Khor Suan Sin	5187	Gnr
Koh Jaik Chong	5009	Pte
Kwok Chan Lun	2880	Gnr
Kwok Kap Lun	3827	Gnr
Kwok Ling Kwong	4240	Gnr
Lai J	4658	Gnr
Lau Hun Ming	5041	Pte
Lau J A	2486	Gnr
Lau Teik Seng	5042	Pte
Lee Chi Nam	4726	Pte
Lee Chun Chung	3423	Gnr
Lee Gordon Chun	4875	Pte
Lee How Fong	4802	Pte
Lee Wee Son	5010	Pte
Leow Hock Yew	5056	Pte
Leung J	2632	Gnr
Leung K S	5192	Gnr
Leung Nai Sung	3165	Pte
Leung Po Shun	4694	Pte
Li A	4384	Gnr
Lim Thiam Tet	4804	Pte
Lo Hon Sang	5188	Gnr
Lo Ka Mo	4272	Gnr
Lo Shu Wing	4747	Pte
Lo Yau Sam	4692	Pte
Loh Tat Beng	5057	Pte
Low Keat Soo	5043	Pte
Lui Kwai Hong	3395	Pte
Lung Li Shih	5012	Pte
Mok Hing Woon	3422	Gnr
Moung Ba Sin	5088	Pte
Ng Jit Thye		Pte
Pau C F S	3436	Gnr
Poon Chun Ho	3494	L/Bdr
Poon O A	4422	Pte
Pun Yiu Kwan	3425	Bdr
Rum Yee D	4232	Gnr
Seah Tin Toon	5053	Pte
Shek W	4993	Spr
Sim Beck Ho	5013	Pte
Tam Chung Man	4710	Pte
Tan Boon Cheok	5044	Pte
Tan Ewe Aik	5045	Pte
Tan Yok Lin	5082	Pte
Tang Sik Hung	3481	Gnr
Wan Hok Nin	5223	Gnr
Wen Chung Wen	5054	Pte
Wong Kam Piu	2949	Sgm
Wong Kwai Yan	4190	Gnr
Wong Kwok Suen	4049	L/Cpl
Wong Yee A D	4987	Spr
Wong Yin Knoon	5055	Pte
Wong Yue Tin	4811	Pte
Yap Pitt Van	4763	Pte
Yeung Wing	3276	Pte
Yoong G	5183	Sgm
Young B J	4980	Pte

Did Not Enter POW Camps or Who Escaped in Early 1942

Name	No	Rank
Au Kim Wah		Pte
Au Ping Wah	3347	L/Cpl
Au Sze Bun	2942	Pte
Au Yang K S	4388	Pte
Chai Kim Swee	4241	Pte
Chan	4546	Gnr
Chan A Kung Po	3000	Pte
Chan Cheuk Kwan	3045	L/S
Chan Chi Fat	3013	Cpl
Chan Chou		Spr
Chan F	3088	Sgm
Chan Fook Cheung	3823	Gnr
Chan Fook Chor	2996	Pte
Chan Fook Kang	3078	Pte
Chan H		Pte
Chan H H	4245	Spr
Chan H M		Pte
Chan H Y	2862	Pte
Chan Hiu Chung	3282	Pte
Chan Hon Cheung	2861	Pte
Chan Iu Tung	3072	L/Cpl
Chan Kai Hung	3822	Gnr
Chan Kang Chuen	2917	Gnr
Chan King Chor	2995	L/Cpl
Chan Kwai	4292	Gnr
Chan Kwong Fook	4219	Pte
Chan L	3487	Gnr
Chan Lam		Spr
Chan P	4705	Gnr
Chan Pui Kan	3449	Gnr
Chan S K	4558	Gnr
Chan Shing		Spr
Chan Sik Tim	3426	Gnr
Chan Siu Lun	4742	Pte
Chan Wing		Spr
Chan Yan Kwong	4810	Pte
Chang W Shin Fook	4386	L/Bdr
Cheah Chong Kee	5073	Sgm
Chen J Ming	2957	Sgm
Cheng Chi Man		Spr
Cheung Chung Hong		Spr
Cheung H		Pte
Cheung Koon Ming	4412	Pte
Cheung Kwok Yan	4672	Pte
Cheung Man Wah	5005	Pte
Cheung Ming Wah	4756	Pte
Cheung Shu Tung		Cpl
Cheung Yau		Spr
Cheung Yim Sang	3121	Pte
Chew Beng Kheng	5086	Pte
Chiang Lee Hai	5165	Gnr
Chin H T	5181	Pte
Ching A	4615	Gnr
Chiu Put Chi	4693	Pte
Chow Cham Leung	4743	Pte

Chow G L	4136	Bdr
Chow H S		Pte
Chow Kwai Cheong	4270	Gnr
Chow S		Pte
Chow Yau Cheung	3041	L/Cpl
Chow Yuk Sang		Spr
Chow Yung	2889	Pte
Chu Hing To	5181	Pte
Chu Kam Yin	3476	L/Bdr
Chua P T H	4387	Gnr
Chung A	4547	Gnr
Chung Chu Wah		Pte
Chung Kam Hing		Pte
Chung R	2579	Gnr
Chung Wah Cheung	4529	Gnr
Chung Wah Chiu	3428	Gnr
Chung Wah Kiu	4530	Gnr
Chung Wah Leung	4531	Gnr
Eu W	3201	L/Cpl
Fang Sin Yang	4744	Pte
Fok P	4813	Pte
Foo Ping Yuen	2891	Pte
Foo Yeow Khoon	4833	Pte
Fung Che Lai	2876	Cpl
Fung F	4534	Pte
Fung Kam Fook	3043	Pte
Fung Ki Wui		Pte
Fung Y S	2915	Pte
Fung Yin Leung	3493	Gnr
Goh Kong Hooi	2892	L/Cpl
Heung L	3421	Gnr
Ho C	3247	Pte
Ho Chung Yin	3253	Pte
Ho Kwai Wing	3044	Pte
Ho Lam		Spr
Ho Sang	3432	L/Bdr
Ho T	4872	Pte
Hooi Cheng Weng	4801	Pte
Huang C L	5089	Pte
Hui Chung Fat	3266	Pte
Ip lu Ting	2893	Pte
Ip King		Spr
Ip Tai Cheung	4701	Pte
Ip Tai Chiu	4559	Gnr
Kam Yiu		Spr
Kan U Wah		Spr
Khoo Kee Seang	4805	Pte
Khoo O J	5185	Sgm
Kwai F W	5161	Gnr
Kwok Kai Chiu	4277	Gnr
Kwok Kam Lun	2883	L/Cpl
Kwok Mok Chi	3444	Gnr
Kwok Mok Hoi	3443	L/Bdr
Kwok Yik On	2884	Cpl
Kwong K C	5074	Sgm
Kwong M	4143	Gnr
Lai Cho Chor	4169	Pte
Lai Chu		Spr
Lai Chun Chou	2911	Pte
Lai Wing Yat	4534	Gnr
Lai Yau Yick		Spr
Lam Chor Man		Pte
Lam Chun Mun	3114	Pte
Lam J	4320	Pte

Lam J Yee	4619	Gnr
Lam Lin		Spr
Lam Po Sih	3441	Gnr
Lam Yuk Jaak	5184	Gnr
Lam Yun Ming	2811	Pte
Lau Cheung	3519	Sgt
Lau Kau	3519	Spr
Lau Ping		Spr
Lau Ping Kwan	4067	Pte
Lau Yam Choi	3365	Pte
Lau Ying Lap		Spr
Lee B	4745	Pte
Lee Chor Ching	4091	Gnr
Lee Hing Cheung	3071	L/Cpl
Lee J	3120	Cpl
Lee Kui Chee	2894	Pte
Lee S Y		Pte
Lee W J	DR 39	Gnr
Leung Cheun Bun	5179	Pte
Leung Chi Chung	3279	Pte
Leung Chung Yin		Spr
Leung H	4679	Pte
Leung Hon Chuen	3039	L/Cpl
Leung Hon Ming	4826	Gnr
Leung Kam Lun		Pte
Leung King Hin	2801	Cpl
Leung S L		L/Cpl
Leung Shew Chow	3069	Pte
Leung Shui Poi	4146	Gnr
Leung Tsi Wai	3448	Gnr
Leung Wai Tak	3506	Gnr
Leung Wing Yan	2895	Pte
Leung Yee Chui	4211	Pte
Leung Yun Cheung		L/Cpl
Li Fai Kuen	4985	Gnr
Li Hon Ki		Spr
Li Kwok Yan	4090	L/Bdr
Li Lai On	4272	Gnr
Li Ming		Spr
Li Ping Shum		Spr
Li Ping Tsan		Spr
Li Tong		Spr
Li Wing Foon	3093	Pte
Li Wing Hon	3094	Pte
Li Yun Gun	4394	Pte
Liang Kam Yuen	5162	Gnr
Lim Beng Chey	5039	Pte
Lim Chin Lang	4822	Pte
Lim Eng Hooi		Pte
Lin Ho Wah		Pte
Lin Sin Lam	5047	Pte
Ling Tak Hong	4818	Pte
Liu Heung		Spr
Liu Sum		Spr
Liu Tam Choi	4659	Gnr
Liu Ting Fai		Spr
Lo Chan Ping	3371	Pte
Lo Ford		Pte
Lo Kam Kei	3397	Pte
Lo Kam Ting		Spr
Lo Kim		Spr
Lo Kin		Spr
Lo P S	4561	Gnr
Lo Ping Yat		Pte

Lo S		Gnr
Lo T S	4565	Gnr
Lo Tat Sang		Spr
Lo Tung Leung	4735	Pte
Lo W		Pte
Lo Ying Yuen	4829	Gnr
Lobertson San Pui de		Cpl
Loo Tsun Huen	3430	L/Bdr
Lor Wing Kit	4216	Pte
Lui Wai Chow	3059	Gnr
Ma Chang Ling		Pte
Ma H Quonnon		Pte
Ma Pui Hung	3490	Gnr
Ma R		L/Cpl
Ma Shuen Hung	3491	Gnr
Ma Siu Leong	3509	Gnr
Ng Chik Hong	4357	Gnr
Ng G Kau Tim	2621	Gnr
Ng H A	5193	Gnr
Ng Hang On	3433	Gnr
Ng Pak Chuen		Pte
Ng Wing		Cpl
Ng Yin Po	5081	Pte
Ngan Chung Hon		Spr
Ngan Poon Lap	4748	Pte
Oh Bak Chua	4834	Pte
Ooi Seng Poy		Pte
Ou Siew Leng	5263	Pte
Pang Oi Ling	3505	Gnr
Pang Shiu Wah	3116	Pte
Pang Yu Tong	3015	Pte
Pao Ching Wah	3483	L/Bdr
Pao Yue Lum	2929	Spr
Penn Yeuk Wing	4396	Pte
Ping Kwai		Spr
Poon Fook Ming	4105	Gnr
Pow Tat Lun	4649	Pte
Pun Chi Fan		Sgt
Pun Heung		Spr
Pun Iu Chiu	3117	L/Cpl
Shi M	4179	Pte
Sim S	4806	Pte
Siu R	4984	Gnr
So Tse Yiu	4686	Gnr
So Yan Kit	2899	L/Cpl
Sum Chan Chip	4300	Gnr
Tai R	4385	Gnr
Tam Cheong Kee	3239	Pte
Tam Hok Nin	3424	Gnr
Tam Kwan		Spr
Tam Kwong Lam	4749	Pte
Tam P T		Pte
Tam Suen Keng	5163	Gnr
Tam Sung Kit		Cpl
Tam Tak Leung		Spr
Tam W	4397	Pte
Tam Yan Kwong	3070	Bdr
Tan Bieuw	5040	Pte
Tan Luen Hooi	4807	Pte
Tang Chu	3122	Pte
Tang H Yew Hung	2620	L/S
Tang King Man	3475	Gnr
Tang Ming Wah	3118	Pte
Tang Tung Hoi	2806	L/Cpl

Tang W Yew Ming	2623	Gnr
Tarn Hock San	4809	Pte
Tcheng Pao King	2752	Sgm
Teoh Tiaw Bee	4758	Pte
Thom W	DR 22	Pte
Thum Kim Wai	4759	Pte
Ting Ping Kwan	4736	Pte
To King Shun		Spr
Tong Kwok Kee	4819	Pte
Tsang For Pui	3099	L/Cpl
Tsang K M	4549	Gnr
Tsang Pang Fei	3095	Pte
Tsang Pong	4673	Pte
Tsang Shiu Woon	3447	Gnr
Tsang Yeung		Pte
Tse Kwing In	3008	L/Cpl
Tse L	2660	Gnr
Tseung Ying Hung	4749	Pte
Tso Kwok Fai	3006	Pte
Tso M Him Chi	4151	Gnr
Tso Wai Huen	4404	Pte
Tsui Shu Hung	3022	Pte
Wan J	4303	Gnr
Wong Chin Wah	4812	L/Cpl
Wong Cho Yau	4679	Pte
Wong F T	3429	Gnr
Wong H	2711	Pte
Wong H S	2912	Pte
Wong Hok	4739	Pte
Wong Hop Yu	3274	Pte
Wong J	4676	Pte
Wong J	5167	Gnr
Wong K P	3252	L/Cpl
Wong Kam Fu	2997	L/Cpl
Wong Ki Lun	4760	Pte
Wong Kok Fui		Pte
Wong Kong		Spr
Wong Ming Hin		Spr
Wong Mun	4677	Pte
Wong Ngai Mun	5038	Pte
Wong P	2823	Pte
Wong Q	2618	Sgm
Wong Shui Kwong	3096	Pte
Wong Sui Kan	2902	Pte
Wong Yin Shau	3244	Pte
Wong Yuk Tong	3254	Pte
Woo P Tak Ming	4539	Gnr
Woo S Y	3270	Pte
Wu T C		Gnr
Yee D W	3058	L/Cpl
Yee J R	2960	Sgm
Yee Man Sum	4563	L/Bdr
Yeung Chan Fan	2863	Pte
Yeung Kin Yau		Spr
Yeung Koon Yuk	4274	Gnr
Yeung Man Ting		Pte
Yeung Man Yeuk	2854	L/S
Yeung Ming Hon	4761	Pte
Yeung Wah Sang	4712	Pte
Yeung Yuk Wah	3479	Gnr
Yip Bink K	3140	Sgm
Yong P P F		Pte
Young C	4275	Gnr
Young K O	2867	Cpl

Young W R	4425	Pte
Yu Fook Sang	3127	L/S
Yu Shiu On	4817	Pte
Yuen H		Gnr
Yuen S L	3226	Spr
Yung Fook Hoi	3451	L/Bdr
Yung J	4155	L/Bdr
Yung Kam Ling	4367	Gnr
Zie Yuen		Gnr

Movements after the Surrender Uncertain

Name	No	Rank
Chak P T		Pte
Chan M F		Dvr
Chan T K		Pte
Chan Y K		Gnr
Cheong A		Pte
Kwok L J		Gnr
Lau SL		Cpl
Lee F		Pte
Leung T H		L/Cpl
Lew K S		L/Cpl
Lim H		L/Cpl
Ling C S		L/Cpl
Lo P W	4177	L/Cpl
Mok K K		
Ng W S		Gnr
Tan H S		Pte
Tang W B		Cpl
Tong S M		Pte
Wan S H		L/Cpl
Wong C P		
Wong P C		Cpl
Yip C		

Killed in Action or Died of Wounds

Name	No	Rank	Remarks (K: killed; U: wounded; 18: 18th December 1941)
Chan U Chan	4134	Gnr	K 18
Cheng K S	3030	Pte	K 25
Cheung Wing Yee	4840	Gnr	K 18
Chung Yew Mun		Pte	U 19
Ho A	4239	Gnr	K 18
Ho A L		Pte	U 19
Ho L K	5169	Gnr	U 25
Hung Kai Chiu		L/Cpl	K 19
Kwok Wing Ching	4317	Gnr	K 18
Lao Hsin Nain	4505	L/Bdr	K 18
Lau George		Pte	U 19
Lau T S		Pte	U 19
Leung Chik Wai	3245	L/Cpl	K 25
Leung Fook Wing	4186	Gnr	K 18
Leung T C		Pte	U 19
Lim A		Pte	U 19
Lim J A	4343	Gnr	U 25
Lim J P F		Pte	U 19
Lim Kim Huan		L/Cpl	U 19
Lim S T		Pte	U 19
Lo W C	4666	Pte	U 19
Ng Po Lau	3040	Cpl	K 25
Poon Kwong Kuen	4188	Gnr	K 18
Tsang Ka Pen	4198	Gnr	K 18
Tse Wai Man	5172	Gnr	U 21
Wong S H	2869	Pte	U 29
Young E B		Pte	U 19
Young W		L/Cpl	U 19
Yung Yue Wang	4222	Gnr	U 25

Died Whilst Prisoners of War

Name	No	Rank	Remarks
Lee J S	4667	L/Cpl	Killed: 1.10.44; Cemetery at Yokohama

Transferred to Other Units on outbreak of Hostilities

Name	No	Rank	Remarks
Young J	3900	Spr	Transferred to E Services on 8-Dec-41
Yow W	3533	Spr	Transferred to A T S on 8-Dec-41

Fought with the HKVDC until the Surrender and then Joined Other Units

Name	No	Rank	Remarks
Chan King		Pte	Joined B.A.A.G.; Did not enter POW Camp Died - Unconfirmed
Cheng M	4616	Gnr	Joined Chindits; Released from POW Camp
Ho B	4820	Pte	Joined B.A.A.G.; Did not enter POW Camp
Hung A	2845	Pte	Joined Indian Army / B.A.A.G.;
Hung D	2845	L/Cpl	Joined Indian Army / B.A.A.G.;
Lam D	4675	Pte	Joined B.A.A.G.; Released from POW Camp
Lam Ping Kee	4392	Pte	Joined B.A.A.G.; Released from POW Camp
Lau Ming Sai	2554	Cpl	Joined B.A.A.G.; Did not enter POW Camp
Lee Yiu Piu	2722	L/Cpl	Joined Indian Army / B.A.A.G.; Escaped from POW Camp
Lo Hung Sui	2914	Sgt	Joined B.A.A.G.; Did not enter POW Camp
Mok Wah Chan	2923	Sgt	Joined B.A.A.G.; Released from POW Camp
Tan S B	2951	Sgm	Joined B.A.A.G.; Did not enter POW Camp

Did Not Mobilise

Name	No	Rank
Bau K K		Gnr
Chan K O	3090	Pte
Chan M C		Pte
Cheng Wat		Gnr
Chow J		Pte
Doo W		Gnr
Heung Hock Chau		Gnr
Hui Koon Fat		Gnr
Lam K F	DR59	Pte
Lau Wing Cho	4393	Pte
Lee Shui Ping	3092	Pte
Lee W C	3434	Gnr
Leung C Y		Pte
Leung Fan		Spr
Leung Kui So		Gnr
Leung On Kwok		Gnr
Low W C	DR 118	Gnr
Mak Shun Ming		
Ng C H		Gnr
Sing T	3527	L/Cpl
Tam H T		L/Cpl
Tam Wai Sun		
Tsang Chor Kwan	4795	Gnr
Tso Chi		Gnr
Wong Sui In	3248	Pte
Yeung C F	2853	Pte
Yim Y		Pte
Yuen C L	3030	Pte

Appendix 2: Local Chinese serving in B.A.A.G.

List of Members of Regular British Forces, the HKVDC and Civilians

Name	Chinese Name	Rank	Role and/or Related Body
Ah Chat			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Ah Choi			Hospital Amah, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Ah Fung			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Ah Kam			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Ah Kwan			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Ah Mui			Agent 42, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Ah Poi			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Ah Poy			Messenger and guard
Ah Sam			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Ah Tam			Wardboy, Regt No. 20, Br.Nil. Hosp.
Ah Wing	亞榮?		
Ah Yee			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Au Chuen Fai	歐陽發		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Au Chung Hok			W/Technician, Signals Office, HQ
Au Chung Kam			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Au Fai			
Au Kai	區楷		Previously in R.A.F.
Au Por			Orderly, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Au Sik Yim			Chinese Cook, Domestic Staff, HQ
Au Wing Chung	歐永忠		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Au Yeung Fat	歐陽發		Previously in Royal Engineers
Au Yeung King			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Au Yung Kau	歐陽球		Previously in Royal Artillery
Book Hung	卜洪		Previously in D.C.R.E.

Chak H.K.			Clerks, Interviews and Troops, Advanced Headquarters, Waichow;
Chak Ho Kar			Accountant; Assistant Accountant, Office Staff, Detachment A
Chan Andrew			Post X, Forward Post; OP Frigate, Ko Ling;
Chan Andrew			Clerk, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Chan Cheung Yiu			W/Operator, Office Staff, Detachment A
Chan Chi	陳智		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Chan Chiu Fan			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Chan Chu Fan			Agent 22, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Chan Chuen	陳存／陳泉		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chan Chui Fan	陳紹芬？		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Chan Chun Lam	陳振林		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chan Fai	陳輝？		
Chan Hang Lei	陳亨利		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chan Ho Ka			Agent 45; Relief Work in Wai Chow area with Captain J.D. Clague
Chan Hon kee			Agent 88, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Chan Hon Kee	陳漢基		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Chan Hung	陳雄		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan Kai Shun	陳啓順		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chan Kam	陳錦		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan Kam Pui/Piu/Poy	陳錦培		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan Kam Tong	陳鑑棠		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chan Kan			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Chan Kwok Kwong	陳國光		Agent 77, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.; Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area
Chan Kwong Fook	陳廣福？		
Chan Lai	陳禮		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chan Lai	陳禮		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chan Lam	陳林		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan Lau	陳流/陳鎏		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Chan Man	陳文		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan On	陳安		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Chan Ping			Mess Steward, Local Staff, Detachment A
Chan Ping Kong			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Chan Pui	陳培		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan Sau Tak	陳修德		Agent 17, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.; Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area
Chan Say			Amah, Washing, Domestic Staff, HQ
Chan Shiu Tong	陳少棠		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chan Shu Tung	陳樹東		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chan Tai			Assistant Storeman, Quartermaster's Office, HQ
Chan Tan Nan			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Chan Ting Pong			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Chan Tso/Cho Yun/Yan	陳藻欣		Previously in R.A.F.
Chan Tsun Lam	陳俊林		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan Wong Chung	陳潢宗		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chan Woon	陳垣		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chan Yee	陳義		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Chan Yeung	陳養		Agent 25, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.; Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area;
Chan Ying Hung			Interpreter for Ride in Interview between Marshal Li Chi Shnel and Ride
Chan Ying Lik			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Chan Ying Lun	陳英麟		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Chan Ying Sang			Mess Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Chan Yiu	陳耀		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chang Shing Fat	陳成發		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chang, Raymond	張？		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chang, Raymond			Previously in Royal Engineers
Chau Hung Min			Clerk, Commandant's Office/ Intelligence Office, HQ
Chau Hung Po			Clerk, Commandant's Office/ Intelligence Office, HQ

Chau Tsun/ Chou Chuen	周泉		Previously in Royal Engineers
Che/Tse Wai	謝維		Previously in Royal Artillery
Cheah Chong Kee	謝昌基		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Chen Chiu Fan	陳超化		Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area
Chen Kai Shek	陳啓石		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Chen Man Wai	鄭文威		Previously in R.A.F.
Chen Oi Kun			Amah, Detachment C
Cheng Chong Kee			Confidential Typist; Clerk, Commandant's Office/ Intelligence Office, HQ
Cheng Fook Choy			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Cheng Kwok Wing	鄭國榮		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Cheng Leung	鄭良		Previously in Royal Engineers
Cheng Ming	鄭明		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Cheng Po			Messenger and guard; Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Cheng Tak Yun	鄭德容		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Cheng Tung Choy			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Cheng Wing Chan			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Cheng Yiu Wah	鄭耀華		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Cheuk Choi	卓才		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Cheung			
Cheung Chiu Hung	張超熊		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Cheung Chiu Shun	張超信		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Cheung Dai Sang	張戴勝		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Cheung Hee			Mess Coolie, Domestic Staff, HQ
Cheung Kai	張佳		Previously in Naval Dockyard
Cheung Kam Chuen	張金泉		Previously in R.A.F.
Cheung King Pui			W/Operator, Detachment B
Cheung Kit	張杰		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Cheung Kong	張江/張光		Previously in Royal Artillery
Cheung Koon Hung	張觀雄		Previously in Naval Dockyard
Cheung Kwok Kuen	張國權		Previously in HK Mule Corps
Cheung Lai Yung			Amah, Officers' Quarters, Domestic Staff, HQ
Cheung Man Fong	張文晃		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Cheung Man Kap	張文甲		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Cheung Min Kan			Driver, Transport Office, HQ
Cheung Po Man			Agent 67
Cheung Sai	張世		Previously in R.A.F.
Cheung Sang	張生		Previously in Royal Artillery
Cheung Sang	張生		Previously in R.A.F.
Cheung Siu Juan	張紹津		Previously in Naval Dockyard
Cheung Tak	張德		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Cheung Tung Sam/Sang	張東生		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Cheung Wa	張華		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Cheung Wah San	張華山		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Cheung Yan Sung			Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Cheung Yat	張益?		Previously in Royal Artillery
Cheung Yau	張有		Previously in Naval Dockyard
Cheung Yiu Wah	鄭耀華		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Chiang Cheung	鄭祥		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chiang Cheung	鄭祥		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chik Shiu Man	植兆文		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Chin			Dresser
Chiu Kwok Wing	趙國榮		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chiu Shin Wah	趙善華		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chiung Kin Chung			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Chow Ching On			Mess Coolie, Domestic Staff, HQ
Chow Hin Shing	周顯丞		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Chow Kong	周光/ 周江		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chow Koxik			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Choy Kow	蔡球		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chu Choy/Choi	朱材?		Previously in Royal Artillery
Chu Chun Man	朱振民？		Previously in Royal Engineers

Chu Chung Man	朱振文		Agent 38; Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area; Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ; Interpreter;
Chu Fook To	朱福滔		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chu Kam	朱涂		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chu Luen Fong			Mess Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Chu Shum			Guard, Local Staff, Detachment A
Chu/Chiu Wai	趙輝/趙威		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chui Gon	趙幹		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chui Shin Wah	趙善華		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Chuk Chun Kwan	翟鎮堃		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chung Che Man	鍾治文		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Chung Hon Ki			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Chung Shing	鍾成		
Chung Wai	鍾威		Previously in Royal Engineers
Chung Yuk Tin	鍾玉田		Previously in R.A.O.C.
David Lam			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Donald Wong Chung Tak			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Dr Eva Ho Tung			Medical post
Dr Wong Hok-nin			M.O. HQ, Kweilin
F. Lee Y.P.			Clerks, Advanced Headquarters, Waichow
Fan Yeuk Lun	范玉麟		Previously in Royal Artillery
Fan Yeuk Lung	范玉龏（麟／驎）		Previously in Royal Artillery
Fok Ming	霍明		Previously in Royal Engineers
Fong			Field Unit under Mr. Kendall
Fong Hin Yeung	方顯揚		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Fong Sai Lam			Hospital Cook, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Foo Huk	傅學／符鶴		Previously in R.A.F.
Frances Wat Po Kan			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Fredric Shek			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Fu Ling	符靈		Previously in Royal Artillery
Fung Cheung Lun	馮祥倫		Previously in Royal Engineers
Fung Sze Kee	馮思奇		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Fung Yau Leung	馮又良		Previously in Royal Engineers
Hing C.F.			Field Unit under Mr. Kendall
Ho Benjamin			Agent 66
Ho Bun	何彬		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Ho Cheuk Wah			Gardener, Domestic Staff, HQ
Ho Fee/Fei	何飛		Previously in Royal Artillery
Ho Fei	何輝？		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ho King			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Ho King	何慶		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ho Kit Chu			No. 1 Amah, Domestic Staff, HQ
Ho Kum Kwai	何錦貴		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ho Lai Piu	何勵標		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Ho Lam			Hospital Cook, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Ho Ling		Spr	Regt No. ??? 326; R.E.
Ho Man Kay			Relief
Ho Pak Fook	何伯福		Previously in R.A.F.
Ho Sau Hoi	何壽海／何秀海		Previously in Royal Artillery
Ho Wah	何華		Previously in Royal Artillery
Ho Wing	何榮		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ho Yau	何佑		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ho Yau	何佑		Previously in Royal Artillery
Ho Ying	何英		Previously in Royal Artillery
Ho Yuk Ming	何玉明		Previously in R.A. Ordinance Depot
Ho, Andrew	何玉明		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Ho/Hoh Tsing	何清		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Htam Yoke Lam			Dispatch Clerk, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Hubert Chin			Junior Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Hui Ka Ping	許家平		Previously in Royal Artillery
Hui Kai			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ

Hui Man Kai			Agent 26, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Hui Man Kai			C. Clerk, Commandant's Office/ Intelligence Office, HQ
Hui Poon			Barrack Cook, Domestic Staff, HQ
Hui Shu Kau	許樹球/許士球		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Hui Tak Wah	許德華		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Hui Yiu	許耀		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Hui Yiu	許耀		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Hung Sai Ming			Mess Manager, Domestic Staff, HQ
Ip Chow	葉秋		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ip Chun Pong	葉振邦		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Ip Foon			Amah, Coolie, Domestic Staff, HQ
Ip Kwong Lau	葉廣流		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Ip Ming Yan			A' Clerk, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Ip Ming Yan	葉銘恩?		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Ip Pak Wah (Ah Ying)	葉北華（亞英）		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Ip Shu Chung	葉樹宗		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ip Wai Kwong			Small Boy, Local Staff, Detachment A
Iu Tak Chiu			M.O's Orderly, Medical Office, HQ
Iu Tak Chiu	姚德昭		Previously in A.A. Regt
Jackie Lau			Assistant Purchaser, Accounts Office, HQ
Jan King Pun			Member, Medical Post, AHQ, B.A.A.G.
Jim Cho Lam	詹祖林		Previously in Royal Artillery
Jim Cho Lam	詹祖林		Previously in Royal Engineers
John Lee			Q' Clerk, Quartermaster's Office, HQ
Johnny Chan Hon Cheung			\
Joseph Tsang Yiu Sang			Agent 19, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Joseph Tsang Yuk Cheung			Agent 63, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Kam Yuk Kam	間玉鑑?		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Kew, Thomas	黃志雄		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ko Chung	高鐘		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Ko Kin	高堅		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ko T'hat			Amah, Officers' Quarters, Domestic Staff, HQ
Ko Wai Chuen			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Kong Kwei	江貴		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Kong Ming	江明		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Kong Sun	江新		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Kong Yan	江恩		Previously in Royal Engineers
Koo Yuk			Boatman, Local Staff, Detachment A
Kwak Pak Cheung			No. 1 Cook, Domestic Staff, HQ
kwan Yan Cheung			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Kwan Yang Cheung			Messenger and guard
Kwok Chung	郭松		Previously in Royal Engineers
Kwok Kam Chuen	郭錦泉／郭錦全		Previously in Royal Engineers
Kwok Ping			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Kwok Sang	郭生		Previously in Royal Artillery
Kwok Sik Yee			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Kwok Yuk Ming	郭玉明		Previously in Royal Artillery
Kwon/Kwan Yiu Wah	關耀華		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Kwong Hoi	江海		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Kwong King			Amah, Detachment C
Lai Ah Fung			Hospital Amah, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Lai Ah Kwong	賴亞廣		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lai Chi Kong	賴忠光		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lai Hung Kit	黎洪傑		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lai Kim Bun	黎健斌		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lai Kwai Kwan	賴/黎桂坤		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lai Kwong	黎廣?		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lai Ping Yau	賴炳祐		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lai Y.L.			Liaison, Advanced Headquarters, Waichow
Lai Yiu Ming	黎耀明		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lai Yu Yuk	黎耀沃		Previously in R.A.M.C.

Lai Yuen Hung			Relief Work in Wai Chow area with Captain J.D. Clague
Lai Yuen Lung			Chinese Liaison duties, Office Staff, Detachment A
Lam Cho Bun	林楚賓		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lam David	林榮光	Pte	B.A.A.G. Agent; Post X, Forward Post; OP Frigate, Ko Ling; Counter Espionage Section, B.A.A.G. Headquaters
Lam Fan	林芬		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lam Fat	林發		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lam Ho Fat	林浩發		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lam Kam Ming			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Lam Kee			Small Boy, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Lam Kow Kwong			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Lam Lee	林利		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lam Pin Kee / Pinky Lam			Interpreter
Lam Sau Tsun			Hospital Amah, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Lam Shek	林石		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lam Tak Ming (Ah Lam)	林德銘（阿林）		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Lam Tung Sum	林東深		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lam Wah Shing	林華勝		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lam Yan Wing	林仁榮		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Lam Yau Kwon	林有觀		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lau Chak Wing	劉澤榮		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lau Cheuk Wing	劉澤榮		Previously in RA Ordinance Depot
Lau Cheung Fai			W/Operator, Detachment B
Lau Chik			Mess Coolie, Domestic Staff, HQ
Lau Chuen	劉泉		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Lau Chung Kau	劉仲球		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Lau Fook	劉福		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lau Hon Hing	劉康興		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lau Kai Ming	劉啓明		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lau King Fai	劉競輝		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lau Kwai	劉貴		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lau Lin Sing	劉連勝		Previously in R.C.S.
Lau Shiu King			General duties, Detachment B
Lau Tai			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Lau Tak Sun			Agent 10, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.; Relief Work in Wai Chow area with Captain J.D. Clague; Accountant, Office Staff, Detachment A
Lau Tak Sun	劉德新？		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lau Teng Kee			Agent 36, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Lau Yung So	劉容修		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lee Cheung	李祥		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Lee Chik Sang	李植生		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lee Fat	李發		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lee Foo	李富		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lee Heep			Security duties, Office Staff, Detachment A
Lee Hon Che	李漢池		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Lee Hung Hoi			Bus driver
Lee Kar Kee			Small Boy, Local Staff, Detachment A
Lee Kuam			i/c Dressers Mess, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Lee Lam	李林		Driver of KMB Bus 203; Carrying messages of Agent 68;
Lee Lup			Agent 44; Relief Work in Wai Chow area with Captain J.D. Clague
Lee Lup	李立		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Lee Ming Chak Dick / Dick Lee			Forward Medical Posts
Lee Sang			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Lee Sheung Cheuk	李尚澤		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Lee Shiu Hung	李少雄		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lee Shui Kee	李瑞祺／李水棋		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lee Sin Sing	李先成		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Lee Tam			Guard/Orderly, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Lee Ting Sang			Clerk, Medical Staff, Detachment A

Lee Ting Sang 'Darkie' / Lei Tin Shang / Lee Ting San / Lee Tin Shang / Lee Tin Sang / Li Ting San / Li Ting Sang		Bdr	Post X, Forward Post; B.A.A.G. FIG Personnel; OP Frigate, Ko Ling;
Lee Tong	李棠／李堂		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lee Yick Chung			Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Lee Yin Chuen			Draughtsman, Draughtmen's Office, HQ
Lee Yiu Piu Francis / Francis Lee		Sgt; L/Cpl	Agent 75; Forward posts for Intelligence purposes; OP Frigate, Ko Ling; Interpreters and translators; Forward Medical Posts;
Lee, William John	李競松／李威林		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lei Seung/Lee Sheung	李常		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Lenung Ping Kwan			Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Leung Choy	梁才		Previously in HK Signal Co.
Leung Choy	梁才		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Leung Chung Yee			Draughtsman, Draughtmen's Office, HQ
Leung Chung Yee	梁宗義		Previously in H.Q. China Command
Leung Fook	梁福		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Leung Hing Cheung	梁興祥		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Leung Kam Heung	梁錦洪		Previously in R.A. Ordinance Depot
Leung Kam Hung	梁錦洪		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Leung Kum	梁錦？		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Leung Kwan	梁群／梁羣		Previously in Royal Engineers
Leung Kwok Wai	梁國威		Previously in Royal Artillery
Leung Lai Ping			Amah, Domestic Staff, HQ
Leung Man Chi			Mess Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Leung Man Chiu			Ward Boy, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Leung Man Hin			OP Frigate, Ko Ling; W/T Operator
Leung Oi Sang			Cashier, Accounts Office, HQ
Leung Oi Sang	梁靄生		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Leung Ping Kwan			Dresser, Tamshui Medical Outpost;
Leung Pui Wing	梁佩榮		Previously in Royal Engineers
Leung Sang	梁生		Previously in Royal Artillery
Leung Sau			Amah, Ironing, Domestic Staff, HQ
Leung Tak Shun / Tak Shueh	梁德信		Previously in Royal Engineers
Leung Wing Ming			Mess Coolie, Domestic Staff, HQ
Leung Yee Hing	梁義興		Previously in Royal Engineers
Leung Yiu			Messenger, Detachment C
Leung Yuk Nam, William	梁玉南／梁惠林		Previously in R.A.O.D.
Leung, C.H.		Pte	Regt No. 3245; H.K.V.D.C.
Leung, William	梁惠林		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lew Ah Loy	廖亞來？		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Lew Kay Sang	廖更新？		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Li Cheung	李祥		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Li Fong	李晃		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Li Kam Shau			Small Boy, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Li Kau	李九		Previously in Royal Artillery
Li Kim Fai	李劍輝		Previously in Royal Artillery
Li Lam	李林		Previously in Royal Scots, cook
Li Sheung Chi	李尚治		Previously in Royal Artillery
Li Wai Choi	李惠才		Previously in Royal Engineers
Li Yik Chung / Li Yick Chung			Dresser-in-charge of the Shekma Medical Outpost
Liu Kwok Nam	廖國南		Previously in R.A.M.C.
Liu Ngan T'hai			No. 2 Amah, Domestic Staff, HQ
Liu Pok			Dresser, formerly of Queen Mary Hospital
Liu Ting Wah	廖定華		Previously in D.C.R.E.

Lo Cheung	盧章		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lo Chun Kit	盧進傑		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lo H. S.			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Lo Hung Sui	羅鴻瑞	Sgt.	Agent 64; Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.; Relief Work in Wai Chow area with Captain J.D. Clague;
Lo Kam Yuen	羅錦元		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Lo Kan	羅根		
Lo Kwan	羅鈞		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Lo Kwok Ying	盧國英		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lo Ping	羅炳		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Lo Ping Luen	羅炳倫		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Lo Pui			Mess Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Lo Pung Lien	羅炳聯		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Lo Shu Tsang			Messenger and guard
Lo Si Cheng		Lance-Corporal	Cook and do the chores for Dr. Laycook in Waichow
Lo Sui Hong	勞少康		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lo Sze Tsang			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Lo Wai Hing	羅懷興／羅偉興		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Lo Wing Shiu	羅永紹		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lo Yuk Pang	盧玉鵬		Previously in Royal Artillery
Lo Yuk Pang	羅玉鵬		Previously in Royal Engineers
Lo, Joseph	羅若瑟		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Loie Fook Wing David	雷福榮		Agent, M Group, B.A.A.G.
Lok / Luk Shiu Ping	陸少平		Previously in Royal Artillery
Low Alex			Despatch Clerk, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Lui Kar Yin / Li Fong	李芳		Agent 68
Lui Yat Chung			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Luk /Chee Keung	陸志強		Previously in Royal Artillery
Luk Hong Ling	陸康寧		Previously in R.A.F.
Luk Sing	陸勝		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ma Hang	馬衡		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Ma Pak Ki	馬柏基		Previously in Naval Dockyard
Ma Pui Hung			Bookkeeper, Accounts Office, HQ
Ma Wah	馬華		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Mak Cheuk Hon			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Mak Chi	麥志		Previously in Royal Engineers
Mak Kam	麥錦		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Mak King Chiu	麥景照		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Mak Kwok Hung	麥國雄		Previously in Royal Artillery
Mak Leung			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Mak Lum			
Mak Yin Jing	麥延楨		Previously in Royal Engineers
Mak Yuk Kam	麥玉錦		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Man Cheung	文長		Previously in Royal Engineers
Man Kam Wah	文錦華		Previously in Royal Engineers
Man Kwok Loy			Commandant's Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Massy Ali	馬敬德		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Michael Lau Yiu Cho			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Mo Chi Lien			Purchaser, Accounts Office, HQ
Mok Leung	麥良		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Mok San	莫生		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Mok San	莫生		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Mok Tat Man / Kin Man	莫達民／建民		Previously in Royal Engineers
Mok Wah Chaan			Dresser
Mr Hoh Lam			ex-Queen Mary Hospital cook
Mr Lee Kuam			Looked after the dressers of B.A.A.G.
Mr Tsung			bricklaying and carpentry
Mr. Cheng			Dresser or nurse, medical post, Waichow
Mr. Shum			Dresser-in-charge, Medical Post, Tamshui, B.A.A.G.
Mr. Woo			Dresser or nurse, medical post, Waichow
Mr. Yeung			Dresser or nurse, medical post, Waichow

Mrs Lee Kuam			i/c Dressers Mess, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Ms Cheng			Dresser or nurse, medical post, Waichow
Ms Cheng Wai Man			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Ms Frances Tang			Steno-typist, Commandant's Office/ Intelligence Office, HQ
Ms Hoh Lam			ex-Queen Mary Hospital cook
Ms Lee			Nurse working in Wanglik
Ms Lee Kuam			Looked after the dressers of B.A.A.G.
Ms Pauline Chan			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Ms Woo			Dresser or nurse, medical post, Waichow
Ng Ah Gow	伍亞苟		Previously in Naval Dockyard
Ng Chak Kwan	伍澤焜		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Ng Cheung Kwai			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Ng Chi Wan / Ng Tse Wan	伍子雲		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Ng Chuck / Cheuk	吳卓		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Ng Chun Pong			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Ng Fook	吳福		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Ng Hing Fat	吳興發		Previously in Royal Artillery
Ng Hing Fat	吳興發?		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ng Hon Lun	吳漢麟（吳漢奄）		Previously in Royal Artillery
Ng Kam Chuen			W/Operator, Office Staff, Detachment A
Ng Ki			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Ng King			Hospital Amah, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Ng Lin	吳連		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Ng Pak Chau	吳伯籌		Previously in R.A.F.
Ng Po Sum			Accountant, Accounts Office, HQ
Ng So	吳蘇		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Ng Wing	伍榮		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Ng Yuk Kwan	伍鑒鈞		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Ngai Kau	魏九		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ngai Tak Cheung	魏德彰		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ngan Anthony			Confidential Clerk, Detachment B
Ngan Ying Kit	顏英傑		Previously in H.Q. China Command
O Pu Sheung			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Pak Fung	白逢		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Pak Kee Sang	畢棋生		Previously in Royal Engineers
Pan, Stephen	潘士敦		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Pang K.Y.			Clerks, Advanced Headquarters, Waichow
Pang Kwok Yee			Relief Work in Wai Chow area with Captain J.D. Clague; Confidential Typist;
Pang Shing	彭聲?		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Paul Lee			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Paul Young			Junior Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Paul Yu Shou San			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Philip Liang			W/Operator, Detachment B
Pickie Lam			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Ping Kai Pung			Driver, Transport Office, HQ
Pong Nam			Mess Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Poon Kei	潘基		Previously in Royal Scots, office boy
Poon Wah	潘華		Previously in Royal Artillery
Preston Wong Shui Pun			
Pun Ming Shing / Phoon Ming Sing			Representative of the B.A.A.G. for the purposes of Relief Work in the Third Sector of the Po On District; Representative of the British Embassy Relierf Dept.
R. Yao Pang		Sgt.	Intelligence Corps (Ind.), HQ Kun Ming
Richard Y. Lee			Steno-typist, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Rudy Choy			Civilian Liaison Officer, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Sham Kwok Fai			Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Sham Loy Hing		Sjt. Maj.	i/c Local Staff
Shek Lam	石林		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Shen Yao Huan	沈耀寰		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Shin Hung	單洪		Previously in Royal Engineers
Shum Kam Kwong	沈鑑光		Previously in HQ China Command

Shum Siu Lun			Clerk, Accounts Office, HQ
Shum Yun			Mechanic, Transport Office, HQ
Shum Yung Hang			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Siew Sum Yiu	蕭深耀？		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Sin Chan Choy	冼鎮財		Previously in Royal Engineers
Sin Sui			Boatman, Local Staff, Detachment A
So Ah Luk	蘇亞陸		Previously in R.A.S.C.
So Lung	蘇龍		Previously in Royal Artillery
Sue Lai Man	蕭世文		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Sun Ya Ming			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
T. T. Wong			News Bulletins, Office Staff, Detachment A
Tai Fun	戴芬		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Tai Kam	戴金		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tam Cham	譚湛		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Tam Chuen	譚存		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tam Hoi Chuen	譚海泉		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tam Kim Shant			Amah, Detachment B
Tam Kwai Shun	譚季孫		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tam Kwok Wing			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Tam Leung	譚良		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tam Sang	譚聲？		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tam Shuk Yin			Amah, Local Staff, Detachment A
Tam Wai Ming (Tamson)			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Tam Wing	譚榮		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Tam Yiu Hom	譚兆洪		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tam Yue Nam	譚耀南		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tam Yuk Tsun			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Tan S.B.			Agent 100, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Tang Ho Sang	鄧浩生		Previously in HKMC, truck driver
Tang Kau	鄧球		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tang Pak Lam	唐柏林?		Previously in Royal Engineers
Tang Pak Lum	鄧柏林		Previously in Royal Artillery
Tang Ping Kei	鄧秉機		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Thong Po Hing	湯寶興		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
To Kam Wing			Boy, Detachment D
Tong Man Cheun	唐文銓		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Tong Poy			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Tong Sui Bun	唐兆彬		Previously in Royal Engineers
Tong, John	唐約翰		Previously in Royal Artillery
Tsang Chi	曾志		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tsang Chiu	曾超		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tsang Chuen	曾全		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tsang Chun Fook			Obtained a blueprint of proposed extension of Kai Tak
Tsang Hing Kwok	曾慶國		Previously in Royal Engineers
Tsang Kam			Armourer, Quartermaster's Office, HQ
Tsang Kwan Wing	曾均榮		Previously in Royal Artillery
Tsang Kwong			Barrack Labourer, Domestic Staff, HQ
Tsang Lam	曾林		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tsang Man Chiu	曾文超		Previously in Royal Engineers
Tsang Man Sze			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Tsang On			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Tsang Shek Shum			Mess Steward, Local Staff, Detachment A
Tsang Shui Wah	曾瑞華／曾水華		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Tsang Sze	曾四		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tsang Tai	曾泰		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tsang Tak	曾德？		Previously in Royal Artillery
Tsang Tak	曾德		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tsang Tak / Tsang Tak Hing			Agent 48, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Tsang Ting Hoi			Security duties, Office Staff, Detachment A
Tsang Tsun Fook			Repair to buildings etc., Local Staff, Detachment A
Tsang Wai	曾惠(曾懷)		Previously in Royal Engineers
Tsang Wing	曾榮		Previously in D.C.R.E.

Tsang Yiu Sang, Joseph	曾？		Previously in Royal Artillery
Tsang Yuen	曾元		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Tse Chu Ting	謝珠婷?		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tse Hoo Yuen	謝浩源		Previously in H.Q. China Command
Tsoi Kwong	蔡廣		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tsoi Ting	蔡庭		Previously in Naval Hospital
Tsui Chak Man	崔澤民		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Tsui Ka Cheung Paul	徐家祥		Agent 65; Representative of L.T. Ride in Waichow for liaising General Chu Lai Chuen; Work for Field Intelligence Group (FIG) from Waichow;
Tsui Man	徐文		Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area
Tsui Man Cheung Matthew			B.A.A.G. Forward Area H.Q.; Clerk, Detachment C
Tsui On Shing Paul	徐安盛		Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area; Intelligence and press, Advanced Headquarters, Waichow
Tsui Shing Kee	徐成紀?		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Tsui Sin Cheung Mark			Intelligence and press, Advanced Headquarters, Waichow; Confidential Clerk, Detachment B
Tsui Yu Tsing / Chuen	徐耀泉		
Tsui Yuk Woon			Clerk, Accounts Office, HQ
Tsui Yuk Woon	徐玉瑗?		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Un Kai Sheung			Civilian Liaison Officer, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Un King Yiu			Draughtsman, Draughtmen's Office, HQ
Vincent Yeung / Young		Sgt	Agent 62, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G. RA
Wai Chuen	韋全		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Wan Cheung	溫祥		Agent 69
Wan Chi Wing	尹志榮		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Wan Tong	溫棠		Old C group member;
Wan Y.S.		Lt.	R.A.M.C.
Wat Hok Chi	屈學志		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
William Chong Gun			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
William Lee			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
William Wong			Agent 46, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Willian Chong			Agent 50, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Wong Ah Sang	黃亞生		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Che Hon	王志漢		Previously in Royal Artillery
Wong Fat Choy	黃佛才		Previously in Royal Artillery
Wong Fook	黃福		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Fook	黃福		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Wong Hon	黃漢		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Wong Hop Yu		Pte	3274
Wong Kai			Carpenter, Quartermaster's Office, HQ
Wong Kai	王佳		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Kai Ki	黃啓淇		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Wong Kam	黃金		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Wong Kam Chow			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Wong Kam Ming			Chinese Cook, Domestic Staff, HQ
Wong Kin-P'ang Al / Al Wong			Field Unit under Mr. Kendall; Field Group to Waichow; Interview and troops, Advanced Headquarters, Waichow; Interpreter and translator;
Wong Kong			Messenger and guard; Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Wong Kwong			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Wong Leung			Boatman, Local Staff, Detachment A
Wong Man	黃文		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Wong Man Chung	黃文忠		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Wong Ping	王平		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Wong Ping Kwong			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Wong Piu			Messenger, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Wong Pui	王培		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Wong Shau	黃壽		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Shing	黃勝		Previously in Royal Artillery
Wong Shiu Man			No. 2 Cook, Domestic Staff, HQ
Wong Sik Ming			Clerk, Commandant's Office/ Intelligence Office, HQ

Wong Sing	黃聲？		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Siu / Wong Sau	黃秀		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Sun	黃新		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Tai Ming	黃大明		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Wong Tak	黃達		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Wong Tung			Guard/Orderly, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Wong Wai	黃偉		Previously in Royal Artillery
Wong Wing Mok	黃榮莫		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Wong Yun	黃潤		Previously in Royal Engineers
Wong Ywe Wan			Amah, Detachment B
Wong, Sunny	黃新利		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Wong, William	黃？		Previously in Royal Artillery
Woo Hung Yung			Local staff, Local Staff, Detachment A
Woo Tick Yu			Dresser with Jan King Pun in Wanglik; Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Woo Tong	胡棠		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Woo Wing			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Woo Wing	胡榮		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Wu Hei Tak			Translator, Translation Office, HQ
Wu Hing	胡興		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Wu Ling	胡連		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Wu Lun	胡倫		Previously in R.A.F.
Wu Wai Kay			Clerk, Counter Espionage Office, HQ
Wu Wang	胡榮		Relief Work in the East River and Wai Chow area
Wu Wing			Agent 7, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Wu Yin			Small Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Y.H. Chan		Captain	S' Section, Kumming HQ
Yan Cheuk Ming / James Kim	甄卓鳴		Agent 71
Yan Pak Chung			Amah, Detachment B
Yan Taat Tung	甄達榮		Previously in Hongkong Signal Company
Yan Tat Chung	甄達中?		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Yan Yuk Tin			Mess Boy, Domestic Staff, HQ
Yapp, Peter	葉國發		Previously in R.A.O.C.
Yau Hing	游興		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Yau Hong Wing	邱漢榮		
Yau Shu			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Yau Yeung / Yau Yuen	丘養		Previously in Royal Engineers
Ye/Yu Fook	余福		Previously in Royal Artillery
Yee Fook	以福?		Previously in Royal Engineers
Yee Wai Yuen			Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Yeung Chan Ting			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Yeung Chee			Storeman, Quartermaster's Office, HQ
Yeung Cheuk Fan	楊卓芬		Previously in Royal Engineers
Yeung Ka Lam / Kee Nam	楊紀南／柏林		Previously in Royal Engineers
Yeung Kwai Choy			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Yeung Man Sang	楊民生		Previously in Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Yeung Sang			Boatman, Local Staff, Detachment A
Yeung Shing			Messenger and guard; Guard/Runner, Local Staff, Detachment A
Yeung Sing Man	楊醒民		Previously in Royal Engineers
Yeung Sun			Messenger, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Yeung Sun	楊新		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Yeung Wing Sin		Sgt	Runner; Former of Alan Mills' battery on Stonecutters;
Yeung Yuk Cheung			Dresser, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Yip Foo			Agent 34, Field Intelligence Groups, Forward Post, B.A.A.G.
Yip Leung			Storeboy, Regt No. 3055313; RN; Dockyard
Yip Sik Ling			W/Operator, Signals Office, HQ
Yiu Hing	余興		Previously in Royal Engineers
Yiu Shiu Nam	姚少南		Previously in Royal Engineers
Young Man Yuk		L/Sgt	5th Column activities; 4th Battery H.K.V.D.C.
Young / Yung Wah	楊華？		Previously in D.C.R.E.

Yu Ah Hong	余亞康		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Yu Che Yeung	余子楊?		Previously in Royal Engineers
Yu Che Yeung	余志揚		Previously in Royal Artillery
Yu Chung			Sanitary Coolie, Domestic Staff, HQ
Yu Kam Mow	余錦鏐		Previously in Army Transport
Yu Keung	余強		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Yu Po Sang	余保生		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Yu Wing Tseung	余永祥		Previously in Naval Dockyard
Yu Yau			Runner, Adjutant's Office, HQ
Yue Kam Kau	余錦鏐		Previously in R.A.S.C.
Yuen Sun Fat	袁新發		Previously in Royal Engineers
Yuen Wing			Guard/Orderly, Medical Staff, Detachment A
Yuen / Yeung Bun	楊斌		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Yung ?	翁?		Previously in D.C.R.E.
Yung Kit	翁傑		Previously in Royal Engineers

Roll of Honour - B.A.A.G. Members, Agents, Runners and Contacts

Extracted from Appendix 9, Ride (1981)

Name
Chan Cho Kit
Chan Hung Chiu
Chan King
Chan Kai
Chan Kwok Kwong
Chan Kwong man
Chan Ping Fan
Chan Sin Chuen
Chan Wing Chiu
Chan Yeung
Chau For
Cheng Yuet
Cheung Po Man
Cheung Yung Sam
Chiang Fong
Fung Him
Hai Mun Lee
Ho Wah
Ip Man Wing
Ki Kam Chan
Lam Chow Kwang
Lam Ho Kwan
Lam Kwok Yiu
Lam Seng
Lau Fook
Lau Kok Ping
Lau Kwong
Lau Tak Kwong
Lau Tak Oi
Lau Teng Ke
Lee Kung Hoi
Lee Lam
Leung Hung
Li Tam On
Lo Wing
Loie Fook Wing
Lok Chung Liang
Lui Kar Yin
Luk Cheng Kit
Ma Tai
Ng Han Chuen
Ng Tak Cheung
Ng Tak Wing
Ng Yan Hing
Ngai Yiu Ming
Shui Mau Lee
So Biu
Tai Kar Yin
Tsang J.
Tsang Tak Hing
Tsang Yiu Sang
Tso Lee
Wong For Yau
Wong Kwong Sheung
Wong Man
Wong Shiu Pun
Wu Hung
Wu Tak Wing
Wun Fah
Wun Mah Shin
Yan Cheuk Ming
Yang Kun Yue
Yeung Kong
Yeung Sau Tak
Ying Sham Cheung

Appendix 3: Local Chinese serving in Chinese Revolutionary Army

Name	Military Unit	Remarks
Chan Man Yuk 陳毓麟	17 Fighter Squadron, 17 Column, 5 Fighter Group, Chinese Air Force 中國空軍戰鬥機師5大隊17縱隊	袁梅芳著 中國遠征軍
Peter Choi 蔡彼得	9 Independent Brigade 獨立第9旅	
Yuen Hok Keung 袁學羌	278 Regiment, 93 Division, 6 Army 第6軍93師278團	

Surveying & Built Environment

The Remains of "Not HMS *Tamar*": Wrecks, Ruins, the Importance of Survey Data and the Tide of Ideological Correctness

Stephen N.G. Davies[*]

ABSTRACT

In 2013 some riveted iron remains were discovered in the seabed off Wan Chai. Provisional and then, subsequently, detailed survey data using maps, nautical charts, aerial photographs and other imagery showed beyond reasonable doubt that what had been found was all that was left of the Royal Navy's nominal depot ship 1898-1941, the old troopship HMS *Tamar*. Despite two expensive marine archaeological exercises and the recovery of other supportive material evidence, this identification has never been accepted by the various agencies of the Hong Kong SAR Government involved in the matter. The logical structure of the evidence in the case of the "not the *Tamar's*" remains is contrasted with logically equivalent evidence pertaining to the identification of elements of the Hong Kong Observatory's 1883-c.1940 meridian mark system. Possible explanations in political correctness and bureaucratic convenience for these inconsistent outcomes are suggested.

KEYWORDS

Nautical charts, aerial photographs, archaeology, meridian marks, Battle of Hong Kong, heritage.

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On 8th December 1841, as the Battle of Hong Kong began, HMS *Tamar*, the Royal Navy's base depot ship in Hong Kong and, at this point more a nuisance than an asset, was moved to No. 10 buoy at the far eastern end of the naval anchorage, just to the west of Kellett Island off Wan Chai.[1] Her personnel, who will have included many locally enlisted, local Hong Kongers, were billeted in the China Fleet Club next door.[2]

Then, on 11th December 1941, as the Battle of Hong Kong turned from bad to worse and the deserted ship threatened capture and use by the enemy, the *Tamar* was scuttled.

Come the morning of the 12th, or so it seemed, the efforts of the previous night had not been completely successful. It was supposed from what people could see that the ship had been prevented from settling fully on the bottom, and so disappearing from sight, by the air trapped beneath her massive, fixed awning. To complete the job some artillerymen – we do not know who or where, save that they were fairly nearby in Wan Chai – were called upon to complete the job by shelling the wreck to punch holes in the fixed awning canopy to let the air out.[3]

A painting by a Japanese war artist, printed and published as a postcard to celebrate the first anniversary of the Japanese victory in 1942, seems to show the awning with at least one large hole in it.[4] It also suggests by implication that probably at all states of tide something of the ship was above the water. However, in nine photographs by the German-Australian photographer Hedda Morrison, taken in 1947 before the *Tamar's* wreck was cleared, only the three stump masts are visible.[5] It is not clear when Ms Morrison took her photographs, so it is possible that all were taken at high tide. But confirmation that the old ship was probably permanently invisible, bar her masts, is given by the *Illustrated London News* in May 1946, which had a two page spread by Lt James Morris RNVR, official war artist to the British Pacific Fleet, showing the central and eastern parts of Victoria Harbour with just the three masts labelled "25" and, keyed to that, "25. Wreck of H.M.S. *Tamar*".[6]

The difference in that 1942 image and the 1945 images is because the battered wreck of the old *Tamar* had been visited with further indignities during the occupation. That wartime Japanese postcard noted, erroneously, that the old ship had been associated with 19th century Western and particularly Royal Naval assaults on Japanese territory

1 **Cracknell** (p.123) gives No.8 buoy, but this is an error and does not match United Kingdom Hydrographic Office Archive, Chart E27, *Hong Kong Harbour East (1937) with updates of wrecks 1947,* which shows the wreck of the *Tamar* plainly at Buoy No. 10.

2 **Banham (2005)**, p.26.

3 Ibid.

4 In the collection of Mr Robert Neild. For Japanese war art see **Earhart (2015); Breece (2016)**. Both are useful, as is https://japanwarart.ocnk.net/.

5 The photographs are in the collection of the Harvard-Yenching Library, Harvard University.

6 "Drawing by Lieut (Sp.) James Morris, R.N.V.R., Official Naval War Artist to the British Pacific Fleet", *Illustrated London News,* 11 May 1946, p.519. James Morris (1908–1989) had begun the war working in civil defence before joining the Royal Navy as a signaller. His work with the British Pacific Fleet made him the only one of Britain's official WW2 war artists to portray post-liberation China and post-defeat Japan. Little seems to be known about him post-war.

and dignity. So, at some stage during the subsequent occupation, perhaps once Allied victory was moving towards certainty, such further damage to the scuttled hull had been done that there would never be any possibility of its salvage and, with it, some sort of symbolic recovery of British, and British naval pride.[7] Time, the age of the old ship (she had been seventy-four in 1941) and the Japanese efforts had probably caused her to settle completely beneath the surface.

In that sunken hulk of the *Tamar* the hubris of two maritime empires, the British and Japanese had met the inevitable nemeses of all empires.

Following the British reoccupation in late August 1945, amongst all the ruination in and surrounding Victoria Harbour, elegantly charted on the emergency chart prepared in October and November 1945 by Commander C.W. Sabine RN and his team on HMS *Challenger*, one wreck stands out amongst the three large wrecks submerged off the Wan Chai waterfront.[8] It is labelled "H.M.S. Tamar" and shows where and how the old lady had lain during the nearly four years since she had been scuttled.

The chart shows how careful the Japanese war artist had been in his depiction of the wreck in 1942. The ship had been scuttled when she was lying with her bows pointing roughly west-south-west. This is clearly shown both on the emergency chart the Japanese watercolour. But once charted, and despite the energetic salvage operations going on around and about it, there the wreck lay until April 1947 when, finally, a decision was made as to its fate.

It was to be "removed within eight months" a news story on 16 April announced.[9] Two days later, with repeats through until 25 April, a notice dated 15 April 1947 invited "Tenders for the Purchase of Wreck of H.M.S. *Tamar*", signed by the Boom Defence and Salvage Officer, British Pacific Fleet, Commander A. McG McCulloch, RN.[10]

There is little detail as to what happened. Family memory agrees that because no other major local salvage business was up and running at this time, the task would most likely have been taken on by the partnership of Mr Leung Man Kwong (梁文廣)[11], and

7 *South China Morning Post,* 5 April 1946, p.2.

8 E7734, China – *South East Coast: Hong Kong Harbour,* HMS *Challenger,* October-November 1945, the chart has hand drawn details on a coastal outlines only copy of the pre-war chart photo-reproduced by the Pacific Fleet's mobile chart production unit on HMS *White Bear* in September 1945.

9 *South China Morning Post,* 16 April, 1947, p.5.

10 *South China Morning Post,* 18-25 April 1947, p.10. McCulloch had joined the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1902, had retired in 1933 but then volunteered for war service in 1939, finally returning to civilian life in 1951 – see ADM 196/96/88.

11 The Leung family was originally from Zhong Shan (中山). Leung Man Kwong (梁文廣) was born in Hong Kong in 1922 as the eldest among four children (all boys) in his family. He had received only 5 years of formal education but with a language talent he later picked up English and Japanese by himself. When war broke out, Leung Man Kwong's father had died, leaving the eldest son as the main breadwinner of the family. During the war, he settled his mother and three young brothers in their ancestral home in Zhong Shan and then returned alone to HK to make a living. Initially he was employed at a metal shop, which collaborated with the Japanese military and collected scrap metal for shipping to Japan. After the war ended, Leung Man Kwong decided to start his own business. With his connections in the scrap metal trade, he then recruited workers, formed his salvage personnel and obtained tools for salvage. When the Royal Navy recruited contractors for wreck salvage, his family believes that his command of English and local Chinese connections gave him an advantageous position. I am indebted to Ms Fanny Fung and Mr Leung's youngest son, Leung Yat-tung, for these details.

there is no strong reason to doubt this.[12] What we do know from the invitation to tender is that what was being offered was the right to purchase the wreck and that the successful tenderer would be required "to remove the Wreck and clear the site within a period of 8 months of purchase".[13] In short, once the tender was accepted the old ship ceased being British Admiralty property and became the salvor's.[14]

There was no subsequent announcement of the result of a successful bid and, indeed, there is a complete silence until a news story of "An underwater 'attack' on HMS *Tamar*" was published in late December. We can piece together a conjectured sequence of events. First the ship will have had its masts removed and will then have been stripped of everything close to the surface and, perhaps, of some of the upper part of the hull. That had taken most of Mr Leung's Consolidated Salvage Engineering Co. Ltd's available time. By the date of the 'attack' on 19 December little time was left because, as the news story put it, the clearance had to be completed "by the end of the year." So with twelve days to go, "After the placing of dynamite in certain parts of the old warship, it was blown into several portions to facilitate the lifting of the wreck."[15]

As far as everyone seemed then to be concerned, that was that. However, a subsequent amendment to the 1947, chart 1459, incorporated new data. This was the insertion of $\underline{4_2}$ where the *Tamar* wreck had been. What that meant is what is called a swept wire depth of four fathoms and two feet (7.93m) below which there was something still on the seabed but above which there is clear water. In short, a wire with its depth controlled is towed between two boats, with its depth increased until it snags something. This data was questioned in August 1952 when, using a hand-corrected version of E10.318, the emergency version of chart 3279, the Marine Department had sent a request to the Hydrographic Office that a new edition of chart 1459 be issued showing the success of the clearance operation. Along with many others, the Marine Department's amendments, using a pasted on bit of

12 I am indebted again to Ms Fanny Fung. There is a possibility that the salvor was the A. King Slipway (Chinese "King Kee Shipyard"), which had done some work on small vessels in 1946, see *South China Morning Post & the Hongkong Telegraph*, 17 May 1946, p.2. In the 1946 telephone directory the address was 37 Electric Road, North Point. Anecdotal evidence suggests the yard was founded in 1891 or before (https://gwulo.com/node/38942) in Wanchai, which is consistent with the obituary for the 70 year old founder, whose family name was Leung (*South China Morning Post,* 2nd Mar, 1936, p.18), although the firm traded as A. King Slipway:

13 *South China Morning Post,* 18-25 April, loc. cit.

14 This is an important point because it explains why there is no Hong Kong Government documentation of any of this. The ship was naval and lay within the naval anchorage, so belonged to the British government and was the responsibility of the Royal Navy. Once the wreck had been sold, it was Mr Leung's (or whoever's) company's and any documentation would be in the company's archives which, Mr Leung's granddaughter, Ms Gillian Leung, informed Ms Fanny Fung, have not survived.

15 *China Mail,* 20 December 1947, p.1.

paper, showed clear water where the old wreck of the *Tamar* had once been shown.[16]

The 1952 note in the Hydrographic Office files identifies five requests from the Marine Department asking for amendments to chart 1459, one of which was to ask for "(a) $\underline{4_2}$ in 22° 17'.03N 114° 10'.37E", the position of the supposedly cleared wreck of the *Tamar*, to be deleted. The annotation in the file comments, "(a) should remain as it was obtained from a survey by "Dampier" this year."[17] HMS *Dampier*, a Royal Navy Surveying Service ship commanded by Commander R.H. Connell RN, had been in Hong Kong in 1952 to survey all the places where wrecks had been shown on Commander Sabine's emergency charts in 1945, and had obviously confirmed that something was on the seabed below the swept wire depth. Indeed, as we can see from the new 1953 edition of Chart 1459, the Hydrographic Office went a bit further as a result of the *Dampier's* work and explicitly identified not just a swept wire depth limitation, but a wreck.[18]

Between that little exchange and 1960, the chart accordingly showed what's known as an 'obstruction' caused by a wreck in the position where the wreck of the old *Tamar* had gone down in 1941. At that point, however, the Hong Kong Government began planning to extend the shoreline of Wan Chai further into the harbour creating what today is North Wan Chai. It is a long and involved story, with the first intimations of a reclamation in 1960, a denial of any such plan in May 1961 and then a confirmation of an intention to reclaim 103 acres (41.7 ha) in September[19]. That was then followed by various possible plans, announcements, delays and changes that lasted until 1965, when work began, with all reclamation work of something between 90 and 93 acres (36.4-37.6 ha) being finished by the middle of 1972.

The results of the reclamation exercise were three things relevant to the remains that had been shown continuously on the nautical chart from 1945 to 1966.

The first is that soon after the plans were firmed up, which was roughly by May 1964, the amended chart 1459 of 1966 deleted the old swept depth marking with its reference to wreck remains. There is, however, no record of any work to clear them. Indeed there is every evidence, from the remains of the wreck of the Norwegian ship *Halldor*, 520 metres inshore and westward of the *Tamar's* wreck, that because of the reclamation all seabed detritus within or close to the edge of the reclamation was ignored as no

16 UKHO Archive, E9215 Press 15u. I am grateful for this, and all other detail of the hydrographic side of this episode, for the great help of Dr Adrian Webb at the UK Hydrographic Office.

17 UKHO Archive, H2515, Hong Kong Harbour: Request for New Edition of Chart, 19 August 1952, p.2.

18 In addition to the specific depth marking – called a sounding – the 1953 chart adds "Wk" – the abbreviation for a wreck.

19 *South China Morning Post,* 16 September, 1960, p.7 begins the story, the completion of the new road network in late 1973 (*South China Morning Post,* 20 March, 1972, p.6), and the opening of the new Wan Chai Cargo Handling Basin in July 1974 (*South China Morning Post*, 27 July, 1974, p.6) bring it to an end.

longer navigationally relevant.

The second is that the first generation Wan Chai pier at the end of Stewart Road, for the ferry service that connected Wan Chai to Jordan Road Ferry Pier, which would disappear in the reclamation, was rebuilt on the northern edge of the new reclamation with its end extremely close to where the old swept depth marking used to be. Again, for ferries drawing at most three or four metres, something a bit over seven metres down just to seaward of the pier tip, where ferries would not be going anyway, could be navigationally ignored.

The third was that the reclamation entirely changed the hydrology of the Wan Chai water front, which was further significantly changed with the building of the new Hong Kong Convention & Exhibition Centre in the 1990s. The result was that over the years, the remains that had been charted on the seabed just off the end of the new second generation Wan Chai Ferry Pier until 1966, disappeared under more and more layers of soft, smelly mud. So much, indeed, that the seabed that in 1945 had been charted 11.9m down with wreck remains sticking up 4m out of it, by 2005 was charted as just 5.5m deep. The remains of the old *Tamar* had, indeed, disappeared.

In the early twenty-first century the decision was made to go ahead with the Wan Chai Development Phase II and the associated Central-Wan Chai Bypass – a project that dated back to the days in the early 1980s, when the Royal Navy's base was an obstacle in the way of sensible strategic planning that needed to be removed. Work fulfilling that plan had gone ahead in the mid- to late 1990s and, after a great deal of brouhaha, all aimed sensibly at trying to prevent further short-sighted ruination of Victoria Harbour, the final stages of preparatory work for the new by-pass off Wan Chai were poised to go ahead.[20] In 2001 a Heritage Impact Assessment was carried out to see whether anything of cultural heritage value would be affected by the proposed work. "It (was) concluded that there are no marine archaeological resources within the study area."[21]

So work went ahead. At some time in 2013, a dredger preparing the seabed near then old second generation Wan Chai Ferry Pier found a 'large metal object' between 11.954m and 13.854m below chart datum or, in layperson's terms, about sixteen to eighteen metres below the sea surface.[22] Subsequent investigation revealed that the object was the stern end of the lowest two metres of part of the hull of a rivetted iron ship. The fittings for any rudder

20 A landmark judgment, if in respect of actually preventing the harbour from further rape a failure, had been achieved in the Court of Final Appeal on 9 January 2004, by the Society for Protection of the Harbour (保護海港協會) initially led by Mr Winston Chu Ka Sun (徐嘉慎) and later, after he received death threats, by Dr Christine Loh (陸恭蕙). This ensured that future reclamation would have to meet the test of "an overriding public need", though any government's capacity to finagle data and anything else to circumvent any such test is infinite.

21 **CEDD and Maunsell Consultants Asia Ltd (2007)**, para 3.10.1, p.18.

22 Because of rather obtusely applied 'confidentiality' rules for Hong Kong's civil servants, quite when the remains of the Tamar were first discovered is uncertain. We can infer that a contract for a side scan sonar survey of the area was let at some time in 2013 from its details: Contract Number GE/2013/37. I owe my knowledge of this detail to Renato Reyes.

or propeller shaft were missing, but the deadwood that accommodated the propeller shafts of early, iron-built steamships was a large part of what remained. The <40m of the remains lay in exactly the same orientation as the wreck of the *Tamar* shown on Commander Sabine's 1945 emergency chart and in the same location to within a metre or less.

I had established this to a reasonable level of accuracy using basic marine navigational techniques, but since these are good only to <±50m, something better was needed. Thanks to subsequent work by friend and colleague Dr Ken S.T. Ching, ArcGIS reconciliations between the position of the *Tamar* wreck on the 1945 Emergency chart and:

a) the official 1945 aerial photograph of the wreck site area;

b) the 1969 Hong Kong Government detailed survey sheet of the newly constructed Wan Chai Ferry Pier and partially completed North Wan Chai Reclamation; and

c) the detailed survey sheet by the contractors who found the remains, which was made in 2015.

were completed. These refined the locational precision to within a metre or less. Indeed, the fit in all cases in depth, orientation and location is close to perfect.

Various artefacts recovered with the wreck, including a brass tally with the name and number of a member of Britain's armed forces, who I identified as Lance-Sergeant E.C. Goodman RMLI,[23] and a brass, Commodore 2nd Classes boat badge, as well as much else, were also consonant with the wreck being the remains of the *Tamar*. Indeed to any reasonably intelligent person with a grasp of naval and maritime history, and of marine archaeology, there was no reasonable doubt as to what had been found.[24]

The Hong Kong government, in the guise of the Civil Engineering and Development Department and the Antiquities and Monuments Office, would seem to have had another agenda. That is in addition, one imagines, to covering up the failing, in 2001, to identify the probable presence of the wreck as charted in 1962, because of an ignorance of the basic facts of how marine charts are made and how to read them.[25] Whatever the reason, the government bodies concerned insisted – and still insist – that what was found was *an unidentified metal object*; 'unidentified' because "no ship's name plate, ship's bell or other unique identifying feature" had or has been found.[26]

On that argument, of course, Britain had wasted £25,000,000 in raising

23 The full story is given in **Davies (2015)**.

24 **Heaver, Atha & Harrison (2015)**, the present author's considerable contributions to this report are not acknowledged.

25 The error was to read what is called the plate date (when the copper engraving with the chart was first made – in this case 1916) for the date of the latest edition and the most recent corrections to that edition (which in this case were 1962 corrected to 1966). In short, in 1966 a wreck that had been charted in the position shown that could be traced back to its first charting, in October/November 1945 (before which no wreck ever appears in that position), was not correctly identified.

26 See notes 24 and 31 for two of several official uses of the phrase.

and creating a museum for the Tudor warship the *Mary Rose*, because no name plate, bell or other unique identifying object had been found, just lots of contemporary 16th century artefacts and, as with the "Not the *Tamar*", a continuous history of the ship's wreck lying in that location.[27] Happily, though some time after the decision to push ahead had been taken, a possibly direct connection was made when divers found the front of the ship's forecastle and with it, the carved rose that is shown there in an illustration of the ship in the 1546 Anthony Roll.[28] It was, accordingly, only via documentary sources that a part of the ship could be understood as a 'unique identifying feature'. Given that what was found was only recognizable as a rose after laser scanning, computer modelling and 3D rendering to produce a digital image, an intelligent flexibility of understanding and approach had to be given, including supposing it unlikely that some other, unknown Tudor ship also had a carved rose projecting from its forecastle.[29]

Whether one chooses to credit indirect evidence or not has little to do with the evidence itself and more with the agenda and its accompanying mindset, willed or sub-conscious, that are brought to bear. It is impossible to know what the agenda driving the Hong Kong authorities' mindsets may have been. One can only conjecture that finding the remains of the historic Royal Navy nominal depot ship from Hong Kong's much-to-be-regretted colonial period was thought unacceptable, so a test was set for the identification of the remains that the authorities could be fairly certain would never be met.

The result has been that the remains of the *Tamar* that had been found were and remain classified as an 'unknown metal object'. To let the bypass project resume, the wreck was moved from where it had been found, before the archaeological investigation its finding had triggered was complete.[30] Subsequently, in 2018, a second archaeological investigation was commissioned costing HK$1 million.[31] Informally, it has been reported to the author, laboratory work confirmed that the wreck remains are of iron, not steel, necessarily dating the remains to those of a vessel built before the 1880s. In addition, the archaeologists, using one of the lower hull plans available in the collection of Britain's National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, have almost precisely

27 The recovery project took from first stirrings in 1965 until the raising of the wreck in 1982. Nothing like a unique identifying object appeared until 2003-2005, twenty years ***after*** the Mary Rose Museum first opened. **Marsden (2003)**, pp. 30-34.

28 **Pulvertaft (2016)**; **Pulvertaft (2011)**, p.42; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/19/the-real-rose-mary-rose-ship-emblem-discovered-500-years-on/; https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4940578/Wreck-Mary-Rose-started-collapse-itself.html.

29 https://www.port.ac.uk/news-events-and-blogs/news/experts-recreate-mary-rose-figurehead.

30 http://www.wd2.gov.hk/eng/new1.html, accessed 19.09.2016.

31 The author received anonymously a copy of the "Restricted (Contract)" document issued by CEDD on 7 February 2018 seeking tenders for "Marine Archaeological Investigation for Metal Object at Seabed of Wan Chai – Investigation" (sic). The tenderers were informed that "The findings of the PAIA report suggested that the Metal Object might be part of the bottom of a shipwreck sank in Victoria Harbour during World War II, but its identity is yet to be confirmed as the ship's bell, name plate or any other unique features have not been found."

matched the conformity of the remains with the conformity of the same part of the hull in the plans.[32] The results of the second investigation had still not been released by June 2021.[33]

Private information also indicates that the government parties, at least until recently, have been insisting that what has been found are the remains of the small, steel, 1925, German built, Norwegian tramper *Halldor*, that had been captured in 1941 and put into service as the Imperial Japanese Navy ship *Haruta Maru*.[34] It had been sunk by the US Army Air Force in January 1945 over half a kilometre away from the *Tamar's* wreck, so its remains almost certainly still lie roughly beneath the area in front of the entrance to today's Hyatt Hotel. We also know from the subsequent charting record that the *Halldor's* lower hull remained intact and that its orientation was almost exactly on an east-west alignment.

Wrong metal, wrong size, wrong period, wrong alignment, wrong position but no matter, the remains of the "unknown metal object" cannot be those of the *Tamar* so must be those of the only other large wreck ever charted in the vicinity. In consequence the remains of the *Tamar* lie unprotected and rotting. No doubt the intention is that inaction will result in the disintegration of the *Tamar's* remains so that, in characteristic Hong Kong government fashion, the problem can be made to disappear.

So, on the one hand there is my claim that in late 2013 contractors working for the Hong Kong Government found the last remains of the old HMS *Tamar*, left behind at the end of the 1947 salvage operation. I advance an array of credible circumstantial evidence – the ship's detailed history, construction material, artefacts found, precise position and exact orientation, match with still extant historical plans of the ship as built, a continuous hydrographic charting record, conditional conclusions of two teams of archaeologists, etc. – to suggest that any reasonable person should identify the remains as those of the old ship.

On the other is the claim of Hong Kong's Antiquities and Monuments Office that the *Tamar* was entirely salvaged in 1947, that the charting record is discontinuous and what was latterly depicted was not necessarily the remains of the *Tamar*, and that therefore, because "no ship's name plate, ship's bell or other unique identifying feature" has been found, the remains must be categorized as an

32 Private communication for both the iron construction material and the matching of the remains and the plans – the Hong Kong government, being what it is, means the name of my authoritative informant cannot be revealed. I have also been told that in consequence the finding of the second investigation is that the remains are those of the *Tamar!* The plan will have been one of National Maritime Museum, London: NPC2824, the Hold, 1861; NPC2827, Watertight Comps, 1861; NPC2823, the Hold, 1872 & 76; or NPC2811, the Hold, 1885.

33 Strangely, an offer by the author, both to the Civil Engineering and Development Department and to a member of the second archaeological team, to provide evidence of a 'unique feature' arising from the grounding in late 1869 when the plating of the deadwood area forward of the rudder post was doubled, was not at any stage taken up. "It is now proposed to construct a massive iron shoe to fit the damaged portion of the stern", *Morning Post,* 1 December 1869, p.6. There is no evidence that at any subsequent stage the heavily repaired section was rebuilt.

34 The *Halldor,* built by Ferdinand Schichau Werft in Danzig (Gdansk) was 1515 tons and 79.8m long, 12.2m in beam and 4.8 m moulded depth. The *Tamar* was 4,650 tons displacement, 91.44m long, 13.5m beam and 10.24m – so about twice the size.

"unknown metal object". The remains must thus be treated as of no historical significance and left to rot away in the mud at the bottom of Hong Kong's Victoria Harbour.

But just in case that exercise in ideological and bureaucratic obduracy was not enough. Those responsible for Hong Kong's heritage have meanwhile promptly moved the goalposts. Close reading of the minutes of AAB meetings in 2017, shows that anything like the *Tamar's* remains has now become by definition usefully removed from any question of their legal protection as heritage via AAB grading. The Antiquities Advisory Board was informed by the AMO – there seems to have been no discussion – that,

> "With a view to expediting the grading assessment of the remaining items (on a list of historic buildings), AMO had critically reviewed the list of new items and new categories and suggested rationalising them by splitting into two lists, i.e. List (a), a list of new items for grading assessment; and List (b), a list of items not falling under the usual category of "buildings/structures"."

It seems clear that administrative convenience was the major driver. The meeting was told that the exclusions were necessary because "the prevailing grading assessment criteria were not applicable as they were non-building/ structure items." Further, because "(s)etting up a standard of assessment and conducting extensive researches on historic items would be prerequisites for establishing a set of grading assessment criteria", by implication the whole issue could be safely put aside for times far beyond anyone's temporal horizon.

The AAB's chairman was anxious to assert, of course, that such a decision "did not imply that those items had no heritage value". The AMO's Executive Secretary opined that "items like historic boundary stones *(and one assumes bits of old ships (SD))* could be included in the list of items requiring attention and protection in conducting HIAs."[35] Only 'could be' mind you.

Perhaps, unspoken, an ex-Royal Navy ship's remains – or, one might add, early colonial monumented trigonometric survey stations, sectional cast iron water tanks, etc. – were also not the sort of heritage to which the AAB's masters were particularly anxious to have too much attention paid.[36] Off message, wrong history, wrong focus.

One might also add, whatever the logical arguments, it appears that temporal sequence in some way is held to trump logical consistency.

That's because the *Tamar* case is in interesting contrast to another, survey related item of Hong Kong heritage in the recovery and rescue of which I have recently been involved. This is the discovery, between 2016 and 2020, of three of the four meridian markers, and what would seem to be the remains

35 HIA = Heritage Impact Assessment.

36 The relevant document is **Antiquities Advisory Board (2017)**, paras 62-71. The quotations come from paras 64, 65, 66 & 70.

of the foundation of the fourth, that were part of the system by means of which the once navigationally vital Hong Kong meridian, or longitude, was identified.[37] Here again precision survey data and aerial photographs thanks to the help of a professional surveyor, in this case Willie Yip Tsan-pong, helped pin down something my own amateur navigator's exercises had only succeeded in narrowing to small, but with Hong Kong's thick vegetation, frustrating ballparks.

Interestingly, the last part of this exercise, the identification of the remains of the 1883 Transit Room annexed to the old Observatory main building, was an example of exactly the sort of 'proof' that, had the initial heritage impact assessment exercise off Wan Chai been properly executed in 2001, would have followed for "Not the *Tamar*".

In the case of the Transit Room, work by me on old documentation had revealed that when the Observatory had been built in 1882-83, beneath the intended location of the transit instrument, a massive, 5 feet deep, four feet by four feet square brick foundation, or pier, had been put in place. When, in 2020, work was commissioned by the Observatory to mark the location of Hong Kong's old meridian with a permanent, granite block line, it was agreed, under the supervision of experts from the Antiquities and Monuments Office, to excavate through the tarmac and concrete roadway that had been put in place in 1979 to see if there were still identifiable remains. There were. They were measured. They tallied exactly with documented measurements from early twentieth century reports. Accordingly, the battered brick remains were accepted as the actual historic remains of the transit instrument's brick pier and hence as part of the old system of meridian markers.

The outcome will be that these heritage relics will be conserved, even if not as public 'monuments' to Hong Kong's mainstream story because, of course, they are all "non-building/structure items". They will survive only as part of the 'micro-history' of the scientific development of the Hong Kong Observatory.[38] At least they will have been recognized and preserved.[39]

Now imagine that properly conducted 'desktop' research in 2001 had identified the probability of wreckage from the old *Tamar* lying beneath the mud just off the Wan Chai Ferry pier. Imagine that the relevant underwater work to evaluate this had been undertaken under the supervision of the Antiquities and Monuments Office in just the way as was undertaken beneath

37 **Davies, Shun & Yip (2021).**

38 See https://www.hko.gov.hk/en/whatsnew/index.htm?year=2019, Hong Kong Meridian (1): A Mysterious Magic Stone; Hong Kong Meridian (2): Dr. Stephen Davies and Mysterious Magic Stone; Hong Kong Meridian (3): In Search of the Lost Magic Stone; and Hong Kong Meridian (4): The Last Magic Stone.

39 A bizarre postscript to this issue emerged in early 2021 as a result of a serendipitous personal connection. I received an email from a Hong Kong government engineer, Irene Or, who had found one of the meridian marks in 2008, when engaged in slope stabilization work following a large landslip. She eventually succeeded in getting some help from a single officer of the Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO) and the mark was rescued from destruction. Nothing of this was officially recorded. The AMO would appear to have forgotten all about it when, finally, they were contacted for the first time by the Hong Kong Observatory in around 2016.

the roadway in the grounds of the Hong Kong Observatory in late 2020. Imagine that what was subsequently found on the seabed off Wan Chai in late 2013, a remnant consonant with the construction of the *Tamar*, had therefore been found in, say, 2002. As what had been found beneath the HK Observatory roadway in 2020 were remnants consonant with the brick pier, would remnants consonant with the old iron troopship have been as robustly denied in 2002 as they are today, as parts of the *Tamar*?

In short, in the case of the meridian mark system, desktop work backed by precision survey data and aerial photography identified the probable location of object X at site Y. Archaeological work was done at Y and remains tallying with descriptions of X were found. Despite none of the remains found having any definitive label saying, "Meridian Mark", or "Transit Pier", no one was or is in any doubt as to what has been found. By contrast, in the case of the "Not the *Tamar*", remains were found at site Y. Desktop work identified that no wreck had been charted at site Y pre-1941. The work found that at site Y object X (HMS *Tamar*) had been sunk in 1941, and its wreck charted in that position in 1945. Further evidence showed the remains to have been consistently charted at location Y for the next 17 years until shoreline changes rendered charted wreck data navigationally otiose. Precision survey analysis and aerial photography backed this finding up. Yet, because object X as found had had "no ship's name plate, ship's bell or other unique identifying feature", and the corroborative data had followed, not preceded, the discovery of the remains, only doubt as to the identity of X is acceptable.

$A + B + C \neq C + B + A$

"乜嘢話?"

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Surveying & Built Environment

Pillboxes on Luk Keng Knoll: Annotated Script for a Documentary on the Battle of Hong Kong

Lawrence W.C. Lai[*] *and Stephen N.G. Davies*[**]

ABSTRACT

This article is an annotated and polished script for a documentary entitled: Pillboxes on Luk Keng Knoll: War relics & heritage.

PREAMBLE

A previous paper (**Lai *et al.* 2011**) in the 2011 special issue of this journal on the Battle of Hong Kong covered survey findings on pillboxes at Luk Keng knoll. This article annotates the script and interviews (made before May 2019) for a documentary on these pillboxes, according to the latest field studies' survey findings (3 March 2021), notably the nature of the cistern as discovered after draining it on 6 April 2021.

Following a press conference held on 3 March 2021, the anniversary of the 1943 raid by the Japanese troops on the East River Column base at Nam Chung, a village below the knoll, the documentary has been used as teaching material in a university built heritage conservation course. March 3 is also the "Armoured Forces Day" to commemorate the victory of the Chinese expeditionary force in the Battle of Walawbum, Burma, in March 1944 (**Bjorge, 1995**).

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INTRODUCTION

On a 120m knoll with a levelled summit, near Luk Keng, stand some 7 pillboxes connected by a system of communication trenches with, further downhill, at least 6 smaller satellite pillboxes that each can only accommodate 1 soldier. The purpose of the small pillboxes could well be controls for guarding entry and exit points to the main area. (**Figure 1** *shows the survey findings (location and outlines) of the pillboxes as re-measured on 3 March 2021 and the trenches that connect most of them, based on aerial photos, during a media trip to the place. The survey was by Dr. Ken Ching.*)

The knoll overlooks scenic Starling Inlet (Sha Tau Kok Hoi 沙頭角海) and uncultivated fields with wild cattle, egret colonies and small villages.

THE STRUCTURES

Inside a stone wall revetted enclosure, a 2-metre deep concrete shaft was constructed near a large rectangular pillbox close to the top of the knoll on the western side. Square in plan and with steel rungs for access on its southern side, its purpose has yet to be determined. Possible uses might have been water supply, field sanitation or some sort of shelter.

The design and layouts of these pillboxes and trench systems do not look British. British pillboxes do not have overhanging roof slabs. The structural conditions of these pillboxes are fairly good. (**Figures 2 to 14** are photos of the 13 pillboxes.)

Interview with Prof. Daniel C.W. Ho, University of Hong Kong (at PB1)

"Looking at the aperture of the pillbox, one may find that there are smooth finishes and its design includes driplines. The condition of the façade is very good. The patterns on the concrete walls were the result of wooden formwork. The Japanese meticulously decorated the interface between the ceiling and internal face of the wall with a cornice. Here is a ventilation shaft. Its shape is like that of an inverted funnel. The shaft is smaller than that for a British Hong Kong pillbox. Due to inadequate waterproofing of the ventilation shafts, water seepage has occurred and caused concrete spalling. Most of it has occurred right beneath the shafts. This type of military structure is rare in Hong Kong."

Interview with Dr. Prudence L. K. Lau, Education University of Hong Kong (at PB1)

"The exterior of the opening is wider than the interior. The Japanese built a comprehensive system of installations including pillboxes, a cistern, observation posts, and trenches."

No archival material discovered so far about pre-war colonial Hong Kong defences refers to them. It is most likely that they were built by the Japanese forces that occupied Hong Kong from 1941-1945.



Location Map - Pillboxes at Luk Keng

Scale : 1:1,000

Legend

Military Features surveyed on 3 March 2021

Military Features surveyed in 2010

Trenches -approx.400m length (Position extracted from Old Aerial Photos)

Existing Features shown on GeoInfo Map of Lands Department as at 5 March 2021

Figure 1

Figures 2 to 14

Interview with Prof. Stephen N.G. Davies, University of Hong Kong (at PB2)

"This hillside has been amazingly comprehensively fortified. It was built in 1944, probably near the end of the Japanese occupation. But what is really interesting is that it is not casually built. Unlike almost all of the Japanese fortification we know, these are actually very well built in concrete. We are standing on top of what we called PB2, the top has a ventilation shaft, the top has fallen off. You can see it was built perhaps in a hurry, the ventilation shaft is only anchored by 4 vertical reinforcement bars, these were central to the concrete column, supporting the top, which has fallen off here. If you look at the faces of these pillboxes, they have been beautifully finished, with a skim of cement, giving them a smooth rendering, which would take camouflage paints. All round there is a line of communication trenches that links up all of the pillboxes, and it carries them back into the centre of the hill where there is something like a headquarters, a base site as large as a company or a hundred people at least. It's going to come out at well over 50 people being occupied in actual defending. You can see this is a very difficult site, in terms of just sheer works to fortify. You look down here. To put these pillboxes here, you need to cut back into the hill, and then backfill with piles rock walling to fill the gap. This was no short term idea. Somebody had this idea quite early on, they put out their fortification plan, and then they were able to do it. Quite of lot of the labor coming from the villages on either side, which was drafted into forced labor, to work for the Japanese, and schlepping up the concrete, schlepping up the reinforcement bars, and doing probably most of the digging, cutting and getting them ready."

Interview footage with Tim Ko (near PB3)

"The trees here were not that tall when I first came to this place. The pillboxes could be easily seen. But then the trenches could not be seen, as there was very dense undergrowth. We had to be very careful when moving along, as we could have easily fallen into the trench floor. I recall that at the end of 1997 or in early 1998, there was a big hill fire. Although the vegetation concealing the trenches was not burnt, the vegetation cover that hid the bunkers was scorched. I had to come very close in order to tell whether there was a trench when I first visited the place. The scale of the relics could only be seen after a fire. After (a third) fire, the scale of the position was revealed to be really huge, much bigger than it appeared after the first or second hill fire. Not only was the trench in front of us, but it was along the hillside as well. The scale of this military base was totally beyond my imagination, as it was so vast and magnificent."

POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH THE EAST RIVER COLUMN

Curiously, no known written or oral account relating to the "East River Column," the opponents of the occupying Japanese in this area, mentions the existence of this system of static defence works. There is a report[1] that on 3 March 1943, 2 companies of Japanese soldiers and about 50 Kempeitai made a successful raid on the guerrilla political commissar's headquarters at Nam Chung, which was (and is) located just below the western side of the knoll. It is possible that this evidence of organized resistance within Hong Kong led the Japanese occupying forces to plan a Starling Inlet area defence system to block further incursions and dominate the surrounding area, which would date Luk Keng to late 1943 or early 1944.

In a historic appraisal by local historian Tim Ko, it was stated that "from the recollections of villages nearby it can be established that the pillboxes and observation posts were built during the period of Japanese Occupation and some local inhabitants were pressed to take part in the construction" (*see below*).

Given that this site was a Japanese military base, it serves to remind us of the clash between nationalistic militarism and local resistance against brutal rule in the history of Hong Kong.

With the lapse of time, the forces of nature at this remote site concealed the Japanese structures under dense vegetation. Even by enlarging portions of government aerial photographs taken in the 1960s, the pillboxes and the trenches could not be easily identified. Only a major hill fire and, later, some active cutting back of the vegetation by concerned visitors made them visible again. Historian Tim Ko should be credited for reporting the complex in his 2001 book *War Relics in the Green*[2], which included photos taken after just such a hill fire.

Interview footage with Tim Ko (at PB7)

"Looking up from the flat ground below, we could faintly see some concrete structures up here. My guess is that if there were any concrete structures up here, they would probably have been defense structures such as bunkers. My first thought was that they formed part of the post-war defense system built by the British Military. (The reason was that) I had seen similar structures in places such as Fanling, Tai Po, and Sheung Shui. In fact, an English friend who lived in Luk Keng called this knoll Bunker Hill. I asked him if this base was used after the war, but he said, "No, they were built by the Japanese during the occupation." If we search the archives and old photos, we should not be able to find any record of these large-scale bunkers or the defense system. During the mid-1990s, those villagers who survived the war and lived below the hill told me that they were forced by the

1 See **Chan (2009)**: p.77.

2 **Ko (2001).**

Japanese to build these pillboxes. After visiting my friends, I visited the knoll myself. Although the relics were covered by tall grass, the scale was huge. I spent over half a day examining the site. The base was as big and comprehensive as the Shing Mun Redoubt. This astonished me, so I mentioned it in one of my books. Besides Luk Keng, there were relics at other Japanese sites in Sha Tau Kok. They remind us of the suffering of people during wartime."

SURVEY BY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

The Hong Kong University Department of Real Estate & Construction team of researchers, supported by a professional land surveyor Dr. Ken Ching, visited the place first in 2009 using a clear path leading up from the village cemetery. They conducted a field survey of the pillboxes, trenches and watering place or sanitation structure that they had annotated "well" on their maps in 2010.

Interview with Prof. Stephen N.G. Davies, University of Hong Kong (at cistern)

"Unlike anything else on the hillside, it is surrounded by a roughly built stone and concrete wall. Very crudely fixed together, roughly a quarter meter high and here in the bottom you've got this rectangular square, and here it is full of water. All around here, it is cement. And that is not deep enough for well, and anyway, it is way above the water table of the Pat Sin Leng geological formation. It is not natural water. It is just filled. Because you can see it (a ladder) it's about 2 meters deep. It is going down and down and down, and it stops there. So, in sum it is about 2 meters deep. And if that is a soft bottom, which is not infill but natural mud, then naturally it would drain, because it would drain down into the water table, and we have professional advice, the level of water table is not going to be here. So, it seems to me a sealed column of roughly 1.5, 1.75 meter in depth. What on earth is that. That's max 2000 Liters, a hundred guys, that's 20 Liters each, and it will last a day or two, it is not a particularly good water supply to an active army. What else can it be? One of the issues for a field commander to bring a bunch of guys into a remote area like this is hygiene. It matters a lot that your troops are healthy. One of the quickest ways for them to become unhealthy is for something like typhoid that spreads around. It spreads from lack of hygiene, usually from polluted water, and general pollution. And faeces, human excreta, are one of the main sources. So, a field commander would want to make sure he got dumping sorted out. If the guys have nowhere else to go, you have to have a central area, where you have the tough business done. You can periodically empty it, take it away from the site. So, my guess, given you get this side wall, and someone squatted to do their daily businesses, it's going to be their heads that are down below

the walls. My guess is probably a field latrine. You cover this on top. The head would probably have a wooden cover. It keeps them out of sight from any sniper around the place. And it focuses your hygiene problems. And if it is deeper, well it would never need to be emptied, just needed to be covered and it doesn't smell too bad. A good archeologist gets really excited about this, because to empty out that water, the stuff that down at the bottom can be analyzed to find out what the guys who garrisoned here ate. It is called coprolites. Coprolites are archaeologists' dream, because it actually tells you what the people ate, they can probably tell you if they carry parasites, with DNA, they may tell you some other health problems of the garrison. So, this could be a very interesting finding. But we need empty it first."

The team managed to empty the cistern using 2 hand pumps on 6 April 2021 in the company of Kenji Kenji Kawase of NIKKEI Hong Kong Bureau (**Figure 15**). *It was found that there is a large rectilinear underground space at the foot of the vertical well* (*3-D scan image at* **Figure 16**). *The volume at the bottom of the access looks something like 1.5m high and about 3m x 3m in plan – a holding capacity for 13,500 litres (nearly 3000 imp. gallons). That meant, if this was a cistern, it could support the full garrison of 200 soldiers for up to 28 days. The narrow, runged-ladder access makes a cistern the most likely use, since for storage, access is simply too restricted.*

Figure 15

Figure 16

Dr. Ching plotted the survey findings on maps for future study. One of the maps appears in a paper on Japanese defences in Hong Kong that appeared in the 2011 special issue of *Surveying & Built Environment* to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Hong Kong. The HKU team named the largest and uppermost pillboxes and one of the satellites they found from 1 to 8 clockwise starting in the north-east corner. They also located two of many small, one man satellite pillboxes on the southern, lower reaches of the knoll. From photos taken at low level by Y.K. Tan, two of these small satellite pillboxes were also seen on the western and eastern sides of the knoll.

By the time the HKU team went up for another survey in January 2016, after government showed the rough locations of the pillboxes on its 1:1000 survey map, the path, pillboxes and trenches had again been well hidden

under regrowth. But they found what they call PB X to the NW of "the well".

On 1 February 2019, they found PB Y and on 11 February 2019, they reached PB Z. [*The last survey was on 3 March 2021*.]

A prominent feature of the small pillboxes is the very narrow and restricted arc of fire from their firing loops. That means that whoever manned them could only observe and control a very restricted area of ground.

Reviewed in relation to mapped footpaths in the area and paths up the knoll, the possibility that these small, satellite pillboxes controlled the entries and exits from the main complex has become a working hypothesis.

It is time to look more thoroughly at this former Japanese military site from a wider historical, heritage and educational perspective.

THE SITE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Luk Keng site is one of five major clusters of Japanese fortifications in the Northeastern New Territories not mentioned in the history of the East River Column.

Three of them are pillboxes and gun emplacements along the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border at Pak Fu Shan, Pak Kung Au and Shan Tsui[3]. With Luk Keng these could all be part of a linked system aimed at interdicting use of routes into and out of Hong Kong's northeast areas accessed by sea from the east[4].

The fourth (such complex) is a far more extensive system of trench-connected pillboxes at Wong Chuk Yeung[5], yet to be subject to detailed ground survey. This last may also have been aimed at suppressing anti-Japanese activity and infiltration from the eastern shores of Mirs Bay (i.e. Dapeng Wan), where resistance forces were well established.

PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

Though the Luk Keng site is of great historical interest and is part of a country park, there is no proper visitor access. The cessation of grazing has meant that an old zig-zag path up the knoll that can be seen clearly on aerial photos taken between 1945 and 1963 has vanished. Other access paths shown on maps are completely overgrown. Slope treatment work behind the local restaurants at Luk Keng in the early 2010s included the construction of concrete maintenance steps. These lead up to a point about 50 metres below the northernmost pillbox complex labelled Pillbox 1 and 1a. However, in Luk Keng there is no signage or information board to show the way. This is so though the place was assessed as a Grade 2 heritage site, in December 2009 by the Antiquities Advisory Board (the AAB). It was identified as "No.432 Luk Keng Pillboxes and Observation Posts" but as can be seen from the 1:1000 map, the locations were not accurately known. (See Figure 1)

3 There is another location at Wu Shek Kok, on the north shore of Starling Inlet directly north of Luk Keng.

4 As well as providing secure bases for area patrolling.

5 Unlike Luk Keng this is a linear, not a closed loop system and is also in an advanced stage of ruination as a result, it is suspected, of systematic demolition.

The site has also drawn much comment in the well-known local, English language heritage website "Gwulo", and in many Chinese language countryside guidebooks.

CONSERVING THE SITE?

One may speculate why this site, graded as part of Hong Kong's built heritage, has not been either conserved or promoted as a tourist attraction. Its Japanese origin is the most likely factor preventing official recognition or publicity[6]. However, its probable connection with the local resistance forces during the occupation would alone be a forceful reason for conserving it, publicizing its existence and therefore its place in Hong Kong's story. Through Luk Keng we can come to a better understanding of the significance of the East River Column in harassing the enemy in those harrowing days.

Interview footage with K.C. Ng[7], President, Hong Kong War History Research Association (at PB7)

"During the war, Luk Keng was a base for the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade's East River Column. Chek Kang nearby served as another base for the Brigade. It was led by Tsoi Kwok Leung (Cai Guoliang) with Chan Tak Ming (Chen Daming) serving as the longtime political commissar of this area. This is Pillbox 7, which was built by the Japanese. It looks very strong, bold, and new."

This conclusion also suggests significant doubt about an early theory that the defensive system was built to cope with an anticipated Allied landing in the Sha Tau Kok area, which we know from American plans was considered in 1945.

Luk Keng's all-round defensive system, readily visible in Dr. Ching's analysis of fields of fire from the pillboxes, and its implicit tactical linkage with the systems on the north side of Starling Inlet around Sha Tau Kok, argues the possibility of a defended location in a counter-insurgency context.

Interview footage with Stephen N.G. Davies (at PBw)

"So, we stand on what at the moment we think is the south point of the fortified points of Luk Keng. What on earth is it about? The honest answer is we haven't got a clue. Because there is no documentary evidence. All we've got is what we've found cutting around, chopping the vegetation, looking at old photographs, talking with possible villagers, which is not a huge amount of old memories. So, like good detectives, we've tried to use all the evidence, to build the picture and explain what we've seen. There are two candidate

6 A statistical study on the 1,444 AAB items (**Chau *et al.* 2021**) found no evidence of bias against British or Japanese built military heritage buildings and structures after the handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1997. It also found no evidence of bias in favour of imperial Chinese architecture in the postcolonial period. Incidentally, it found some evidence that suggests AAB's assessments of heritage value for military heritage buildings and structures have increased, while those for imperial Chinese architecture have decreased after 1997, which is somewhat puzzling and merits further investigation.

7 Mr Ng's father was with the East River Column.

explanations. One is, this is Hong Kong's local version of what it is called the Atlantic Wall in Europe, which was a massive fortification in the Northern European coast to defend occupied Europe against an allied British-American invasion. So, this theory is this is a massive defense work that was going to defend Japanese-occupied Hong Kong, against a British-American invasion. A second theory, which I favour, and as a soldier primarily thinks and looks at it, it doesn't make sense to argue its fortified for a massive invasion. These pillboxes, this little ring, they are one-man pillboxes with a very narrow entrance, and a very, very small firing slit on the front. It is big enough only for taking a pot shot at someone. This is basically a lookout and where somebody can put interdiction fire out briefly but hope like hell there would be no real attack. So, looking at the whole complex, my hunch is that this is a strong point. And that the person thinking about that, and putting it down on paper, was thinking about the problem of control of territory. We know that not long before Luk Keng was built, there was a joint Kempeitai, Japanese police and military raid on Nam Chung down here, where they grabbed senior officials of the East River Column. So, the East River Column, which was primarily Chinese Communist guerillas making trouble of the Japanese, they were clearly a counter-insurgency problem. So, perhaps the Japanese, it has to be perhaps, we have no evidence, may think that we need a strong presence on the ground, to prevent any kind of guerilla build-up, which is going to threaten their hold on Hong Kong. When you look at it on the map, what they are doing is that they are controlling all the exits into the main parts of Hong Kong, from this end of Starling inlet. That (one) controlling the valley slightly east and north into Shenzhen. That (one) to control the valley to go out to Fanling. And this controls these 2 inland valleys, that lead over towards Tai Po. From here, they can guarantee they can put out patrols aggressively to dominate territory. They also can make sure all the ammunition and arms for the patrols can be kept guarded. Because when you are guerilla, half the time what you would do is you survive on what you can steal. And your enemy's arms and ammunition are what you are going to grab. So, the major reason for a fortified position is to make sure all your arms, ammunition and food are yours to control, and not theirs to use."

One prominent feature – very unusual in any structure aimed at countering a major conventional warfare attack – is the elegant finish of the exterior of the pillboxes. The surface has been well rendered. The outlines of the external walls were neatly delineated – even to the curved patterns showing where camouflage earth had been piled up! Although some might call Luk Keng "negative" or "enemy heritage", such places unquestionably have positive

educational and social value, helping us understand and embrace the past.

Interview footage with Tim Ko (at PB1)

"I hope the system can be tidied up and basic conservation work on it performed. Concerning the practical matter, the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) does not have much experience preserving military relics. The Antiquities Advisory Board and other professionals may offer some help. The relic itself is attractive and proof of the "Three Years and Eight Months" of Japanese occupation. The defense system was built by Chinese villagers living nearby as forced labour. I hope to pass on their history to the next generation. I hope the AFCD can set up some signs to ensure the safety of tourists. Recently, the AFCD set up illustration boards as its attempts at preservation. I hope tourists will respect this place and avoid damaging its relics."

Interview footage with Prudence L.K. Lau, Education University of Hong Kong (at PB1)

"There are over two hundred military relics all over Hong Kong. But it is hard for the government to preserve them because the sites are scattered. Recently, some local groups organized ecology and military history tours, including overnight camps, here. These initiatives are fascinating. A possible way to promote conservation is for more Hong Kong citizens to motivate themselves."

Interview footage with Stephen N. G. Davies, University of Hong Kong (at PB4)

"How does this Luk Keng Area grade in terms of conservation? My particular pitch would be very highly indeed. Because it's unique and it speaks far more eloquently to Hong Kong's experiences during that agonizing period from 1941-1945. Far more than the other much shorter term military relics, that only lasted during the battle of Hong Kong. This is a fortification as far as we know of the occupying power. It is a testament that the occupying power did all of this. The Hong Kong people and the people of Guangdong province of China were not happy being an occupied country. To hold the country (the Japanese) have invaded and occupied, they have to fortify, and to fortify like this at a high cost in people and materials—this is reinforced concrete, it's got steel reinforcement bars in it, we don't have many. But you can certainly see the remains. By 1944, steel for the Japanese was like gold. The threat here was sufficiently bad to divert resources, which were very scarce, as well as troops to occupy here. So, in terms of Hong Kong stories, this is incredibly bold."

Other than its historical and architectural values, Luk Keng also has ecological interest as indigenous flora and fauna repopulate a site that was

once a fortification, then later grazing land. The well-ventilated abandoned military structures may also be suitable for observing how fauna colonize such structures. Luk Keng presents itself as particularly apt for development along these lines, given its location with good road access, parking and catering facilities in a scenic environment with other attractions that draw many visitors. For such visits, better access and signage to this little known but historically interesting site would undoubtedly add significant value.

[*"I will set aside $500 million to carry out enhancement works on facilities in some country parks, such as providing recreational elements like additional lookout points, treetop adventure and glamping sites, improving toilet facilities and barbeque and picnic sites, and revitalising some wartime relics by converting them into open museums so as to enrich visitors' experience and enjoyment at the countryside."* (para. 149, Budget Speech 2021)

At the time of writing, it was heard that Luk Keng has been identified as a site for better conservation by various government departments. Some suggestions for decision makers regarding the Japanese site[8] *are:*

(1) *Establish a small museum at the foot of the hill, probably using an old village house or in a purpose designed structure on government land.*

(2) *Build hanging walkways like that in the aviary of Hong Kong Park along the crest of the knoll and along the trenches for safe and convenient inspection of the relic.*

(3) *Construct a new path to connect the site better with the villages downhill.*

(4) *Reopen and repair old paths as firebreaks and escape routes now blocked by dense vegetation.*

(5) *Connect the slope treatment route with PB1 by a paved path for emergency escape.*

(6) *Update government survey maps for accurate conservation planning purposes.*]

8 Made in the 3 March 2021 press conference, held at 11am, the Department of Real Estate & Construction, University of Hong Kong.

CREDITS FOR ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1 was produced by Dr. Ken S.T. Ching, the photos in Figures 2 to 15 by the first author and the 3-D scan in Figure 16 by Mr. Y. K. Tan.

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Surveying & Built Environment

Rear-Admiral CHAN Chak's Contributions to the Defence of Hong Kong and his Escape, 1941[1]

Alfred Yiu-kwong Lau[2]

ABSTRACT

This paper sums up Rear-Admiral CHAN Chak's contributions to the defence of Hong Kong and his escape with the surviving motor torpedo boats (MTBs), 1941 based on secondary sources with an epilogue on their exact escape route.

KEYWORDS

CHAN Chak, Battle of Hong Kong, MTB, Aberdeen Island, Ap Lei Pei.

1 This paper was submitted shortly prior to the sudden death of the author. The Abstract and the Epilogue were added by SBE with information provided by a team of friends including Y. K. Tan and Ken S.T. Ching. The whole manuscript was edited by Stephen Davies, who added most of the footnotes. All Chinese family names are capitalized in this paper.

2 1951-2021, retired Chief Town Planner, Planning Department, HKSAR Government.

INTRODUCTION

With the fall of Guangzhou in October 1938, Japan had captured all the big ports along the Chinese coastline. Despite Japan's trade embargo, Hong Kong began to serve the Chinese government as a lifeline to the outside world. Up to 70% of war material including armaments, fuel, and essential provisions from overseas came in, legally and illegally, through Hong Kong to China. Acknowledging the importance of Hong Kong, the Chinese Nationalist government started to move on to the Hong Kong stage and pour in large numbers of officials. By July 1939, it had tried to group the various Nationalist government organs operating in Hong Kong under one umbrella, and set up the Kuomingtang Hong Kong and Macau main branch office. General Tie-cheng WU (吳鐵城) was the first political representative of the office. In April 1941, General WU was transferred out of Hong Kong, Rear-Admiral Chak CHAN (陳策) (hereinafter referred to as CHAN)[3] was appointed in June to take up the political, as well as the military representative posts of the office.

Rear-Admiral CHAN was forty-seven in 1941. He was short but he was sturdily built. He had received a wound in his left leg during a sea battle at Humen and because he was suffering from diabetes, his wound got worse. He had to have his left leg amputated at the St. Theresa Hospital in Hong Kong. After that he had to use an artificial leg. He was still recovering from his operation when he was appointed the military attache under General WU.

On 8 December 1941, the date the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, CHAN and General Jie-min ZHENG (鄭介民), a top ranking staff officer from the army headquarters in Chongqing, had paid a visit to General Maltby, General Officer Commanding the Hong Kong garrison force. General Maltby had outlined his battle plan to the two visitors and was happy to hear them pledge China's support. CHAN also told General Maltby that he was determined to stay behind and help to tighten the cooperation between the two governments.

General ZHENG on the other hand was pessimistic about Hong Kong's chances. He had come to Hong Kong about a week previously and had gone on a tour of Hong Kong's defences. In ZHENG's view, the British garrison was not ready for tough battles. ZHENG was not as keen as CHAN to stay in Hong Kong. He left Hong Kong with Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Owen Hughes of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, who would go to Chongqing to persuade Generalissimo CHIANG Kei-shek (蔣介石) and his generals to send an army to help Hong Kong as soon as possible. They left on one of the last few flights out of Hong Kong to Chongqing.

CHAN's efforts in helping Hong

3 Rear-Admiral CHAN Chak was promoted to Vice-Admiral on 29 May 1942 and was promoted to full Admiral after his death on 2 September 1949. He was buried first in the naval cemetery in Canton. In 1970, his remains were relocated to Tsuen Wan Chinese Permanent Cemetery. His wife and two sons were also buried there.

Kong's defence came in a number of ways. They include:

(a) setting up a Temporary Joint Liaison Office of the All Chinese Organisation in Hong Kong.

On 10 December, CHAN called a meeting of representatives of various Nationalist government organs in Hong Kong and amalgamated them into a Temporary Joint Liaison Office. It had the necessary administrative infrastructure, and worked somehow like a shadow government. It had nine divisions: namely, a secretariat, army and police, external affairs, intelligence, propaganda, finance, communications and transport, food supply and general duties.

Through the efforts of the propaganda division, CHAN issued a number of statements through the Nationalist newspaper *Kuomin Daily News* (國民日報) and radio broadcasts urging the Chinese community to rally to the defence of Hong Kong, because they were now fighting for their own country and not merely helping the British. He also called on the public to maintain law and order and refute defeatist rumours.

The transport division had mustered some one thousand five hundred drivers and workers to replace those that had walked-out or deserted from the army and police force.

The food supply division enlisted teachers and university students to help to run twenty two food kitchens and rice shops and to distribute food and rice.

The finance division helped the British authorities borrow several millions newly issued five-yuan notes from the Bank of China, and asked the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to help to overprint the five-yuan notes, converting them into Hong Kong one dollar bills, so as to put them into circulation and help to relieve the crisis of a shortage of small-change in Hong Kong.

(b) setting up a regular daily meeting with the British authorities to brief both sides on military-civilian matters and to exchange intelligence.

The British deputation consisted of four parties: namely David MacDougall, head of the British Ministry of Information Hong Kong Office, representing the Governor[4], Major Charles Boxer, representing the army[5], R.A.C. North from the Secretariat of Chinese Affairs[6] and Mayer[7], representative from the police. On the Chinese side, CHAN, his secretary K.Y. CHAN (陳劍如), his chief of staff C.K. TSOI (蔡重江) and his aide-de-camp Heng HSU (徐亨) were the

4 David Mercer MacDougall (麥道高) (1904-1991) had joined the Hong Kong Government as a Cadet Officer in 1928. He had been seconded to the Colonial Office in London 1937-39, returning to Hong Kong in his new role with the Ministry of Information on the outbreak of war in 1939. MacDougall served as Colonial Secretary from 1946 to1949.

5 Charles Ralph Boxer (1904-2000) was the chief of British army intelligence in Hong Kong in the run up to the Japanese invasion. He was wounded and captured and spent the rest of the war in captivity. Post-war he became the English speaking world's leading authority on western maritime and trade expansion in Asia.

6 Roland Arthur Charles North, (1889-1961) had joined the Hong Kong Government in 1912 and in 1936 had been made Secretary for Chinese Affairs (today's Secretary for Home Affairs).

7 This was S.C.H. Mayer who was captured at the surrender and survived the war. Nothing else is known.

representatives. They met in CHAN'S office in Shell House on Queen's Road Central. The meeting was held each day from 9 December to 24 December.

On 13 December, CHAN received a cable from Guangdong advising him that Nationalist troops were on the move to Hong Kong. The vanguard of the relief force had pushed south to Cheung Muk Tau (Zhangmutou), beside the Kowloon-Canton railway line, a few stops away from Shenzhen on 12 December. The bulk of the relief force consisting of three divisions was expected to catch up in three to four days. CHAN promptly relayed the message to General Maltby's headquarters. Though General Maltby had reservations as to the progress of the Nationalist army, CHAN's message was still a piece of good news to the general public, especially the Chinese community, who held on to the belief that a rescue force of Chinese soldiers was on its way to Hong Kong. Unfortunately, the Nationalist army failed to arrive in time.

(c) setting up the ABCD[8] Chinese Corps Hong Kong

The need to set up this corps was caused by a crisis in the Hong Kong police force. After the British military and police force started to pull out of the Kowloon Peninsula on 11 December, Kowloon turned into a riotous and disorderly area. Civil violence like looting, killing, and raping organised by triad gangs and fifth columnists[9] bought off by the Japanese, were widespread in Tsim Sha Tsui, Yau Ma Tei, Mong Kok and Sham Shui Po areas.

On 11 December, the Director of Criminal Intelligence and Investigation of the Hong Kong Police, F.W. Shaftain, received a startling report from a paid informer inside the triad society[10]. From another source, he received additional facts which satisfied him as to authenticity of an apparently fantastic and improbable story to the effect that there was an agreed plot to massacre the entire European community and that zero hour was to be 13 December. In other words, they would attempt to carry out a massacre on behalf of the Japanese, in order, so Shaftain was told, to help bring about a British defeat and thus save the Chinese community from prolonged bombardment. Shaftain realised that he needed to contact the main Hong Kong triad bosses immediately and also he realised that money might be the key to change their minds. Shaftain passed on the information concerning the plot of the triads to the Commissioner of Police and asked him to get government sanction to place twenty thousand dollars at Shaftain's disposal. The Commissioner acted promptly and Shaftain got the money within an hour.

After hours of unsuccessful attempts

8 ABCD represents American, British, Chinese and Dutch. As of the Japanese attacks on December 7/8 1942, all became enemies of Japan.

9 The term fifth columnist was originated from Spanish Civil War. It means enemy collaborators.

10 Frank Walter Shaftain was a Superintendent and after the fall of Hong Kong was interned in Stanley. He had joined the Hong Kong Police in 1912 and retired, shortly after the reoccupation, in October 1945. For the triad story see *China Mail*, 6 Oct 1945, pp. 1 & 4.

to contact the triad bosses, Shaftain in desperation got in touch with Rear-Admiral CHAN's deputy, Colonel S.K. YEE (余兆麒), who in turn contacted Ji-lin CHANG (張子廉), the head of the Shanghai triad society. Under some pretext, CHANG gathered some heads of the Hong Kong triads to attend a meeting with Shaftain at CHAN's office. The meeting was a polite affair and all that could be agreed was another meeting in the Commissioner of Police's office that night.

At 9.00 pm the meeting was held at the office of the Commissioner of Police. Present were Pennefather-Evans (the Commissioner)[11], Shaftain, S.K. YEE, Ji-lin CHANG, J.K. SHUM (沈哲臣), P.K. LAU (劉伯琴) and W.Y. MA (馬華逸). The discussion was not so amicable and rough words were used in the meeting. Finally the five so called mediators said they would get in touch with the heads of the triads and persuade them to cooperate with the government tomorrow. However, the police officers insisted on immediate action. It was a question of getting all the sub-heads of the triads to attend a meeting that night. After a lengthy impasse, the police officers withdrew leaving S.K. YEE and Ji-lin CHANG to try to force an agreement. A Mr. WONG was mentioned and he was brought on the scene to provide details of the sub-heads. It was at once arranged to hold a meeting in the dining room of the Cecil Hotel at Ice House Street. Buses were requisitioned and over two hundred sub-heads or junior triad chiefs were picked up and escorted to the hotel. The final meeting on the 12 December produced results, or rather cooperation, at a high price. YEE calculated that twenty thousand dollars were not enough, a much larger sum was needed to secure the cancellation of the massacre plot for the 13 December. The government was facing a crisis, it was in fact being blackmailed by the triads. The crisis however was solved by Ji-lin CHANG, who undertook to deal with the extra funding personally. The triads kept their word and afterwards no European was killed by triad members[12].

The meeting with the police officers touched upon the issue of maintaining law and order and avoiding the outbreak of civil violence on Hong Kong Island, and the need to deal with the fifth columnists. On 12 December, CHAN after a meeting with his aides, began to set up the ABCD[13] Chinese Corps Hong Kong, with CHAN being the head of the Corps. Members of the Corps at first mainly consisted of members of the Loyal and Righteous Charitable Association and members of major triad gangs in Hong Kong. Members of the Corps were told to help to maintain public order and to suppress pro-Japanese saboteurs in return for a daily allowance of two Hong Kong dollars[14]. The headquarters

11 John Pennefather-Evans (1894-1977) had joined the Federated Malays States Police in 1914, serving there until appointed Commissioner of Police in Hong Kong in 1941. During the occupation he was interned in Stanley, Post-war he became Commissioner of Police in Singapore from February 1951 to February 1952.

12 More details of the case can be found in **Birch and Cole (1979: pp. 59-62)** and **Wright-Nooth with Adkin (1994: pp. 48-49).**

13 See note 2, ante.

14 It is worth noting that daily wage rates in 1941 Hong Kong were HK$0.75-1.40 for skilled craftsmen, HK$0.70-1.00 for skilled workmen, HK$0.60-0.75 for semi-skilled workmen and HK$0.40-0.66 for unskilled workmen **(United Nations 1948: p.143)**

of the Corps was set up in Happy Valley at the corner of Shan Kwong Road and Wong Nei Chung Road. For administrative and control purposes, Hong Kong was divided into three main districts, east, central and west.

Over the following days, CHAN and YEE had captured a total of five hundred to six hundred fifth columnists. According to Tim Luard "several accounts spoke of shoot-outs in which whole roomfuls of men were killed by groups led in person by either CHAN or YEE. According to CHAN's sons, more than a hundred fifth columnists were taken by surprise during a meeting in a cinema when about twenty men led by the Admiral burst in with grenades and killed them all." (**Luard 2012, p.25**)

According to Ted Ross[15], chief assistant to David MacDougall, "rumour had it that, at least three times, those on our side discovered the secret meeting place of the fifth columnists at the eleventh hour, and went in with hand grenades and Tommy guns, mowing down as many as four hundred in one raid. Ted's son Warwick said his father used to recall vividly how SK YEE burst into his office with his Tommy gun, looking exhausted and saying "We got them all." (**Luard 2012: 25**)

According to Freddie Guest, a Captain in the Middlesex Regiment, "Admiral CHAN went to Battle Box (General Maltby's headquarters) to see the General and to ask to be supplied with Tommy guns.....I learned that over a hundred Fifth Columnists were to hold a meeting in some building that Chan knew of. His party of about a dozen quickly surrounded the building and at a given signal by the one-legged Admiral went right in and shot up the whole crowd. Not one got away." (**Guest 1953: 33**)

(d) taking charge of counter-insurgent actions.

There were a number of actions that are said to have been carried out by CHAN. These actions were mainly reported by Captain Freddie Guest in his book *Escape from the Bloodied Sun*, although some critics have found the accounts highly dramatized. Nevertheless, these actions include:

(a) Organising a fleet of motor sampans and Chinese flat-bottomed river boats to help the Royal Scots and the Canadian regiment evacuate from mainland Kowloon to Hong Kong Island on 11 December. Most of the Chinese launch crews and boat hands, who were supposed to evacuate the British forces across the harbour, had done a walk-out or deserted during the night under cover of darkness. Making his own base on the waterfront, CHAN soon had his fleet scurrying backwards and forwards with stores, ammunition and equipment.

15 Charles Edwin Ross (1912-2005), ex-merchant seafarer (purser) with Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd., who was working in the Canadian Pacific office in Shanghai in 1937, when he volunteered for Red Cross ambulance service. In 1941 Canadian Pacific sent him to Hong Kong, where he was recruited for David MacDougall's Ministry of Information team. He returned to Hong Kong in 1951 and retired to Australia in 1965.

He and his boats worked all night and the evacuation was completed by dawn.

(b) There were reports of fifth columnists using primitive lamps, operated from a dry battery with a small mirror, signalling from places like Conduit Road and Lugard Road on Hong Kong Island to Kowloon. The Japanese guns were being directed onto their targets by these signals from the collaborators. On 14 December, a report came in that night concerning a bright light seen shining across the harbour from a point about two hundred feet above the Battle Box. Captain Freddie Guest was told to do something about it. He sought help from CHAN. They later spotted the light and estimated it to be a point just below May Road. They drove up May Road to reach the point where the light came from fifty to a hundred feet below the road. They climbed down the hillside and CHAN hurled a grenade to eliminate the fifth columnists, who were responsible.

(c) On 15 December, the Japanese, using a small, deserted cargo ship in the harbour, mounted loudspeakers and microphones to broadcast propaganda talks and English popular music. CHAN told Captain Freddie Guest he would help him to stop the propaganda talks and music. CHAN drew some limpet mines from the Naval Store. With three men in a sampan, they got as near to the ship as possible. Then two of the men swam to the ship and stuck the mines to the ship. The mines went off and the ship sank in the harbour[16].

(e) offering assistance to fight alongside the British forces.

In the afternoon of 19 December, after the Japanese landed on Hong Kong Island, CHAN had met with Ji-lin CHANG and other Nationalist leaders and agreed that time had come for the Loyal and Righteous Charitable Association members to do something to help the British force to defend Hong Kong. According to information gathered by members of the Association, the number of Japanese currently occupying Tsat Tsz Mui and Taikoo Dockyard areas was only about three hundred. The temporary Japanese headquarters was situated in a hotel in the Causeway Bay area. CHAN proposed the formation of a two hundred man desperado squad to attack the Japanese headquarters. CHAN asked TSOI to press General Maltby's headquarters for arms and necessary support. However, that night the British authorities declined CHAN's offer saying that the mission was too dangerous because it would probably endanger the lives of foreign nationals who had been captured and were being held by the Japanese in the Causeway Bay area.

16 **Guest (1957)**: p.20, 21 and 30 and **Birch and Cole (1979)**: pp.43-45.

On 22 December, CHAN knowing the British force was struggling against the Japanese army, made another offer of using the Loyal and Righteous Charitable Association members to attack a battery and machine gun position near the Wong Nei Chung Gap area. The British authorities accepted CHAN's offer and agreed to issue them with two grenades and one pistol per person. The next day the arms were not delivered to CHAN. However according to the police officer, George Wright-Nooth, second in the command of Central and Western Division, the Commissioner of Police on 22 December instructed him and five European non-commissioned officer volunteers to collect one thousand grenades from the Shouson Hill magazine and distribute them to the Chinese special force members. However, when Wright-Nooth approached the magazine along a narrow and winding road, he stopped by a pill-box manned by soldiers of Middlesex Regiment and was given the advice to turn back since the Japanese had taken the Wong Nei Chung Gap area. Wright-Nooth took the advice and returned empty-handed. (**Wright-Nooth with Mark Adkin 1994: p.56.**) It was not until nightfall on Christmas Eve that the British authorities finally provided CHAN with twenty boxes of grenades and 75 revolvers. Even then the British authorities got back in touch with second thoughts asking CHAN to postpone distributing the arms to his men.

(f) leading a group of sixty-five British officers and soldiers to escape to Mainland China on Christmas Day.

On 25 December, when CHAN learned of Governor Young's decision to surrender, he told General Maltby's headquarters that he and his aides intended to escape from Hong Kong to avoid being captured by the Japanese. He asked whether the British had any naval vessels he could borrow to break out of Hong Kong and whether any of their officers would like to follow him. Actually, the British authorities and the Nationalist government had a kind of gentleman's agreement that the British would not let CHAN and his deputy YEE to fall into Japanese hands. That was why the British authorities agreed to make available five Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs), which were stationed in the Aberdeen area, for the proposed escape. When CHAN, his three aides (S.K. YEE, H.S.Y. HENG, Chuen YEUNG (楊全)) and a group of senior officers from General Maltby's headquarters arrived at the meeting point in Aberdeen, they found that the Motor Torpedo Boats were thought to have left already. The group commandeered a small motor launch and set off to look for the Motor Torpedo Boats. The Japanese caught sight of the motor launch and opened up with a barrage of machine gun fire. When the engine of the motor launch caught fire, it started to sink. People on board jumped into the sea and swam to the nearby Ap Lei Chau Island. CHAN minus his artificial leg was helped by Hsu HENG to reach the island. At around 10pm some members of the party spotted a single Motor Torpedo Boat lurking in the vicinity and they

swam out to make contact with the seamen on the Motor Torpedo Boat. The party members, including CHAN, were hauled on board of the Motor Torpedo Boat. (Editor: see Epilogue for details of his escape based on research by Tan, Ching and Davies.)

From this point onwards, CHAN assumed the leadership of the group because only he had the local knowledge of Southern China and contacts that would enable the party to proceed into the interior of China. That had been why the British had confidence in CHAN and placed the flotilla of Motor Torpedo Boats under CHAN's command. CHAN ordered the boats to go for the island of Peng Chau in Mirs Bay and then to Nan O on the coast of Chinese Mainland. On 29 December, the group including CHAN, his two aides Hsu HENG and YEUNG Chuen[17], and sixty five British officers and soldiers arrived in Huizhou, the Nationalist stronghold in Guangdong Province and met with the soldiers of General Hon Mu YU's (余漢謀) army.

All the above initiatives helped to counter the succession of crises facing the British authorities. On Hong Kong Island, there were neither widespread panic nor riots. Some of the British officials acknowledged the extent of the contribution by CHAN and his team. Phyllis Harrop, a former Assistant Secretary in the Department of Chinese Affairs, who worked at the police headquarters, had praised the men from Chongqing, saying they had done wonderful work in maintaining public order[18]. David MacDougall, the head of Ministry of Information Hong Kong Office, as quoted in Tim Luard's book "Escape from Hong Kong" was of the opinion that "it had always been wrong to even think of defending Hong Kong without accepting China's help.....things would have been a lot worse if the Admiral hadn't insisted on helping anyway. Internal order could almost certainly not have been preserved for more than a few days if Kuomingtang influence hadn't been so actively thrown in on our side when the attack come." (**Luard 2012: pp. 25-26**) Indeed CHAN and his team can claim credit for deploying their organised efforts in support of the British authorities and for preventing any repetition on the civil violence in Kowloon from happening on Hong Kong Island.

EPILOGUE: CHAN'S ESCAPE ROUTE FROM ABERDEEN HARBOUR

What exact route CHAN and his party actually took is an interesting research exercise. **Figure 1** shows the route reported by **Li** (**2002: p.76**) and **Luard** (**2012**). The escape party is held to have climbed over Aberdeen lsland (Ap Lei Chau) after being hit by fire from Pillbox (PB)12. Davies considered that they were more likely hit by fire from PB13 and swam to places near the tombolo between the main island and

17 SK YEE remained on the motor launch when everybody jumped off the launch. He finally got on shore and escaped separately back to China.

18 Phyllis Margaret Harrop (c.1907 -) had arrived in Hong Kong in 1937 having previously worked in Shanghai. She managed to escape Hong Kong by claiming German nationality based on a marriage that had ended in divorce and was the first person to report Japanese atrocities to the outside world. Her account is in Harrop 1944.

the smaller island, which is now called Ap Lei Pai[19] (Ap Lei Chai), as shown in **Figure 2**. In either case, they were unaware that the Japanese were along the coast of Brick Hill. In fact, PB14 was overrun on 24 December.

According to Davies, "much of the early part of the escape would have been visible from the artillery observation post (AOP) at Mount Kellett, though probably not all of it. They probably could not have seen the embarkation pier, where everyone got onto the *Cornflower's* launch, though they'll have hove into sight as the launch headed out through Deep Pass into Po Chong Wan. They will have had a grandstand view of the Japanese infantrymen firing at the launch and sinking it when it was off Tai Shue Wan. Once it had been sunk and everyone swam to Ap Lei Tsai, they'll have been out of sight again and the actual pick-up by the MTBs on the west side of Ap Lei Tsai would also have been out of sight...and in the dark, too!"

Buddy Hide's excellent Hong Kong escape website[20] quotes extensively from narratives by the escapees. It is clear from these narratives that the sinking of the launch took place further south than appears in many sources. In part this is an inference from CHAN's statement that the island from the location of the sunken launch was "one Li distant". A *li* (里) is conventionally 500m. Had the launch come under fire from PB 12 the distance to the Ap Lei Chau shore would have been nearer half a *li*. By contrast, from the probable point at which the launch would have come under fire from PB13 to the tombolo area between Ap Lei Chau and Ap Lei Pai/Chai/Tsai – called Aberdeen Island in the Hong Kong Escape website – it is very close to one *li*.

It is also clear from the descriptions of the survivors, including the wounded, one-legged CHAN, who refer to clambering over the "top" of the island, that the larger island does not fit. The route taken is evidently not the col between the two peaks of Ap Lei Chau. Nor did it go over any of the hills on Ap Lei Chau proper. That is most specifically since the description of getting to the other side of the island by going over the top by one protagonist, Ted Ross, notes "it wasn't very far to the top." Heng HSU is quoted as saying, "We just swam towards the tip of Ap Lei Chau." And this is confirmed in CHAN's own words, "I finally swam ashore on the small isle right next to Ap Lei Chau. After I swam ashore, I saw that HSU Heng had already been there for a while."

Ching's GIS analysis has found which part of Aberdeen Harbour in 1941 could be seen from the AOP of Mount Kellet.

19 Ap Lei Pai in old maps refers to the reef off what is now called Ap Lei Pai but in pre-war maps and charts is called, more logically, Ap Lei Chai/Tsai.

20 See http://www.hongkongescape.org/Escape-2.htm; http://www.hongkongescape.org/Escape-3.htm



Figure 1: *Escape route as portrayed in Li (2002) and Luard (2012)*



Figure 2: *Escape route suggested by Stephen N.G. Davies*

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Surveying & Built Environment

Technical Note

Artillery Observation Posts (AOPs/OPs) and Battery Observation Posts (BOPs) on the Hong Kong Territory Mainland

Y. K. Tan[*]

Introduction

Many artillery observation posts (AOPs or simply OPs) were situated on strategic high points in the mainland portion of Hong Kong to support its mobile batteries. The AOPs were used to monitor enemy movements, determine their locations, and direct artillery fire. They also monitored the impact of shells and reported the results of each firing.

A few battery observation posts (BOPs) that supported fixed gun batteries were also active.

The hilly topography of the Hong Kong mainland provided many good spots for AOPs to cover large areas. However, the remoteness of these locations also made construction work and communication cable laying more difficult. The AOPs on the mainland not only covered the sea channels, but also the roads. A limited number of AOPs were built to the north of Shatin to cover major roads and the Kowloon-Canton Railway, but they still could not cover everything.

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AOP personnel needed to calculate the accurate locations of targets and send information to their affiliated batteries for firing. One major device they used was a depression position finder (DPF). The DPF (**Figure 1**) was placed on a high point of a known height, while its operator used depression angles to calculate the distance. What formally limited a DPF's range whether placed high or low were: (a) visibility - i.e., the translucency of the atmosphere; (b) the optics/magnification/resolution of the observing instrument - most DRF/DPF scopes were quite low magnification (<12x)

A DPF has a telescope placed on supporting arms, which could tilt down by turning a wheel. Usually two supports connected to the lower mounting that incorporated the slider that was used to read off the range. The target is centred in the cross hairs of the scope's graticule. Range was worked out by multiplying the height of eye by the tangent observed angle. So, the calibrated range/distance scale was an analogue computer read-out that expressed an ANGLE OF DEPRESSION as a DISTANCE TO TARGET. The drawing below shows how a DPF works.



Figure 1: *Depression position finder mechanism.*

Another wheel turned the telescope in a different direction to find the target direction. A DPF was used to find the target direction and distance. A pen placed on the indicator automatically marked the target position on the map below and plotted its movement. The Depression Range Finders Mk II (c.1899) and Mk III (c.1920s) Depression Position Finders were the ones in use in HK during World War II. Provided the height of the OP and the height of the target were known to a reasonable degree of accuracy, the range finding solution could be calculated using the instrument. It is standard British artillery procedure that in ANY fixed OP, ALL initial fire was based on already REGISTERED target areas (e.g. a pass through hills, a bend in a road, a bridge, etc.), which the enemy would usually be obliged to pass through, either by REGISTRATION SHOOTS (i.e., fire until hitting target and then note elevation and direction (usually on a locally installed DATUM POINT) or by PREDICTED RANGE (worked out from a well-surveyed map).

A field artillery scope (or stereoscopic telescope) was the main device for measuring distance for land targets. These were known in the army as 'donkey's/rabbit's ears' because of their appearance, but they were originally called Scherenfernrohr in German (literally scissor telescope) or Relieffernrohr and patented by Carl Zeiss in 1908). To operate it, two telescopes were placed in V-positions to expand the distance between two human eyes to allow an observer to see

the depth of an image from afar. The stereoscopic telescope has two sets of prisms that turned the light through two right angles and enabled the units to work also as periscopes (from trenches). In effect the two scopes formed a pair of BINOCULARS, the DISTANCE between the object lenses (far end) of which could VARY from side by side (arms between viewer and object lenses vertical) when they were LEAST accurate in range finding (a function of the distance between object lenses) to maximum range accuracy (arms between viewer and object lenses horizontal). The 'V' position was just one of a range of possible angles between the object lenses. The whole thing had to be set up so that the coincidence of the images in each of the two eyepieces resulted in a range.

The system works by having a FIXED left eyepiece prism and a MOVABLE right eyepiece prism. In each eyepiece there is a target marker (a central cross or circle). One looks at the target and using the RIGHT EYE adjustment brings its cross hair/circle into coincidence. The distance of field artillery scope could measure depended on how far the two telescopes were separated. The accuracy of the stereoscopic telescope is a function of using it with the object lenses maximally displaced apart, i.e. horizontal. They are only V-shaped or vertical when the observer is in cover and peering over a parapet - rangeing accuracy necessarily suffers. The length of the telescope itself is irrelevant. What matters is the HORIZONTAL DISTANCE between the two object lenses- i.e. the BASELINE of right angled triangle that the instrument is solving to come up with the range.

Another method for calculating the target distance from a long range was to compare the target directions from two OPs. This is known as base end station (US) or position cell (UK) rangefinding and solved as a simple triangle knowing two angles (the angles between each cell and the target) and the included side (the baseline between cells). The third angle is found using the fact that three angles add to 180°. Then use The Law of Sines to find each of the other two sides.

The observation post had phone lines connected to the headquarters. Some OPs even had communication devices to send target data directly to a battery plotting room.

The following sections describe the AOPs on the Hong Kong mainland (**Figure 2**).

Figure 2: *An artillery observation post with a DPF in front and field artillery scope in the back (internet source).*

Devil's Peak BOPs

GPS Position: N22° 17 34.6
E114° 14 35.7

A BOP, subject to confirmation, was built on the southern ridge of Devil's Peak at a height of 195 meters. This OP looks directly at the top of Sai Wan redoubt and within plus or minus 5m at the same height above mean sea level. It is possible they acted as position finding cells for the originally planned 6" batteries on either side of Lei Yue Mun Pass. The OP was a half-underground, single level concrete structure that overlooked Lei Yue Mun. The roof of this OP was demolished and its floor has since been covered by earth and vegetation. The OP is a long rectangular structure with a large opening in front for the DPF. The rear of the BOP housed its command and communication room. There was an entrance on each side of the structure, with the eastern entrance connected to the trench that led up to a redoubt on the Devil's Peak summit. This BOP might have been abandoned when the guns of Gough Battery were removed (**Figures 4-7**).



Figure 3: *Portion enlargement of the 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 5108.*

Figure 4: *Devil's Peak BOP with the redoubt in the background. The flights of steps were constructed after 2000. A trench lined by well-cut stones was dug along the ridge to connect the OP to the Redoubt (photo by the author in 2018).*

Figure 5: *Devil's Peak BOP seen from above. Note the entrance below that connects the trench to the Redoubt (photo by author in 2018).*

Figure 6: *Looking at the front of the BOP from inside (photo by author in 2000).*

Figure 7: *An entrance to the BOP (photo by author in 2000).*

Another BOP-cum-command center, like one found in Mount Davis Fort but subject to better research, was built farther below Gough Battery at about 130 meters. (GPS Position: N22 17 24.6 E114 14 33.0) This was a two-level structure with a BOP and fire control center for Gough and Pottinger Batteries. The roof and floor of its upper level have long been demolished. It has a rectangular extension on the side and a concrete trench connects to the entrance (**Figure 8**). The current condition of this structure is poor and its floor has been covered by earth and thick vegetation. It is very difficult to inspect the site and get a clear view of it. This BOP probably closed when the guns of Gough and Pottinger Batteries were removed (**Figures 9 & 10**).



Figure 8: *Portion enlargement of the 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 5108.*

Figure 9: *BOP-cum-command center. Note that the roof and upper level floor were demolished (photo by Lawrence W.C. Lai in 2020).*

Figure 10: *Concrete trench connecting to one of the entrances (photo by author in 2000).*

Razor Hill AOP

Located at 365 meters along the southern ridge of Razor Hill, this was a formal battery observation post with a concrete shelter that was very similar to that in Shing Mun. The OP was demolished after the war, leaving a big hole on the ground (**Figure 11**). Some concrete structures still remain on the site, but the details of its layout are still unknown.

Figure 11: *Razor Hill AOP after a hill fire. Note the remains of the concrete structures (photo by Rob Weir, 1990s).*

Aerial photos show the OP is a rectangular shape with two trenches on both sides for entrance and additional observation positions (**Figure 12**).



Figure 12: *Portion enlargement of the 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 9743.*

Hebe Hill AOP

Located at 310 meters on the top of lower Hebe Hill, this AOP was just a large foxhole without any concrete structure. Some sandbags and concrete blocks were spotted inside the hole. Three pillboxes and many trenches were constructed around the Hebe Hill area for local defence (**Figures 13 & 14**).



Figure 13: *Portion enlargement of the 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 4640.*

Figure 14: *Hebe Hill AOP after a hill fire in 1990. Note the concrete blocks (photo by Rob Weir, 1990s).*

Black Hill AOP

GPS position: N22° 18 37.1
E114° 14 41.5

Located at around 285 meters on the northern ridge of Black Hill, this AOP was mainly used to support the Devil's Peak Battery for the Ma Yau Tong Line. The AOP was demolished, leaving only a big hole. No concrete structure could be found on the site and its original details are unknown. The aerial photo shows trenches on both sides of this AOP that were possibly used for entry protection (**Figures 15-17**).



Figure 15: *Portion enlargement of the 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 5225.*

Figure 16: *Black Hill OP now just a hollow on one side of the trail near the hill top (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 17: *Looking to the north and east from Black Hill OP (photo by author in 2019).*

Smuggler's Ridge AOP

An OP was built above the Shing Mun Redoubt at 310 meters on the northern end of Smuggler's Ridge. It overlooks the Shing Mun reservoir dam and area below Needle Hill. This AOP was constructed above a cliff on a steep hill slope below the ridge. The 1964 aerial photo (**Figure 18**) shows a landslide above the AOP that was possibly due to the structure's demolition after the war. The AOP is now a big hole in the ground. Further details of it are unknown and the site is fully covered by vegetation. It is dangerous to inspect this site (**Figures 19-21**).



Figure 18: *Portion enlargement of the 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 4882: Smuggler's Ridge AOP was demolished no later than 1964. Note the hidden path below the main path on the ridge connecting to the OP.*

Figure 19: *Smuggler's Ridge AOP was fully covered by vegetation (photo by the author in 2019).*

Figure 20: *Looking out from the Smuggler's Ridge AOP. Needle Hill is in the middle. Left side is Shing Mun Reservoir and right side is Lower Shing Mun Reservoir (photo by author in 2010).*

Figure 21: *Landslide above the AOP. Note the very steep slope below (photo by author in 2010).*

Shing Mun AOP

GPS position: N22° 22 29.7
E114° 08 44.2

Located at 274 meters on the southern edge of Smuggler's Ridge, this was a formal AOP with a large concrete shelter and accommodation facilities. It had a communication station with phone service and possibly data transmission lines to connect to a battery plotting room (**Figures 22-24**). This AOP was equipped with a DPF to locate enemy ships near the Ma Wan and Tsing Yi channels. Three separate observation positions in the OP were for its field artillery telescope to locate land targets (**Figures 25-28**). During the Battle of Hong Kong, the AOP was used as the headquarters of the Shing Mun Redoubt (**Figures 29-34**).

Figure 22: *Shing Mun AOP (photo by author in 2018).*

Figure 23: *Roof of the Shing Mun AOP. An opening on the AOP's roof was caused by scavengers removing steel reinforced bars from the supporting beam (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 24: *Front of the Shing Mun AOP. The small slit was for a field artillery telescope. The large opening in the back was for the DPF. Both openings had steel shutters for protection. They were removed by scavengers after the war (photo by author in 2007).*

Figure 25: *The front of the Shing Mun AOP from the inside. The field artillery scope position was on its left-hand side. The DPF was on its right with a large concrete platform in the back. The three concrete blocks supported the DPF, but two have collapsed and only one remained in its original position. Note the battle damage on the roof and an opening for another field artillery scope position on the right (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 26: *The rear of the Shing Mun AOP. The holes on the wall were for mounting three bunk beds. The openings on the left and middle were for a field artillery scope. The opening on the right led to the communication and living area. Note the support beam on the roof (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 27: *The escape shaft for the Shing Mun AOP. The two metallic remains below were for mounting a ladder. The metallic part on the roof was used to lock the steel exit door (photo by author in 2007).*

Figure 28: *Communication station behind the Shing Mun AOP. Note the missing concrete table (photo by author in 2007).*

Figure 29: *Battle damage on the Shing Mun AOP inside walls caused by Japanese hand grenades dropped from the open observation roof opening (photo by author in 2011).*

Figure 30: *Wooden blocks laid inside the Shing Mun AOP roof used for holding cables to different observation positions via cable ducts. Note the battle damage on the surface of the roof (photo by author in 2015).*

Figure 31: *Battle damage to the field artillery scope position inside the Shing Mun AOP caused by Japanese hand grenades (photo by author in 2007).*

Figure 32: *Battle damage to the Shing Mun AOP caused by Japanese hand grenades (photo by author in 1990s).*

Figure 33: *Damage on the Shing Mun AOP roof caused by scavengers removing large steel reinforcement bars below the support beam. The shape of the removed rebars is still visible on the damaged surface (photo by author in 2007).*

Figure 34: *Shing Mun OP aspect view.*

Lung Ha Wan AOP

Two formal battery artillery observation posts were built at Ping Tok Hang Shan and Tai Leng Tung to monitor enemy ships approaching from the east. The AOP was possibly constructed for a 15-inch gun battery planned for Clearwater Bay, but it was never built. Both OPs supported the Lung Ha Wan Battery for a short time and were used to guide the gun batteries on Hong Kong Island East. Both AOPs had a two-level design. The upper level was an observation position with a DPF, while the lower level was probably for plotting and communication. A large encoding device might have been installed there to send target data to the battery command center.

Tai Leng Tung (Tai Wan Tau) OP

GPS position : N22° 17 39.5
E114° 18 30.4

Located at 165 meters on the southeastern ridge of Tai Leng Tung, this AOP covered the channels around Basalt Island and the Ninepin Group (**Figures 35-43**).

Figure 35: *Tai Leng Tung AOP with Steep Island in the background. The roof and upper level floor was demolished after the war to prevent the structure from being occupied by squatters (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 36: *The front of the Tai Leng Tung AOP's upper level. The metal remains on its wall were racks used to hold the steel shutters for the window. Note the remains of the camouflage painted on the wall (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 37: *The rear of the Tai Leng Tung AOP entrance hidden inside a large cave. Two trenches on the ground connected to the upper and lower entrances. A steel ladder would have been installed on the platform outside the upper entrance to facilitate access. Note a T-shaped Japanese tunnel dug inside the hill behind the AOP (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 38: *The front of the Tai Leng Tung AOP from the inside. Two large I-beams were used to support the upper level structure. Two windows were on the lower level used for large equipment installation and ventilation. Two trenches connected to these windows separately (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 39: *The rear of the Tai Leng Tung AOP from the inside. The entrances to both levels opened on different sides. There is no access from inside the building to either level. Instead, one had to gain access to either floor from outside the AOP (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 40*: Looking out from the Tai Leng Tung AOP (photo by author in 2016).*



Figure 41: *Portion enlargement of the 1972 Government aerial photo 1349.*



Figure 42: *Tai Leng Tung (Tai Wan Tau) OP.*

Figure 43: *The base for a post found near the Tai Leng Tung AOP. It is uncertain if they were for a fence or something else (photo by author in 2016).*

A small brick house was found next to the path near the *Tai Leng Tung AOP*. This could be a storage room for the AOP (**Figure 44**).

GPS position: N22° 17 39.1
E114° 18 30.1

Figure 44: *A brick house near Tai Leng Tung AOP (photo by author in 2016).*

Ping Tok Hang Shan AOP

GPS position: N22° 18 13.3
E114° 18 14.5

A separate AOP was constructed at 190 meters on the northern ridge of Ping Tok Hang Shan near the top of this hill. This AOP was used to cover the Rocky Harbour and Basalt Island area. It may also have been used to back up the Tai Leng Tung AOP, whose structure and layout it resembled.

This AOP was almost completely covered by vegetation, which makes it very difficult to access today. **Warning:** Many deep trenches and cliffs around the OP are hidden by undergrowth and almost invisible from above. One can easily fall into a trench or hole 4-5 meters deep and find it difficult to get out if one is not already injured (**Figures 45-49**).

Figure 45: *The rear of Ping Tok Hang Shan AOP and its entrance. The deep trench on the right was the main entrance to the AOP. Another trench in the middle connected to the window on the lower level. Note the steep cliff behind the AOP (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 46: *The right interior of the Ping Tok Hang Shan AOP. Its design was the same as that of the Tai Leng Tung AOP. The roof and upper floor of this AOP were demolished after the war (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 47: *The right side of the Ping Tok Hang Shan AOP with the upper and lower entrances at the rear. The earth outside was piled up to the same level as the lower level window on one side and to the upper level in the front. The right photo shows the narrow and deep main entry trench now blocked by vegetation (photo by author in 2016).*

Figure 48: *An L-shaped support wall was found outside the right-hand, lower level window. The upper section of the wall was demolished. A trench connected to the lower level window on each side (photo by author in 2016).*



Figure 49: *Portion enlargement of the 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 8964.*

Crown Point AOP (CPOP)

Located above 200 meters on the top of the north ridge of Crown Point, this AOP is a large underground complex with living, administrative, and communication rooms (**Figures 50-52**). The underground structures were generous enough to accommodate a company headquarters. The main sections of these structures were built over seven meters below the Earth's surface. This site was not only an AOP, but also a command and communication center.

The AOP had three observation posts facing different directions. They could use the data of two different directions measured from two different observation posts to plot the accurate position of a target. No DPF was used for this AOP, as it was only used against land targets.

Unfortunately, the hill where the Crown Point observation post was located was leveled during the 1980s for Sha Tin New Town development, so nothing is left today (**Figure 53**). The details of this site came mainly from Japanese survey reports (九龍半島に於ける本防御陣地　調査報告　昭和17年1月調査) and aerial photos. Aerial photos show that the entire site collapsed during the early 1960s. Possibly the British Army destroyed the site soon after the war.

A war diary (WO172/1685) mentions that the Crown Point AOP was shelled by Japanese artillery located near Cove Hill on 11 December 1941. However, no shell crater was spotted around the AOP on aerial photos. The AOP also reported 200 enemy soldiers coming on around 25 boats and two launches to land in Tai Shui Hang outside the range of any mainland battery.

Figure 50: *Looking down to the Shatin area from the Crown Point AOP. At the far left is Golden Hill, Ma On Shan is on the far right. Sha Tin Pass on the right is at the bottom along with Shui Chuen O Estate, which is under construction (photo by author in 2014).*



Figure 51: *Portion enlargement of the 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 5321.*



Figure 52: *Portion enlargement of the 1974 Government aerial photo 6328.*

Figure 53: *The top of Crown Point was flattened and the OP has completely disappeared. It was one level below the flattened ground on the Sha Tin side (photo by author in 2000).*

The following layout of the CPOP (**Figure 54**) was based on a Japanese survey report (防衛省防衛研究所：九龍半島に於ける本防御陣地　調査報告　昭和17年1月調査) written during the occupation.



Figure 54: *CPOP layout.*

Moffatts AOP

Located at over 380 meters on the top of a knoll at Garter Pass was Moffatts AOP. I was unable to locate its precise location, as the immediate area is now occupied by a pylon. The remains of this AOP were possibly destroyed by the construction of a power supply tower. The aerial photo showing an AOP might be just a hole dug into the ground like the Hebe Hill AOP (**Figures 55 & 56**).



Figure 55: *Portion enlargement of the 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 5727. Moffatts OP is just a hole left on the ground.*

Figure 56: *The marker stone points to Moffatts OP at MacLehose Trail near M104 (GPS position N22° 21 19.0 E114° 11 15.1). The OP is not far from the marker stone (photo by author in 2010).*

Crest Hill AOP

Several forward battery artillery OPs were constructed north of Shatin to monitor the main roads and border areas. An AOP on top of Crest Hill near Lo Wu was built to monitor the border and it was probably the first to witness the Japanese invasion. It reported the enemy bridging Lo Wu on the morning of 8 December 1941. The forward troops at this OP retreated when the enemy advanced and the defenders lost track of the enemy in this area. A 1945 aerial photo showed trenches around the hill top but no clear view of the OP. The OP was possibly just a hole dug in the ground (**Figures 57 & 58**).



Figure 57: *Crest Hill OP on 1945 R.A.F. Photo 681-4 4096. Note the badge on the hillside possibly built by the troops.*

Figure 58: *Crest Hill today. The underground OP in front of the communication tower was possibly built after the war (photo by author in 2018).*

Tung Lung Chau AOP

To monitor the main sea approach east of Victoria Harbour, an AOP was built at 120 meters on a ridge above Shek Chung Kok on Tung Lung Island (**Figure 59**). Its layout was similar to that of the Lung Ha Wan AOP, but had three levels. The additional level was possibly used for accommodation, as the site is in a remote location. The communication line of this site linked to the AASL site in the middle of the island and down to Fat Tong Mun. The cable was laid under water and also connected to the Lung Ha Wan AOP. From there, it might have linked to Devil's Peak and Hong Kong Island.



Figure 59: *Portion enlargement of the 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 8914.*

Surveying & Built Environment

Technical Note

Heavy Anti-Aircraft (HAA) Batteries

Y. K. Tan[*]

Hong Kong had four three inch anti-aircraft (AA) guns during the 1920s, but kept all of them in storage. The guns were taken out for training purposes at the end of the 1920s. In 1935, the British realized that Japan would be their future enemy in Asia and started to boost the defences of Hong Kong. In the 1937 air defence layout review, they planned to build 30 searchlight sites and seven heavy AA batteries to protect Hong Kong. (See the layout of the 1937 AA defence plan in the AA searchlight section as a reference.) In January 1938 the War Office recommended that Hong Kong be equipped with 32 3.7 or 4.5-inch AA guns to replace its old three-inch guns. However, due to budget limitations and the threat of war with Germany, there were not enough guns to supply Hong Kong. In July 1938, the Committee of Imperial Defence accepted the policy of defending Hong Kong Island only. All heavy guns on the mainland side, including the AA guns, were moved there. When the war began in December 1941, there were no heavy AA guns on the mainland side. On Hong Kong Island AA batteries were constructed for fixed and mobile guns (Figure 1).

Figure 1: *1939 Sai Wan AA Battery with Two QF Three-inch AA Guns (Photography by RAI).*

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The main heavy AA guns used in Hong Kong during the war were the QF three-inch 20 cwt AA gun (Figure 2). This was a World War I-era AA gun that became outdated by World War II. Before the war started in 1941, Hong Kong realized that it needed to upgrade its outdated air defence weapons urgently. It requested new AA guns, which included QF 3.7-inch mobile AA and QF 4.5-inch models, from the UK. However, only a few of these new models had arrived in Hong Kong before the war started. The outdated three-inch AA guns remained the type of AA defence by the time the Japanese invaded.



Figure 2: *QF Three-inch 20 cwt AA Gun (Internet source).*

The map of the 1938 (Figure 3) Hong Kong defence scheme shows that most AA batteries were located on Hong Kong Island. Only three were built outside it: in Kai Tak, Prince Edward Road, and Stonecutters Island. All AA batteries were equipped with two three-inch AA guns. However, the layout of the 1937 AA defence plan showed AA batteries in Lai Chi Kok (1), Kai Tak (3), and Stonecutters Island (6). The map below combines the AA batteries from both plans.

The British order of battle at the end of November 1941 shows that Hong Kong had two 4.5-inch, four 3.7-inch mobile, and ten three-inch heavy AA guns plus two 40mm Bofors autocannon and 12 searchlights. At least one additional three-inch AA gun was obtained from the Royal Navy to improve Hong Kong Island's air defences. Some three-inch guns mounted on mobile platforms were transferred to different locations throughout the city. These guns were moved as circumstances required, as Hong Kong did not have enough guns to equip every AA battery.

When the war started, there were no heavy AA guns in Kowloon, as all heavy guns were moved to defend Hong Kong Island. Two three-inch AA guns were moved to Kai Tak battery only a few days after it was bombed by the Japanese on December 8. One wartime report also mentioned that a mobile three-inch AA gun was sent to the Kowloon side in December 1941 to cover the withdrawal from the mainland, but the positions of these gun are unknown. All AA guns were withdrawn to Hong Kong Island before December 13.

The details on AA guns and searchlight deployments before and during the battle are confusing. There were many changes going on before the battle, while guns and searchlights were all over the place once it was underway. Different documents from different sources give different details of the same time period. I tried to summarize the information I received in the attached tables (Tables 1-3).

Figure 3: *Anti-Aircraft Battery and Searchlight Positions.*

List of HAA batteries Outside Hong Kong Island

Prince Edward Battery

It was located in the area between Boundary Street and the Kowloon-Canton Railway where the Kowloon Tong School is today. The battery might have been located inside the school back then. Nothing remains of it and its other details are unknown. An attached aerial photo shows the area around the battery in 1949 (Figure 4).



Figure 4: *Portion enlargement of R.A.F. aerial photo 1949 81A_117-6056.*

Kai Tak Battery

This site marked the east end of Kai Tak Aerodrome on the 1937 AA defence layout. However, on the 1938 Hong Kong defence scheme it marked the center area of Kai Tak on the seaside. No remains of the battery could be found on the aerial photos, so its actual location is unknown. It seemed more logical to build the AA battery on the edge of the airfield, as shown on the following 1949 aerial photo of Kai Tak (Figure 5). The AA position in the photo does not look like the wartime British style. This position was probably built by the Japanese during the occupation or British after the war. Note the shelters and hangar built along the hillside with many small tunnels. These were possibly built by the Japanese when they expanded Kai Tak.



Figure 5: *Portion enlargement of R.A.F. aerial photo 1949 81A_117-6066.*

Lai Chi Kok Battery

This battery is only shown on the 1937 AA defence layout. It was built on a hilltop in Lai Chi Kok where Kwai Chung Hospital is located today. This site could only be accessed by boat, as no road connected there. A large pier built on the seaside provided access to it and supported the battery's construction. A road laid from the pier to the AA battery was located on the hilltop. The battery occupied a flat space on the hilltop and none of its buildings (Figure 6) have been spotted on postwar aerial photos. It was probably abandoned soon after its construction started in 1938, when the defence policy changed. Thus, it was never completed and nothing remains

of it. Therefore, full details of it are unclear.

Figure 6: *Portion enlargement of R.A.F. 1949 aerial photo 81A_117-6104.*

Stonecutters Island Battery

This battery was supposedly located at the southeast point (White Point) of Stonecutters Island, but its actual location is unknown. Also unclear are the details of the battery and anything that remains there. The attached aerial photo shows the area around the battery in 1945 (Figure 7).

Figure 7: *Portion enlargement of R.A.F. 1945 aerial photo 681_5-4156.*

Table 1: Performance of Heavy AA Guns

	QF 3 inch	QF 3.7-inch	QF 4.5-inch
Calibre	3-inch (76.2 mm)	3.7-inch (94 mm)	4.45-inch (113 mm)
Elevation	-10° to +90°	-5° to +80°	0° to +80°
Traverse	360°	360°	360°
Rate of fire	16-18 rpm	10–20 rpm	12 rpm
Shell weight	16 lbs (7.3 kg)	28 lbs (13 kg)	55 lbs (24.9 kg)
Effective range	16,000 ft (4.9 km)	Ceiling 30,000 ft (9 km)	41,000 ft (12.5 km)

Table 2: Heavy AA Batteries

No.	HAA Site	Location	Guns in 1936	Guns in Nov. 1941	Guns on 8 Dec. 1941	Guns on 25 Dec. 1941	Post WWII	Remarks	Action in War
New Territory and Kowloon Peninsula:									
3	Kai Tak	Waterfront of old Kai Tak airfield	2 x 3"	No Gun	2 x 3"	No Gun		Possiblely withdrawn back to HK before Dec. 13.	2 3" guns moved to Kai Tak few days after bombing by Japanese on Dec. 8.
1	Lai Chi kok	Around Princess Margaret Hospital today		No Gun	No Gun	No Gun		abandoned before construction completed.	
	Prince Edward Road	Between Boundary Street and the railway line where Kowloon Tong School now stands	2 x 3"	No Gun	No Gun	No Gun			
Hong Kong Island:									
7	Mt. Davis	North side around the top of Mount Davis	2 x 3"	2 x 3"	2 x 3"	2 x 3" destroyed	Yes		Blown up at the surrender on 25 Dec.
	Pinewood	Lung Fu Shan Country Park	2 x 3"	2 x 3"	2 x 3"	2 x 3" destroyed			Shelled, gun destroyed / damaged and abandoned on 15 Dec.
4	Sai Wan Redoubt	South hilltop of today's Lei Yue Mun Park	2 x 3"	2 x 3"	2 x 3"	2 x 3" captured	Yes		Shelled on 16 Dec. Overrun on 18-19 Dec.
5	Shouson Hill	At the top of Shouson Hill	2 x 3"		No Gun	No Gun			
	Shek O				No Gun	No Gun			
	Stanley			3"/3.7" Mobile		3 x 3"		Photo shows 3 x 3" AA guns after the surrender.	Captured on 25 Dec.
	D'Aguilar			2 x 3"	2 x 3"	2 x 3" destroyed			Blown up on 10 Dec.
	Tai Hang			2 x 3"/3.7" Mobile	2 x 3.7" Mobile	No Gun			Moved back to Wong Nai Chung on 15 Dec.
	Causeway Bay			2 x 3"/3.7" Mobile	2 x 3"/3.7" Mobile	No Gun			One plane shot down on 10 Dec.
	Braemar Point			2 x 3"/3.7" Mobile		No Gun			
	Wong Nai Chung Gap	Near the entry of Tai Tam Country Trail			2 x 3.7" Mobile	2 x 3.7" Mobile captured		Only 4 x 3.7" AA guns in HK before war started. Two lost here.	Destroyed one plane on 16 Dec. Overrun and two 3.7" guns captured on 19 Dec.
	West Bay	Somewhere behind Chung Hom Kok beach		2 x 4.5" Planned	No Gun	No Gun			Withdrawn to Stanley and claimed plane destroyed on 20 Dec.
	Waterfall Bay	Where Phase 3 of Bel-Air		2 x 4.5"	2 x 4.5"	2 x 4.5"		Prepared site. All two 4.5" guns in HK were used here.	Destroyed a float plane on 13 Dec. Blown up on 25 Dec.
	Brick Hill	Today's Ocean Park			2 x 3.7" Mobile	2 x 3.7" Mobile	Yes	Prepared sites. Only 4 x 3.7" AA guns in HK before war started. Two lost here.	Destroyed one plane on 16 Dec. Overrun on 25 Dec. and two guns captured.
	Albany Road	Today's Botanical Gardens			2 x 3.7" Mobile	No Gun		Prepared sites?	Shelling near AA on 10 Dec. Moved to Caroline Hill on 15 Dec. Moved from Stanley Prison to Stanley Fort on 18 Dec.
Outlying Island:									
6	Stonecutters	Southeast point (White Point) of Stonecutters Island	2 x 3"	No Gun	No Gun	No Gun	Yes		

Table 3: AA Searchlight Sites

No.	AASL Site	Type	Location	Remarks	Action in War
New Territory and Kowloon Peninsula:					
3M	Tsuen Wan	Mobile			
5M	Shatin Station	Mobile	Area around Pai Tau Village		
6F	East of Shatin Station	Fixed	Below Siu Lek Yuen Fresh Water Service Reservoir.		
7M	Ho Chung	Mobile			
8F	Razor Hill	Fixed	Hill top between Clear Water Bay Road and Yau Yue Wan Village.		
9F	High Junk	Fixed	Around Tai Au Mun area.	Synchronised the time each morning, which was done by signalling lamp to Cape Collinson AASL site, which were in telephone contact with HQ.	
10F	Tai Miu Au	Fixed	East side of Tai Au Mun Road at Tai Miu Au. The searchlight site has become The Clearwater Bay Golf and Country Club today.		
22M	North end of Lion Rock railway tunnel	Mobile	Between Taipo Road and the railway line, NE of Keng Hau Road.		
23M	Customs Pass	Mobile	North side hill top of Clear Water Bay Road where the Flamingo Garden is located today.	A concrete equipment / accommodation building and concrete engine house (can't find on aerial photo), surrounded by a 8' high barbed wire on concrete posts.	
24F	Devil's Peak	Fixed	To the north of Devil's Peak Redoubt.		
28M	Whitfield Barracks	Mobile	Inside Kowloon Park at the north side of Haiphong Road, Austin Road end.		
29M	Kowloon Tong	Mobile	Around Junction of Argyle Street and Tin Kwong Road where Astaria located today.		
Hong Kong Island:					
	Quarry Bay / Side of Mt. Parker?	Mobile	Around the Quarry Bay MTR station where the Taikoo Sugar Factory was.		
	Sai Wan Barracks were destroyed in the late 19th century. So where was this AASL?				Attacked at night by 5th columnists - 13 Dec 1941. Attacked again - 15 Dec 1941
12M	D'Aguilar	Mobile	Windy Gap area near Shek O Road which became a quarry in the 20th century and is now reforested.		
	D'Aguilar Peak		Situated on a fairly flat area about 600 feet above the road leading to the lighthouse (pre Bokhara or pre-D'Aguilar Battery. The suggestion is the AASL was nearer the latter than the former.).	In 1940, the path had to be widened from 3 to 6 feet, to provide access for the sound locator on wheels to be taken up from the road. It was manhandled up, using a hand winch and block and tackle. It had a lovely view, but was hard work getting up to it.	
	Shek O		Shek O Golf Course.		
13M	Stanley		Bluff Head		
18M?	Aberdeen Island	Fixed	Ap Lei Chau near South Horizons.	1937 plan originally showed the AASL on the Aberdeen side of the harbour.	Bombed 9-10 Dec 1941. Cables damaged by bombs - 15-Dec-1941
19F	Mt. Austin	Mobile	West side of Victory Gap near the Peak.		
25F	Cape Collinson	Fixed	On the ridge above Siu Sai Wan.	The interior walls of the shelter still retain their the original paints. Three different colours were painted at different heights on these walls. Outside the equipment entry, some hit marks can be found.	Damaged by shellfire. Repaired - 13 Dec 1941
27M	Repulse Bay	Mobile	Area north of Repulse Bay Road and below the service reservoir.		

30M	Braemar Point	Mobile			Moved to North Point - 15 Dec 1941
	Tai Tam Tuk Reservoir		Tai Tam Tuk Reservoir.		
	Pottinger Gap	Mobile			
	Middle Spur		?		
	Wong Nai Chung Gap	Mobile			
Outlying Island:					
1F	South Cheung Hue/ Hui Island	Fixed	Tsing Yi Island Nam Wan near today's Mobil Oil Depot.		
2F	North Cheung Hue/ Hui Island	Fixed	North end of Tsing Yi Island, on the East coast. The concrete engine room was almost at the water's edge, with the concrete equipment building about 100 feet above and to the west.	Barbed wire surrounded the whole site, in the shape of a U, starting and finishing at the low water mark. There was no gate in the fence, access was only by boat, from Stonecutters Island.	
11F	Tung Lung Island	Fixed	A concrete engine room was about 20 feet above the western shore line. The equipment store was some distance up the grassy hillside.	Access by boat to a jetty below the southern cliff.	
17F	Green Island	Fixed	East point of Green Island.		
20F	Stonecutters Island	Fixed	North east point of Stonecutters Island.		

Surveying & Built Environment

Technical Note

Anti-aircraft Searchlights

Y. K. Tan[*]

Introduction

For night time air defence, many anti-aircraft searchlights (AASLs) were installed around Hong Kong to support its anti-aircraft batteries. The searchlight sites were far away from the anti-aircraft batteries to avoid exposing the batteries' locations when the searchlights were turned on. Heavy anti-aircraft guns of three inches or above had longer range than the searchlights. When an enemy aircraft flew beyond one searchlight's range, it would be passed on to the next one for continuous illumination. By organizing a large number of anti-aircraft batteries and searchlights around Hong Kong, the British could complete the coverage of the city's air defences.

A 1937 anti-aircraft gun and searchlight plan (Figure 1) shows the deployment of 30 searchlights on Hong Kong Island and the mainland to detect enemy aircraft at night. The anti-aircraft batteries surrounded the central city area to provide protection. However, the actual deployment of anti-aircraft guns and searchlights during wartime was a bit different from the plan. More anti-aircraft batteries were allocated to Hong Kong Island and some searchlight sites were placed at better positions.

Figure 1: *The Anti-Aircraft Gun and Searchlight layout as planned in 1937.*

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Two types of anti-aircraft searchlight site were used during the war: fixed and mobile. The "mobile" site had very limited supporting structures. Basically it was a searchlight position on open high ground with a terminal box connected to a power supply and communications equipment. A narrow trail connected the position to the road below. The searchlight and power generator were "mobile" by being transported by truck to the position when needed. The generator was connected to a terminal box on the roadside below the searchlight position to power the searchlight. The searchlight was moved by muscle power to the position on its tracked wheels.

The "fixed" site had a concrete shelter built near the searchlight site. The searchlight could be stored in the shelter when not in use and receive basic maintenance. The power generator was placed in a separate concrete shelter below the site. This arrangement prevented the engine noise from disturbing the sound locator used by the searchlight above. The "fixed" site constituted a complete support facility for the searchlight's operation, including living quarters, so that they could stay much longer at the site when needed. No site was manned permanently, but only during exercises. Most equipment was locked in a storeroom when not in use, but some smaller stores were returned to Wellington Barracks.

The searchlight sites were surrounded by barbed wire on concrete posts (Figure 2) or barbed wire fences for protection. Light anti-aircraft machinegun (LAAMG) posts were also built at each searchlight site to protect it from low flying enemy aircraft attacks.

Figure 2: *Remains of concrete posts for no evidence perimeter fences at the Mt. Austin AASL site (Demolished, photo by author in 2005).*

All rations, including water and fuel, were carried to the site manually during an operation. Searchlights, sound locators, machine guns and all required equipment were also manually moved to the positions on the ground well above the store room.

The Order of Battle in November 1936 indicated that Hong Kong was equipped with 18 120cm electric anti-aircraft searchlights (four mobile, 14 fixed) with Lister generators and 18 Mk III sound locators. But no information was available on how many anti-aircraft searchlights actually operated in Hong Kong during the war. The archives did, however, indicate that some 90 cm searchlights were supplied before the war.

Chinese sappers were also manning the searchlight sites during the war. They usually operated the engine and generator. But sometime they also manned the sound locater, Lewis gun and searchlight.



Figure 3: *A 1930s photo showing a searchlight (120cm?) in a barracks (Tim Ko's collection).*

AA Searchlights

Hong Kong used British-built carbon arc anti-aircraft searchlights (projectors). Originally 120-cm projectors were used and these were supposed to be replaced by new 90 cm types (Figures 4-7). However, only a few 90-cm projectors arrived in Hong Kong before the war began, so many sites still had to use old 120-cm projectors throughout the war.

The projector (light) was mounted on wheels to allow for easier relocation using manpower. The power requirements for a searchlight were 80 Volts and 250 amps these were supplied by a 24 kW Lister diesel engine. Because of the heat and intense brightness generated by a searchlight, an extended control arm was attached to it to allow its operator to control it from a more comfortable distance.

Figure 4: *A 90 cm searchlight with tracked wheels in operation during WWII. Note the operator using an extended control arm to maintain distance from the light (Imperial War Museum collection).*

Figure 5: *A 90 cm Mk VI searchlight at Brisbane's Fort Lytton. This Australian-made searchlight is similar to the ones used in Hong Kong (Photo by author in 2010).*



Figure 6: *The carbon rods inside the searchlight generated highly luminous electric arcs when the power was on. The rack of horizontal carbon rods can adjust the position between two carbon rods to generate electric arcs, the arc strikes between the tips of the two rods and the 'rack' is the mechanism for moving the movable rod to the fixed rod as its carbon is consumed during operation. (Photo by author in 2010).*

Figure 7: *Ventilation fan on top of the searchlight helped dissipate heat and smoke generated by the electric arc (Photo by author in 2010).*

AASL Power Generators

A 24 kW, 4 cylinder, Lister diesel engine was used to power the searchlight. The generator was placed on a trailer for mobility or in a concrete shelter for fixed protection. The photo below (Figure 8) shows a Lister generator similar to those used in Hong Kong. The diesel engine is on its left, while a generator with its output controls on the right.

Figure 8: *Lister JP4 generator on trailer (internet photo).*

Sound Locaters

Anti-aircraft searchlight sites used Mk III sound locators to seek and locate enemy aircraft in the dark during the pre-radar days.

The sound locator also called an Automatic Remote Control (ARC) Sound locator. The attached photo (Figure 9) shows a typical sound locator used in Hong Kong before the war.

Figure 9: *Sound locators used in Hong Kong during the 1930s (Tim Ko's Collection).*

Light Anti-aircraft Machineguns (LAAMG)

To protect each searchlight site from air attack, a Lewis machinegun post was situated nearby. The machinegun was mounted on a special stand to allow it to fire at a high angle. The machinegun post was normally set in a hole or surrounded by walls to protect the gunner. The photo below (Figure 10) shows a Lewis machinegun in an anti-aircraft exercise before the war.

This weapon was considered outdated and inefficient against the more advanced airplanes during WWII.

Figure 10: *Anti-aircraft company training in Fanling, 1937 (internet photo).*

Searchlight Platforms

A searchlight position was normally built on open high ground near an equipment shelter. A narrow trail or concrete path was also built between the storage room and searchlight position to facilitate easier transfer of the searchlight. The searchlight was equipped with wheels or tracks to enable it to be manhandled to another position.

Small concrete platforms were often found in searchlight positions in remote areas. The platform was hexagon (Figure 11) or octagon-shaped (Figure 12), which made it easier to build.

Figure 11: *Hexagon-shaped platform at searchlight position at Siu Lek Yuen (Photo by author in 2018).*

Figure 12: *Octagon-shaped platform at searchlight position on Tung Lung Chau. Note the terminal box on the right behind the platform (Photo by author in 2018).*

For searchlight positions situated close to a battery or barracks, a well-constructed, large circular searchlight platform was used. The following photo (Figure 13) shows a large searchlight position surrounded by a railing. It allowed the operator to remotely control the searchlight using an extended arm. A concrete trench connected to the searchlight position and storage room to facilitate moving the light. Note the round plate on the left used to cover the searchlight hole when not in use. This searchlight is possibly a 120 cm type.

Figure 13: *Photo showing a large searchlight position in 1930. Note the direction indicator (W) marked on the rail (Tim Ko's Collection).*

Terminal Boxes

A concrete box built near the searchlight platform connected communication and power supply cables (Figure 14). The box had a thick steel door in front to cover the cable panel inside. A hole was drilled at the bottom for a cable to go through its underground concrete duct. An operator had to open the door and plug in the power and phone lines to operate the searchlight.



Figure 14: *Concrete cable box on Razor Hill (photo by author in 2014).*

A heavy twin cable was encased in a concrete duct running from the engine room to the searchlight position. This duct also protected the cables from battle damage. The photo below (Figure 15) shows a concrete cable duct exposed by weathering.



Figure 15: *Underground concrete cable duct exposed in Razor Hill (photo by author in 2014).*

Equipment Storage Rooms

The standard layout for a searchlight site had a concrete equipment storeroom and concrete engine room. The store and engine rooms were also used as personnel living quarters. A crew consisted of 11 members who operated the lights, sound locators, and engine.

The equipment storeroom was a concrete shelter built near the searchlight position (Figure 16). It was normally built at a lower level and hidden by landscaping. The shelter and its windows were fitted with massively strong steel doors and shutters as protection. The personnel entrance was built as a cutout along the hillside to provide protection. A large door on the other side of building faced a flat, open space used for the searchlight and equipment entrance. The building included an office with a direct communications link to headquarters. However, some remote sites had no phone communications line and had to use signal lamps to communicate with other sites that were in visual range.

Figure 16: *Searchlight equipment storeroom near Cape Collinson (photo by author in 2018).*

The site was not designed as a permanent living quarters and was only manned during operations. It provided basic amenities like a toilet and kitchen (Figures 17-22). The site was normally located in a remote area and all supplies, including water, had to be carried by the crew. The crew had to sleep in tents or on the storeroom floor. During idle periods, the larger equipment was locked up in the shelter, while the smaller items were taken away.

Figure 17: *Personnel entrance, water tank, and pit toilet at the back end of the shelter (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 18: *Left photo shows the inside of pit toilet. A toilet seat possibly covered on the hole before. Right photo shows an opening behind the toilet probably used for emptying or cleaning (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 19: *The kitchen with rack and pipe for a basin on the left. The hole in the wall on the right is a chimney for the stove. The opening on the right leads to a storeroom. The window had steel shutters before (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 20: *The office with a concrete table and a two-level rack mounted on the wall (both gone). Note the rail on the wall for window's sliding steel shutters (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 21: *The storage room with large sliding steel door to the open space in the front. Note the wall was painted in different colours different colours at different heights for reasons yet unknown (photo by author in 2005).*



Figure 22: *Floor plan of the searchlight equipment storage shelter.*

AASL Generator Rooms

The generator and engine were installed in another specially-designed concrete shelter below the searchlight. This arrangement was intended to reduce the likelihood of the engine's noise interfering with the sound locator's operation.

Such structures also tended to be built along hillsides and were equipped with steel doors and shutters to provide protection. Inside, an i-beam and crane were installed on the ceiling to handle heavy objects (Figures 23-26).

Engine fuel and all required supplies were hand-carried by the soldiers during an operation.

Figure 23: *I-beam and crane at the Mt. Austin AASL Site, now demolished (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 24: *AASL engine room below Devil's Peak Redoubt (photo by Lawrence W.C. Lai in 2021).*

Figure 25: *Inside the Razor Hill engine room is the store room and engine platform (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 26: *Concrete platform on floor used to install the engine and generator. Three trenches on ground used to place cables from the generator. Note the remains of large bolts used to install the engine (photo by author in 2019).*

Anti-Aircraft Searchlight Sites

Because the wartime records of Hong Kong defense have been lost. We have no idea whether they were lost in HK, Singapore, India or UK. Nor is it clear whether, in the case of places outside HK, duplicates were sent from HK in the first place. History is what the evidence obliges us to believe, no less AND NO MORE. The only extant records are pre-war from the 1930s. The list of anti-aircraft searchlight sites is mainly based on the 1937 defense plan, aerial photos and site visits. The actual sites and equipment used during war time are still not fully clear to us.

The list below only includes located anti-aircraft searchlight sites on the mainland and islands excluding Hong Kong Island. The full list of AASL and HAA sites can be referenced on the attached table and map. The original site name used in the wartime record may be different from the name of the location today.

Aerial photos show most searchlight site buildings had the roof removed shortly after war. This must have been done by the government or military to prevent the buildings being occupied by squatters. All metal parts on the abandoned buildings were also removed by scavengers. The heavy steel covers on windows, steel doors and rebars inside concrete were worth good money at that time.

East of Shatin Station (6.F.)

A fixed site located below Siu Lek Yuen Fresh Water Service Reservoir today. The equipment store room and searchlight position still exist but the engine room has been demolished. The aerial photo below (Figure 27) shows the layout of the site in 1964. Another recent photo (Figure 28) shows the site in 2019 for comparison.



Figure 27: *Portion enlargement of the 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 4978.*

Figure 28: *Recent photo of the site (photo by author in 2019).*

Searchlight Store Room

GPS position: 22° 22’ 43.6” N
114° 12’ 49.1” E

The searchlight store room found below Fa Sam Hang Fresh Water Pump House (See Figure 37). The personnel entrance side is covered by construction land fill. The roof of the building was removed after the war to prevent occupation by squatters. Earth banks on the right side of the photo (Figure 29) provide additional protection to the entrance area.

Figure 29: *The rear of store room is covered by landfills (photo by author in 2005).*

Large damage found on the west side by an artillery shell (Figure 30) was possibly caused by artillery shell. Major damage found on the west side wall (Figure 30) was possibly caused by an artillery shell, which exploded on impact. Smaller damage at ground level

was probably from the same cause. The damage shows the explosion occurred outside the wall at ground level.

Figure 30: *The west side wall and large round hole (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 31: *Battle damage on the outside wall (photo by author in 2005).*

Damage on the inside of the east side wall was probably caused by shell splinters. The horizontal line of damage line below and above the window was caused by removing the rail for the window shutters window shutters. The vertical line of damage line on left is the was caused by the removal of the brick wall separating the storage room, office and kitchen.

Figure 32: *Splinter damage on the inside wall (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 33: *Outside of the east side wall (photo by author in 2005).*

Inside of equipment entrance: The horizontal line of damage below the roof was caused by the removal of the rail for the large sliding steel door (Figure 34). All metal parts in the building were removed by scavengers after the war. Note the splinter damage on the wall.

Figure 34: *Inside of equipment door area (photo by author in 2019).*

Inside of personnel entrance: This side was built in a cutout in the hillside to protect people getting in and out (Figure 35). The entrance is now blocked by landfill. On the right side is the office and left side is the kitchen. An opening on the left side connects to the small store room. The vertical damage line on the right is from the removal of the brick wall which separated this area from the equipment storage space.

Figure 35: *Inside of person entrance (photo by author in 2005).*

Damaged supporting beam under the roof shows the steel rebar inside (Figure 36). Steel rebars were commonly dug out of concrete by scavengers after war.

Figure 36: *Damaged supporting beam with rebar (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 37: *AASL shelter aspect views.*

Searchlight Position

GPS position: 22° 22’ 42.5” N
114° 12’ 50.1” E

The searchlight position and power box luckily survived after the development of a road and service reservoir (See Figure 42). The position is above the road and the power box is just at the edge of a cliff (Figure 38). In the background one can see the ridge of PB 205 which is the edge of Gin Drinkers Line in the Sha Tin area. The searchlight site is far outside the defense line. This site is difficult to defend from attack and would be abandoned on the approach of the enemy.

Figure 38: *Power box above the cliff (photo by author in 2018).*

Front of power box (Figure 39): The panel inside provides a connection to power supply and communication. The hole at the bottom allows cables to go to the cable duct underground. Damage was caused by scavengers removing the steel doors.

Figure 39: *Front of power box (photo by author in 2018).*

A hexagon shape platform (Figure 40) is about six meters away from the power box. The small hole open on the edge was for drainage.

Figure 40: *Concrete platform (photo by author in 2018).*

Remains of concrete path connecting the searchlight platform to the power box and store room below (Figure 41). The remaining concrete path is mostly covered by earth and plants. Most of the original path was destroyed by road and service reservoir construction work.

Figure 41: *Remains of concrete path to the searchlight post (photo by author in 2018).*



Figure 42: *AASL aspect views.*

Shatin Station (5.M.)

A mobile site where Shatin Park is located today. Nothing remains of the site and the exact location is unknown. This 1949 aerial photo (Figure 43) shows the landscape around the site. AASL location is based on the 1937 defence plan.

Figure 43: *Portion enlargement of 1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A_118-5069.*

North end of Lion Rock Railway Tunnel (22.M.)

A mobile site located between the railway line and Keng Hau Road (Figures 44 and 45). Nothing remains remain of the site today. The exact location and details are unclear. The AASL position marked is based on the 1937 defence plan. Note the defence positions around the tunnel entrance to protect the tunnel.



Figure 44: *Portion enlargement of 1956 R.A.F. aerial photo F22/81A/RAF/560-0015.*

Figure 45: *Keng Hau road area today. The AASL site is on the hill where buildings are located now. The construction site in front is new Hin Keng station (photo by author in 2014).*

Whitfield Barracks (28.M.)

A mobile site inside today's Kowloon Park at the north side of Haiphong Road near Nathan Road (Figure 46). The site is inside Whitfield Barracks which was near the Mosque in Kowloon Park today. No remains of the site can be found and the exact location is not known.

Figure 46: *Portion enlargement of 1945 R.A.F. aerial photo 681_6-3025.*

Kowloon Tong (29.M.)

A mobile site on the south side of Argyle Street around today's Tin Kwong Road, where The Astoria is located today. This site just has a searchlight platform without any support buildings. The cable duct connecting to the searchlight post is not visible on the photo (in Figure 47). The searchlight may have been directly connected to a generator on a trailer on the roadside close by. No remains can be found today.



Figure 47: *Portion enlargement of 1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A_117-6145.*

Tung Lung Island (11.F.)

A fixed site built around the center point of Tung Lung Island. The searchlight position is on the hill top. The store room and engine room were built in the valley below. A zig zag trail was built to connect the site with Nam Tong pier below. Another path connected to the observation post at the east side of Tung Lung Island. Note the shell/bomb craters around the site. One hit destroyed the cable connection between the searchlight post and engine room (Figure 48).



Figure 48: *Portion enlargement of 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 1134.*

Searchlight Position

GPS position: 22° 14' 56.9" N
114° 17' 22.1" E

The searchlight position is on the hill top above the store room. The photo below (Figure 49) shows a hexagon shape searchlight position with a power terminal box behind (Figure 50).

Figure 49: *Searchlight platform on the hill top with a survey point and Tseung Kwan O behind (photo by author in 2017).*

Figure 50: *The power terminal box (photo by author in 2017).*

Equipment Store and Engine Room

GPS position: 22° 14' 57.9" N
114° 17' 18.1" E

The store and engine room were built together in a valley below the hill. Now the site is fully covered by vegetation. The roof of engine room and store room were removed soon after war. Both structures were further damaged in the 80s (Figures 51 and 52). The walls above the bottom of the window have been demolished. The site has been used as a construction site with a lot of construction waste and equipment. The original path to Nam Tong has also disappeared.

Figure 51: *Heavily damaged engine room with a concrete mixer inside (photo by author in 2017).*

Figure 52: *Remains of store room covered by landfill (photo by author in 2017).*

North Cheung Hue/Hui Island (2.F.)

A fixed site at the north end of Tsing Yi Island near today's St Paul's Village. (Figure 53). Tsing Yi was named as Tsing Hue (or Hui) or Chung Hue on wartime maps and records. The concrete engine room was almost at

the water's edge, with the concrete equipment building about 100 feet above and to the west. A U-shape barbed wire barrier surrounded the whole site, starting and finishing at the low water mark. There was no gate in the fence, access was only by boat, from Stonecutters Island. This site has no phone communication with headquarters. They needed to use a signaling lamp to communicate with other sites in visual range.



Figure 53: *Portion enlargement of the 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 2285.*

Figure 54 below shows the site today next to Tsing Yi Park. The hill is completely reshaped and much lower than the original. The knoll on the south side of store room where the searchlight position was located is gone. However, the store room still exists but the landscape around has changed. The base of the engine room also remains behind the car park on the right side of the photo.

Figure 54: *Tsing Yi north searchlight site today (photo by author in 2019).*

Equipment Store Room

GPS Position: 22° 21' 27.9" N
114° 06' 17.8" E

The roofs were removed from almost all searchlight site buildings outside Hong Kong Island soon after the War. This is the only searchlight store room outside Hong Kong Island which still has a roof. This structure was used by a church to help the local fishermen in the 1960s and 70s. Now it is used by Tsing Lam Alliance Church (宣道會青霖堂) (Figure 55).

Figure 55: *Searchlight store room on church land today (photo by author in 2019).*

The landscape around the store room is completely reshaped (Figures 56 and 57). There was a ridge on the right side of the building to provide cover. The searchlight position was on a knoll behind and above the store room. The area in front of store room was also leveled. The store room area has now become the hilltop.

The store room was modified by the church. An additional roof was added on top of original one and the chimney was also blocked. The open area around the personnel entrance is covered with a new window and side door. The inside of building may also have changed. However, this still the most intact searchlight store room outside Hong Kong Island.

Figure 56: *Side of store room shows the modified entrance on the right side (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 57: *Personnel entrance side of the store room. The extended structure in front was the toilet and water tank. The square mark above the ground now blocked was for access to the toilet. All power and water pipes are modern enhancements (photo by author in 2019).*

Engine Room

GPS position: 22° 21' 31.1"
N 114° 06' 17.6" E

The engine room was demolished but the base still remains. It is located behind the car park under the railway bridge (Figures 58 and 59). The place is used as small temple by the local villagers now.

Figure 58: *Remains of engine room base is below the steps in middle (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 59: *The remaining base of the engine room in the middle. On the Right side is a car park where the water front was located before. The Hill on the left side was cut and reshaped (photo by author in 2019).*

South Cheung Hue/Hui Island (1.F.)

A fixed site located at Tsing Yi Island Nam Wan is today the Mobil Oil depot. This site may also have had no phone communication with headquarters. There was no road connection to the site from the island. A pier built on the beach below provided access by boat. A path was constructed to connect the equipment store and engine room with the pier. The equipment store and engine room were built together inside a valley. The searchlight position is on the hill top above. The path to the searchlight position was damaged by a landslide in the 1963 photo (Figure 60), but some of the cable duct can still be seen. The power terminal box seems much larger than normal. It may also have been used to store some equipment as the position is far away from store room below. A zigzag trail on the right side linked to another unknown position on the hill top.



Figure 60: *Portion enlargement of the 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 8335.*

Stonecutters Island

A fixed site on the north east point of Stonecutters Island (Figure 61). Details and accurate location are unknown.



Figure 61: *Portion enlargement of 1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A_117-6155.*

Green Island

A fixed site on the east point of Green Island (Figure 62). Details and accurate location unknown.



Figure 62: *Portion enlargement of 1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A_128-6053.*

Customs Pass (23.M.)

A mobile site on the north side of a hilltop off Clearwater Bay Road today occupied by the Flamingo Garden development. No remains of structures can be found on the site now. However, some records show it had a concrete equipment / accommodation building and engine house surrounded by a 8' high fence on concrete posts. We cannot find the remains of the equipment store and the engine room shown on a 1949 aerial photo (Figure 63). It is not clear whether the buildings were demolished or could not be completed before the war started.



Figure 63: *Customs Pass AASL site on 1949 aerial photo (1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 6076 81A-117).*

Ho Chung (7.M.)

A mobile site located at Ho Chung. Unable to find this site on aerial photos. Location and details unknown.

Razor Hill (8.F.)

A fixed site located on a hill top between Clear Water Bay Road and Yau Yue Wan Village. The equipment store and engine room still exist today. This site only has a small store room without an accommodation facility (See Figure 65).

This anti-aircraft searchlight storage shelter is built behind the hill ridge. A platform is in front of the building with steps connected to the engine room below. The searchlight position is on the ridge next to the store room roof. A tunnel portal can be found on the aerial photo (Figure 64) at the end of main trench. It is possibly an air-raid shelter or storage. This tunnel was long demolished. Roads connected to the store room and engine from Clearwater Bay road is clear visible. Also the marker stones at the road junctions can be seen. The marker stone at Clearwater Bay road is gone but the other two stones still exist (Figure 66).



Figure 64: *Portion enlargement of 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 4707.*

Figure 65: *Razor Hill AASL aspect views.*

Figure 66: *Marker stone points to the searchlight site (AA) (photo by author in 2008).*

Equipment Store Room

GPS position: 22°19'50.4"N 114°15'42.3"E

The equipment store room built inside a large trench on the hill ridge above Clearwater Bay Road near Ngan Ying Road (Figures 67-74). The hill on the front side of the building has a large cutout possibly for lighting and ventilation. A stepped path is built on the side of a cutout to the engine room below. Two large windows are in the front wall of the building. Two large doors on the sides of the building allow passage along the trench. The door area is heavily damaged, possibly caused by removing the steel doors and expanding the road.

Figure 67: *The south east side of the store room (photo by author in 2004).*

Figure 68: *The north west side of the store room. Note the cutout in front of the building with a path on the right side (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 69: *Inside of the front wall and window of the store room. The square hole at the top right is for ventilation (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 70: *The front side of the store room (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 71: *The rear of the store room. The round hole on the top left is possibly a chimney (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 72: *The remains of a chimney hole on the hill top above the store room roof (photo by author in 2014).*



Figure 73: *Different aspect views of the AASL Shelter.*

Figure 74: *Concrete steps found on the hillside below the store room. They go down to the old path to the engine room. These steps were possibly built by the military to connect the store room and engine room (photo by author in 2019).*

Searchlight Position

The searchlight is on the ridge next to the store room roof (Figures 75-78). A branch of a 1.8m wide trench connected to the position from the main trench. During operations, the searchlight was moved out from the

shelter and pushed along the trench to its position by manpower. A hexagon shaped searchlight location and concrete power box can be found near the shelter roof for the searchlight operation. A concrete covered duct was built underground connected to the engine room to protect the power line.

Figure 75: *Branch of the smaller trench on the left side of the photo connected to the searchlight position (photo by author in 2004).*

Figure 76: *Hexagon shaped searchlight position (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 77: *The front of the power terminal box (photo by author in 2004).*

Figure 78: *Rear of power terminal box. The underground cable duct connected to the box on the left side of photo (photo by author in 2014).*

Engine Room

GPS Position: 22° 19’ 45.4” N
114° 15’ 40.0” E

The engine room is on the hillside further below the store room (Figures 79-86). The roof was removed after the war. Most damage was caused by removing metal parts from the concrete.

Figure 79: *The front side and large entrance of the engine room (photo by author in 2004).*

Figure 80: *Engine room inside a cutout in the hillside. Note concrete path and the large platform in front of the entrance (photo by author in 2004).*

Figure 81: *Inside of engine room with the platform for the engine and generator. Damage on top of the wall caused by removal of the roof supporting beams (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 82: *Looking towards the engine room entrance. Note the remains of metal racks on left side wall (photo by author in 2004).*

Figure 83: *The engine platform and cable ducts. Metal plating originally covered the ducts to protect the power cables below. Note the long bolts used to install the engine on platform (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 84: *The rear wall inside with open hole for pipeline. Bricks embedded at top of wall have holes for ventilation (photo by author in 2019).*

On the rear of the engine room is an extension of a concrete rack that may have been built to support the fuel tank. It is safer to place dangerous fuel outside the engine room. The hole in the wall allows the fuel pipe to connect to the engine inside the engine room.

Figure 85: *Rear of the engine room with concrete rack inside a large cutout from hillside (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 86: *Different aspect views of the AASL Engine Room.*

High Junk (9.F.)

This site is a mystery as I am unable to find it on the map or aerial photos after a long time searching (Figures 87-91). A friend of mine met a soldier who actually manned this site a long time ago. He described the site as about 30 yards above the Clearwater Bay Road, by what is now Ha Yeung New Village. The site had no telephone communication with headquarters. Each morning they needed to use a

signalling lamp to synchronize the time with the Cape Collinson antiaircraft searchlight site. Unfortunately we cannot get any further information about this site from him now.

By studying the landscape there, the knoll next to Tai Au Mun road junction is a good spot for a searchlight. The store and engine room were possibly located on the roadside below. I walked around the area to search for remains of the shelter and searchlight post but found nothing. This site may even have been destroyed during the Japanese occupation as nothing is shown on the 1945 aerial photo in Figure 87.



Figure 87: *High Junk AASL site area on 1945 aerial photo (R.A.F. aerial photo 681 6 3037).*



Figure 88: *A clearer version of 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo that shows the Tai Au Mun area with no sign of the AASL site. (No. 8975).*

Figure 89: *Area below High Junk today (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 90: *The knoll below High Junk at Tai Au Mun (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 91: *Ha Yeung New Village area today (photo by author in 2019).*

Tai Miu (10.F.)

A fixed site at Tai Miu Au where the Clearwater Bay Golf and Country Club is located today (Figures 92-96). This site has no road connection and access is only by boat from the pier near the Tin Hau temple. Note a shelter built above the pier was possibly used to store supplies brought by boat.

The engine room is in the gap below and the store room in the cutout near the hill top. A U-shaped fence was built around the storeroom to protect it. The searchlight post was built on a

knoll near the storeroom. The aerial photo shows the cable duct from the engine room to the searchlight position. Another cable duct from the Clearwater Bay direction also passed through there in the direction of Tung Lung Chau. This must have been the communication cable connecting the Lung Ha Wan and Tung Lung Chau observation posts (OP). Both power and communication cable were connected to the terminal box at the searchlight position. This site must have been able to communicate with headquarters by phone.



Figure 92: *1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo shows the AASL site clearly (No. 8919).*

Figure 93: *AASL site has become a golf course today. No remains of AASL structures can be found (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 94: *Tai Miu Au today. The engine room was located on the high ground above the road (photo by author in 2019).*



Figure 95: *The hill top of AASL site was flattened to build a golf course. The engine room is also completely demolished and nothing is left on the site (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 96: *Another view of the AASL site today (photo by author in 2019).*

Devil's Peak (24.F.)

A fixed searchlight site on the north of the hillside near Devil's Peak Redoubt. The searchlight post was on top of the ridge and the storeroom in the gap below (Figure 97). The engine room was located in a valley further below the site. The equipment storeroom and engine room still exist today but the searchlight position is gone. This site has two searchlight positions. Possibly the second one was built on a better position after completing the first one. The main position was close to the storeroom. The second position may have used the base of No. 1 Block House (BH1). Two cable ducts were constructed from the engine room to the searchlight position. Note many Japanese tunnels and caves around that area.



Figure 97: *Portion enlargement of the Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 4752.*

Equipment Store Room

GPS position: 22° 17' 47.3" N
114° 14'44.9" E

The store room is located on the ridge next to a cemetery (Figures 98-102). Other than missing the roof and metal parts the structure is still in relatively good condition.

Figure 98: *Searchlight store room next to the cemetery (photo by Ping Yung in 2002).*

Figure 99: *Equipment entrance of store room (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 100: *Outside wall of store room. The personnel entrance is on the right side hidden in a cutout (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 101: *Inside of the equipment store area (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 102: *Inside wall of store room in 2005 which was still not covered by trees (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 103: *Inside of personnel entrance. Note the door outside is covered by a cliff face (photo by author in 2005).*



Figure 104: *Different aspect views of the DP AASL shelter.*

Engine Room

GPS position: 22° 17’ 42.2” N
114° 14’ 42.0” E

The engine room is located in a valley further below the searchlight site.

Figure 105: *Engine room still visible from above in 2005. Now it is completely covered by trees (photo by author in 2005).*

Figure 106: *Front of the engine room. The path in front was built in recent years (photo by author in 2017).*

Figure 107: *A water tank found near the engine room which disappeared after building the new path (photo by author in 2005).*



Figure 108: *Different aspect views of the AASL generator shelter.*

Surveying & Built Environment

Technical Note

Headquarters of the Gin Drinkers Line and Mainland Defence

Y. K. Tan[*]

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1930s British interim defence plan, two battalions were planned for the defence of Hong Kong's mainland areas. This plan was updated after the arrival of the Canadians in the city in November 1941 and changed to three battalions on the mainland. The Mainland Infantry Brigade included three battalions (right, center, and left or ABC) to defend the New Territories and Kowloon when the Japanese attacked in 1941. The 2nd Battalion, the Royal Scots Regiment (2RS), was the left battalion (C Bn) responsible for the Tsuen Wan and Kwai Chung area. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment (2/14 Punjab), was the center battalion (B Bn) responsible for the Shatin area. The 5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment (5/7 Rajputs) was the right battalion (A Bn) responsible for Tate's Cairn to Hang Hau.

Each battalion was divided into four companies from A to D. Each company was assigned a section of the Gin Drinkers Line. C Company of the center battalion was placed forward near Tai Wai. The mainland defence force was reinforced by 'D' Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, who covered the area around Kowloon Reservoir and Tai Wai, and the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC), which covered the Ngau Chi Wan area.

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The following map shows the layout of Hong Kong's mainland defences in December 1941.

Figure 1: *1:80,000 Base Map of Hong Kong and the New Territories Published by the War Office (No.3961, 2nd Edition, 1945).*

To support the above arrangements, at least 12 company headquarters and three battalion headquarters were situated along the Gin Drinkers Line. However, the original plan was only for two battalions and was not changed to provide an HQ for the third battalion. According to the *Progress Report of the War Office in 1938,* 11 shrapnel-proof headquarters were completed or half-completed by 1938. New headquarters shelters were constructed before the war started and some reserve HQs were added. Those companies that lacked HQ shelters were expected to use what was available as their HQs even if they were only pillboxes or any other building with a phone line.

The following HQs were mentioned in the 1938 Defence Scheme. Some came with grid references for the map attached to the Defence Scheme, but many consisted of only rough descriptions of their locations. Some mentioned the names of HQs, but others simply stated "Bn" (Battalion) or "Coy" (Company) HQ without names. The actual wartime HQs might have changed or moved, but were not updated in the plans. The battalion or company HQs were normally designated either Left, Right, and Center or A, B, and C on official documents, but sometimes used location names. However, their HQ names might have changed during the war.

- Mainland Brigade or Kowloon Infantry Brigade HQ located at the end of Waterloo Road (Grid 210602)
- Mainland Battalion HQ located at the Tai Po Road junction in Sham Shui Po (RES Bn HQ?)
  - Left Coy HQ at Skeet Ground (Grid 168632)
  - Coy HQ at Grid 159637 (Tai Wo Hau)
  - Coy HQ at Smuggler's Pass
- Indian Battalion HQ located at Shatin Pass (Grid 2362)
  - Left Coy HQ at Kowloon Pass
  - Centre Coy HQ at Grid 205642 (Tai Po Road Milestone 49 raiding school)
  - Right Coy HQ at Grid 229638 (Shatin Pass Shatin entrance)
  - Coy HQ at Grid 2660 (Customs Pass)
  - Coy HQ Tate's Pass (Grid 2562)
  - First Aid Collection Post Shelters (Group II, No.1) at Customs Pass Road

The following HQs are mentioned on the marker stones I found. In many cases the marker stones only showed Coy and Bn HQs. But some included the HQ's location names.

- Coy HQ GP Company HQ Grasscutters Pass
- Coy HQ CP/ HQ CPOP Company HQ Crown Point
- Coy HQ KH Company HQ Keng Hau
- Coy HQ SP Company HQ Shatin Pass
- Coy HQ TP Company HQ Tate's Pass
- Bn HQ GH Battalion HQ Golden Hill
- Bn HQ SP Battalion HQ Shatin Pass
- RES Bn HQ Reserved Battalion HQ
- Rear Bn HQ Rear Battalion HQ (same as RES Bn HQ?)
- Fwd Bn HQ Forward Battalion HQ
- CP Bn HQ Custom Pass Battalion HQ

GENERAL LOCATIONS OF THE HEADQUARTERS

The British Army used topography and camouflage to hide its headquarters.

Headquarters covered here are normally located in strategic locations such as gaps or major road junctions. They were also close to a freshwater source to ensure a steady water supply. Some HQs had a large water tank to store freshwater.

Each HQ mainly used telephones to communicate with others, but larger HQs also had teleprinters to transmit text messages. To protect their vital communication lines from battle damage, the defenders placed all communication lines inside cable ducts and buried them underground. This required the construction of a long cable duct network along the entire defence line to link the HQs to the frontline positions. Police stations were used as a communication center in the New Territories before the war because very few other places in New Territories had telephones back then. However, the police station was too exposed to enemy artillery fire, which made it useless during wartime.

Figure 2: *WD cable marker stone on Shatin Pass Road showing the military communication cable below (photo by author, 2009).*

Figure 3: *WD cable marker stone on Shatin Pass Road (photo by author, 2014).*

Tracks for mule and wheeled transport were built around a HQ for transporting men and materiel from remote locations. A typical track was approximately one meter wide and lacking concrete cover, which meant it had difficulty being an all-weather road. Some HQs, like Shing Mun, had concrete steps to connect to the nearest roads. Zig zag tracks commonly built on slopes allowed wheeled transport or laden mules to navigate steep hills.

Figure 4: *Concrete steps to the Shing Mun redoubt (photo by author, 2015).*



Figure 5: *Zig-Zag track connecting to PB124 on a steep slope (1964 4599).*

HEADQUARTERS SHELTERS

An HQ shelter was built on a hillside away from the expected direction of an enemy attack to avoid being spotted and hit. With proper protection, it's almost impossible for enemy artillery to hit a HQ shelter directly. The HQ would also be difficult to spot by air. As a shelter was hard to hit directly by artillery, the lighter Type A shrapnel-proof shelter was used for a HQ. It protected its occupants from nearby explosions, but not a direct hit. I still have not found any document that mentions Type B or any other type of shelter. However, some HQ shelters, like those at the Shing Mun Redoubt and Crown Point OP, were built underground.



Figure 6: *HQ shelter protected by hiding it in a valley.*

The three rooms inside Bn HQs usually included two large rooms of similar size and a smaller room. The survey map shows three entrances for the HQ building. It seems no door inside connected the different rooms in the building. This was possibly to ensure that a hit on one room would not impact the others.

Type A Shrapnel-Proof Shelter

A shelter's interior dimensions were around 12 feet long X 12 feet wide X 9 feet high. It had only one entrance and a window in front with a bulletproof steel door and window shutter. A ventilation shaft was installed on its roof for ventilation. Some shelters also had small ventilation holes on their front walls near ground level for ventilation when their doors and windows were closed. Each shelter was equipped with 7-9 foldable bunk beds.

A shelter is typically built on a hillside with three sides covered. Its roof was covered with earth to prevent it from being spotted by air and to provide additional protection. Shelters were built individually with at least one foot of space between each other to ensure that damage to one shelter would not affect the others nearby. Each HQ normally had four shelters used as accommodation.



Figure 7: *Different views of the shelter.*

Figure 8: *Type A shrapnel-proof shelter in Wong Nai Chung Gap (photo by author, 2007).*

Figure 9: *Inside a shelter. The metal rings on the wall were used to mount foldable beds. Three bunk beds were mounted on each wall in this shelter. Note the square-shaped ventilation hole on the roof (photo by author, 2016).*

Figure 10: *Heavy steel door for the shelter. Note the three huge locks inside the door. The hole on the door allowed the occupants to shoot out from behind the door. The hole could be covered by a steel plate when not in use (photo by author, 2016).*

Figure 11: *The steel cover for the window (photo by author, 2016).*

Figure 12: *Ventilation holes along the front wall of the shelter (photo by author, 2007).*

Military Toilets

Most battery and headquarters sites were equipped with standard military toilets to improve hygiene[1]. Toilets were built separately from the shelters for obvious reasons.

Just like a shelter, a toilet was built along a hillside. It provided some protection for its occupant. Each toilet surveyed by the author had two rooms and each room had two stalls. There was also a separate room with a wash stand.

1 See *Field Service Pocket Book,* Ch.11, sects 50 & 51.

Figure 13: *An early military toilet at Pinewood Battery. The wash stand is in front and the two toilet rooms are in the back. Note the camouflage painted on its wall (photo by author, 2000s).*

Figure 14: *The wash stand (photo by author, 2000s).*

Figure 15: *A wall dividing a toilet room into two stalls – one with a concrete stand and one without. Such a design might have been to divide users' lavatory activities. Note the lack of an open hole in the ground, as all solid waste was stored in "honey buckets" and disposed of elsewhere every day (photo by author, 2000s).*



Figure 16: *Plan of an early toilet at Pinewood Battery.*

Figure 17: *A pit toilet at the Tai Tam Gauge Basin Battery. The officer's toilet is in front. Note the thickness of its shelter wall (photo by author, 2015).*

Figure 18: *The "executive toilet". Note the toilet seat inside and ventilation hole on the roof. A wooden plate served as a toilet seat on top of a concrete step. A hole on the wall was possibly used as a toilet paper mount (photo by author, 2019).*

Figure 19: The "common toilet" *with three squat pans separated by two short walls. Two ventilation holes on the roof maintained airflow (photo by author, 2015).*

Figure 20: *Roof of the toilet shelter camouflaged by rocks and earth. Three ventilation shafts on top typified pit toilet shelters (photo by author, 2015).*

Pit Toilet Plan



MAINLAND BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS (Bde HQ)

The Mainland, or Kowloon Infantry, Brigade Headquarters was the command center of the mainland portion of the defence. It was located on the north end of Waterloo Road, which ended at the junction with Cornwall Street before the war. In the 1949 aerial photo, one large and two

standard shelters could be seen. The large shelter was possibly the brigade headquarters. An air vent was visible on the hillside, which meant a shelter there was demolished. The three Nissen huts near the HQ were probably used for accommodation. The HQ of the 1st Mountain Battery was also located in a shelter near the mainland HQ.

This site was completely demolished to allow for the extension of Waterloo Road and nothing of it remains today.

Figure 21: *Mainland Brigade Headquarters at the End of Waterloo Road in 1949 (1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A/130 6053).*

The Mainland Brigade Headquarters was not complete when the Japanese invaded. The brigade's war diary (WO 172/1685) mentioned that it was still busy setting up the teleprinters, lighting, and water in early December 1941. This indicated that they were not well-prepared for the war when it came to Hong Kong.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

The following list includes battalion headquarters on Hong Kong's mainland that we know of so far.

Battalion Headquarters Custom Pass

The headquarters of the Right Battalion (A Bn) was located at the junction of Clear Water Bay and Fei Ngo Shan Roads. This was a strategic location for controlling the only road from the Clear Water Bay and Sai Kung area to Kowloon. A large complex of shelters was divided into two groups on each side of Clear Water Bay Road. A 1949 aerial photo (**Figure 22**) shows many shelters of different sizes. One can see shelters for personnel and large underground storage areas. One shelter (Group II, No.1) was used as a first-aid station.



Figure 22: *Battalion Headquarters at Custom Pass in 1949 (1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A/117 6078).*

Figure 23: *Shelters of the Bn HQ highlighted on a 1968 map (1968 1:1200 survey map C-163-SE-D).*

This site (**Figure 23**) was demolished when constructing the New Clear Water Bay Road. However, a shelter still remains there near Sienna Garden. Its remains are mostly covered and only its top section can be seen (**Figures 24 and 25**).

Figure 24: *A shelter below Sienna Garden that might be a first aid station. GPS position: N22 20 05.1 E114 13 38.7 (photo by author in 2013).*

Figure 25: *Customs Pass Bn HQ site today. The landscape of the HQ site has been completely reshaped (photo by author in 2019).*

Battalion Headquarters Shatin Pass

Shatin Pass is a major thoroughfare connecting Shatin and Kowloon (**Figures 26 and 27**). A Bn HQ was built here. Shelters were found on aerial photos of Shatin Pass' Kowloon side entrance. The Bn HQ was located on the reverse slope below Temple Hill towards the Shatin side for protection. A cable duct connecting to the HQ building and continuing to Kowloon was clearly visible from the Shatin side. Two other shelters built on opposite sides of the Bn HQ. Three larger buildings were found below Unicorn Ridge near the U-turn of Shatin Pass Road. Defence positions were built along the ridges near the site. A police station was located on the hilltop, which was leveled after the war. A large water tank built behind the police station near a stream still exists today.



Figure 26: *Shatin Pass on 1963 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo 5637.*



Figure 27: *The Shatin Pass area on a R.A.F. aerial photo (1956 R.A.F. aerial photo F21 81A 554 0024).*

All HQ shelters and buildings at Shatin Pass, including the old police station, were demolished after the war. Only the cutout for a building on the hillside and water tank remain (**Figures 28-36**).

This site was prepared for an Indian Battalion and possibly used by the Center Battalion (B Bn). However, I could not find any record that mentioned that the B Bn HQ was located at Shatin Pass or on Tai Po Road near MS 50 during the war.

Figure 28: *Looking towards Kowloon from Shatin Pass (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 29: *Looking toward Shatin from Shatin Pass (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 30: *The Shatin Pass area today (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 31: *The BN HQ site is in the valley to the left of the steps going up to Temple Hill. The site was fully covered by plants and nothing of it remains (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 32: *The marker stone and water tank still exist at Shatin Pass (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 33: *The water tank remains at Shatin Pass (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 34: *The cutout of HQ shelters near the trail from Shatin Pass Road to Unicorn Ridge (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 35: *Three HQ shelters located above the corner of Shatin Pass Road near the trail to Unicorn Ridge (photo by author in 2014).*

Figure 36: *The marker stone on Shatin Pass Road (photo by author in 2007).*

Battalion Headquarters Tai Po Road

A battalion headquarters was found along Tai Po Road near Milestone 50 (MS 50). The HQ was located at the entrance to the gap that connects to Kowloon and looks down on Shatin Valley. This might have been the Forward Battalion Headquarters (FWD Bn HQ) mentioned on the marker stone (**Figure 37**).

This HQ had accommodation and support facilities (**Figure 38**). The Bn HQ shelter was located on the slope above old Tai Po Road and connected to it by steps. A survey map shows that the shelter had entrances on its left, front, and right, which indicated it had three separate rooms. Four shrapnel-proof shelters were built one level above the HQ shelter. Two other facilities – possibly a toilet and kitchen – were built at the end of the accommodations area. To ensure a steady water supply, a dam was built across a stream in the valley to divert water to tanks below for storage. Also, a large building was built along the old Tai Po Road. It is unclear if it was part of the HQ or villagers built it after the war.

Figure 37: *The Bn HQ site on 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo (No. 4916).*



Figure 38: *HQ buildings highlighted on a 1963 survey map. Note that the map shows the original Tai Po Road curved around the hill, which has since been straightened. The dotted line shows part of the old Tai Po Road after straightening (1963 1:1200 C-145-SW-D).*

No document on who used this HQ during the war has been found so far. It might have been used by the Centre Battalion (B Bn) in the Shatin area. But it is not clear if the HQ for B Bn was located here or at Shatin Pass.

Figure 39: *Marker stone located 500 meters behind the Bn HQ and pointing the way to it. The original path from there to the Bn HQ has disappeared. GPS position: N22 21 58.8 E114 09 35.9 (photo by author in 2008).*

Figure 40: *Milestone 50 (MS 50) on Tai Po Road, which was destroyed by the construction of Eagle Nest Tunnel (photo by author in the 2000s).*

For unknown reasons, this site was not demolished after the war and remained intact for a while. All of its HQ buildings and shelters were occupied by squatters after the war and the complex eventually became Luk Hop Village. The villagers also added new buildings of their own, but most of them were demolished after 2000 when the government prepared to build the Tsing Sha Highway. Only the Bn HQ shelter has survived, while the building above it is still occupied by villagers. It was difficult to obtain a closer look, as the site is private property. However, as

far as I know, this is the only existing Bn HQ shelter that survived on the mainland. For that reason alone, it has unique historical value and should be preserved (**Figures 39-47**).

Figure 41: *Luk Hop Village before its demolition. Note the original HQ building below (photo by author).*

Figure 42: *Luk Hop Village during the 2000s. The steps go up to the Bn HQ (photo by author).*

Figure 43: *Luk Hop Village today. The Bn HQ building is still there (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 44: *Looking down at Shatin from the Bn HQ (photo by author in the 2000s).*

Figure 45: Bn HQ site today. Most buildings here were demolished, but the Bn HQ shelter remains *(photo by author in 20019).*

Figure 46: *Demolished accommodation shelters on the upper level (photo by author in 2008).*

Figure 47: *The existing Bn HQ shelter. The brick house on top of it was possibly added by squatters after the war (photo by author in 2010).*

Reserve Battalion Headquarters

A battalion headquarters was located near the junction of Tai Po and Cheung Yuen Roads below Piper's Hill (**Figures 48 and 49**). This site had very

limited facilities and was located in a gap along the road that could oversee the Golden Hill area below the filter bed. This should be the location of the reserve (or rear) battalion headquarters (RES Bn HQ) mentioned on the marker stone (**Figures 50-52**).

This site was also used by the Left Battalion (C Bn) as its headquarters during the war. According to the Mainland Brigade's war diary (WO 172/1685), on 11 December 1941 at about 0915, the OC of C Bn reported being able to see his two left Companies retiring from their positions on Golden Hill and astride the road NE of Lai Chi Kok from his HQ at the Filter Beds House. As the HQ position was too exposed to attack, he moved the Res Coy C Bn HQ to PB315 at around 1015.



Figure 48: *BH29 refers to Block House No 29 of the Anderson Line disused well before WWII broke out. RES Bn HQ building on 1949 aerial photo. The building in front might have been built after the war (1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A 117 6114).*



Figure 49: *RES Bn HQ area in 1945 (1945 R.A.F. aerial photo 681 5 4110).*

Figure 50: *The Bn HQ is located in a gap along Tai Po Road near the entrance to Cheung Yuen Road. The filter bed is around 400 meters away from here (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 51: *Looking in the direction of Golden Hill and Lai Chi Kok from the HQ (photo by author in 2019).*



Figure 52: *RES Bn HQ location from above with Lai Chi Kok in the background (photo by author in 2019)*

The area around was once called Lai Chi Kok Pass. A police station was built some 100 meters from the HQ. PB315 was built behind the police station and is about 150 meters away from the HQ. The police station building still exists today (**Figures 53-57**).

Figure 53: *Lai Chi Kok Pass police station today. It's located on a knoll looking down on the Kowloon Reservoir dam and Cheung Yuen Road (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 54: *Lai Chi Kok Pass police station and RES Bn HQ today (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 55: *The buildings below Piper's Hill behind the police station were built after the war (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 56: *The main building of the police station is still intact today (photo by author in 2012).*

Figure 57: *The accommodation building and garage of the police station (photo by author in 2012).*

Battalion Headquarters on Golden Hill (Bn HQ GH)

A Bn HQ on Golden Hill (Bn HQ GH) was indicated on a marker stone at Smuggler's Pass that was destroyed when a police firing range was built there. The Golden Hill Road ended before reaching Smuggler's Pass before the 1960s, while only a small trail continued on to the pass. Cutouts and trenches found below Golden Hill on a

1964 aerial photo (**Figure 58**), which should be of the Bn HQ, which is now on a small hill behind Golden Hill Road and fully covered by vegetation. Aerial photos show a cutout along the hill for shelters and buildings. A large cutout farther inside the valley made it possible for more shelters to be built. I could not find any wartime document that mentioned this site. This well-constructed HQ site seems to have not played an important role during the Japanese attack – possibly because its position became too exposed when the Shing Mun Redoubt came under attack.



Figure 58: *Golden Hill Bn HQ site on 1964 Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo No. 4925.*

All of the HQ buildings were completely demolished after the war. Only some concrete blocks and pieces remained when I visited (**Figures 59-64**).

Figure 59: *Bn HQ site below Golden Hill is fully covered by plants today, making it difficult to see what is underneath (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 60: *Remains of a concrete ventilation shaft near the shelter cutout (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 61: *Remains of the shelter wall at the site (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 62: *Concrete steps connecting Golden Hill Road to the HQ (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 63: *Remains of trenches around the site (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 64: *Looking out from the knoll above the HQ (photo by author in 2019).*

This site is very close to Smuggler's Ridge, which is a narrow ridge and steep valley separating Needle Hill and Kwai Chung. No pillbox or strong defence position was built in this area other than the Shing Mun Redoubt and a few lookout posts, which were unable to stop the enemy's advance once it reached Smuggler's Ridge. The HQ was immediately endangered when the redoubt fell, after which the Japanese could reach Lai Chi Kok and Kowloon via paths along Golden Hill while bypassing the defence lines in Kwai Chung.

Figure 65: *Overview of the Smuggler's Pass area today (photo by author in 2019).*

During their occupation of Hong Kong, the Japanese built many tunnels along Golden Hill Road (**Figures 66-68**). Most of these tunnels were sealed by the government's slope maintenance service and are inaccessible today. But a large cave possibly used by the Japanese as a HQ still exists. A large complex of tunnels was also found next to the Bn HQ site. This indicated that the Japanese also considered Smuggler's Pass a strategic position and placed a sizable garrison there.

Figure 66: *A large Japanese tunnel network built next to the HQ site (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 67: *A large Japanese cave along Golden Hill Road (photo by author in 2015).*

Figure 68: *The interior of the Japanese cave (photo by author in 2015).*

Battalion Headquarters Skeet Ground

Britain's 1938 defence scheme mentioned the Left Company Headquarters at Skeet Ground (map grid 168632). A layout of the skeet shooting range near present-day Shek Kin Street near Castle Peak Road is clearly visible on 1949 and 1956 aerial photos. The following diagram (**Figure 69**) showed a standard layout of a skeet field, which is the same as that of the Skeet Ground on the photos.



Figure 69: *Layout of a skeet shooting field (internet resource).*

Skeet Ground's main building and shooting field are also clearly visible on the aerial photos. The 1949 photo (**Figure 71**) showed a few shelters, while the 1956 photo (**Figure 72**) showed four shelters along a hillside whose arrangement was similar to that of other HQs. A 1957 survey map (**Figure 70**) showed three concrete shelters on Skeet Ground (Hong Kong Gun Club) and four shelters near Castle Peak Road. It's not unusual for a survey map to miss some military structures that were difficult to detect on aerial photos. Six to eight shelters at this site were arranged in two groups. All were built on the reverse slope of the hillside.

Figure 70: *1957 Survey map showing the concrete shelters at Skeet Ground (1:1200 144-SE-D Ed 1957).*



Figure 71: *Skeet Ground and Salvation Army site on a 1949 aerial photo. The shelters are hardly visible from above (1949 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A 118 5076).*

Figure 72: *Skeet Ground on a 1956 aerial photo shows three HQ shelters. The shelters near Castle Peak Road are invisible. Note the new buildings and firing range built there after 1949 (1956 R.A.F. aerial photo 81A 560 0009).*

This site was called Left Company Headquarters in the 1938 defence scheme. However, according to Jim Ford, the platoon commander of three PBs near Skeet Ground, the battalion headquarters of the 2nd Royal Scots was located at Skeet Ground. The Mainland Brigade war diary (WO 172/1685) mentioned that it was located near the Filter Bed (RES Bn HQ) on 11 December 1941. Possibly the Royal Scots relocated there after the Shing Mun Redoubt came under attack on 9 December. The Skeet Ground Bn HQ was ordered to retreat after the redoubt had fallen.

This site was completely demolished after 1964 for the development of Kwai Chung. No remains of its HQ are left today.

The Salvation Army site in Kwai Chung is visible on the 1949 photo, which meant it existed before the war. The main buildings and site layout were the same as today. Some shelter-like buildings still exist there (**Figures 73-75**). There is no documentation of the British having used this site during the war. However, as there were few well-constructed buildings in the area by the time the war broke out, the British could have used it to support their defence of Kwai Chung.

Figure 73: *The main building of the Salvation Army site in Kwai Chung was probably a prewar building (photo by author in 2010).*

Figure 74: *A shelter-like structure at the Salvation Army site (photo by author in 2010).*

Figure 75: *Another pre-war building at the Salvation Army site (photo by author in 2019).*

Surveying & Built Environment

Technical Note

World War II Mainland Barracks and Firing Ranges

Y.K. Tan[*]

MAINLAND BARRACKS

To accommodate Hong Kong's mainland garrisons, three barracks were built in Kowloon during the early 1900s: Gun Club Hill, Whitfield and Sham Shui Po Barracks.

Whitfield Barracks

Whitfield Barracks, with an area of approximately (42 acres) 17 ha, housed some of the Indian garrison. There were 85 barrack buildings constructed during 1910. A mosque also built at the southeastern corner of the site for worship by the Indian soldiers. The northern part of the area was known as Whitfield Camp - the 1922 Ordnance Map shows this and the very different built structures. A 1926 government plan shows that the camp was seen as temporary, since the plan shows a new road planned to pass diagonally through it from SE to NW, and another road passing straight along the dividing line from the end of Kimberley Road to the end of Navy Street. However, the southern section of Whitfield Barracks had many attractive, multi-storey, British-style buildings for officers and support staff (**Figure 1**).

In 1938 the Rajputs were in Chatham Road Camp. In 1940 the 5th/6th Rajputanas were in Hankow Barracks, Shamshuipo. Because of the good facilities of Whitfield Barracks, the Japanese housed their own garrison there during the occupation. After the war, Japanese were interned here too for a while before the British military took it back. The first part of the barracks was handed over to the government in September 1968 and the last part in possibly 1970 or 1971.

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Whitfield Barracks is bordered by Nathan, Canton, Austin, and Haiphong Roads as WD Lot No. 5. (**Figure 2**) In 1970, its southern section was redeveloped into Kowloon Park. Most of its buildings were demolished during this redevelopment, but some were preserved as exhibition centers or storage facilities. (**Figure 3**) The northern section was also demolished during the 1980s and became a public swimming pool and Chinese Garden. **Figures 4 to 5** show some remaining buildings of the former barracks. The Kowloon West II Battery was also located inside the Whitfield Barracks. It was converted into a discovery playground inside Kowloon Park (**Figure 6A**).

A large air-raid tunnel network was built under Whitfield Barracks around the northern section area. Several tunnel portals are still visible today (**Figure 6B**). Some shielded tunnel sections and underground structure also can still be found inside Kowloon Park today (**Figure 6C**).

Figure 1: *Whitfield Barracks in 1945 (R.A.F. aerial photo No. 3025 681 6 3025).*

Figure 2: *WD No.5 boundary stone remains on Haiphong Road outside Kowloon Park today. It marked the land as War Department property before (photo by author in 2006).*

Figure 3: *The northern section of Whitfield Barracks in 1961 (Tim Ko's collection).*

Figure 4: *Blocks S61 and S62 of the former barracks building were converted into the Hong Kong Heritage Discovery Centre (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 5: *Block S4 (formerly Block G) was completely modernized and became the Health Education Exhibition and Resource Centre (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 6: *Only Block 58 (formerly Block A) was used by the Hong Kong Museum of History for storage and maintained its original appearance (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 6A: *The remains of Kowloon West II Battery become Discovery Playground in Kowloon Park (photo by author in 2007).*

Figure 6B: *Air-raid tunnel network below Whitefield Barracks.*

Figure 6C: *Blocked tunnel section in Kowloon Park (photo by author in 2018).*

Sham Shui Po Barracks[1]

Much bigger barracks, with an area of approximately 27 ha, were built in Sham Shui Po in 1926 (PWD report for 1926) **(Figures 7 and 8)**. Sham Shui Po Barracks boasted mainly simple, single-level, concrete-brick buildings and Nissen huts (post war) as accommodation. It also included some multi-level married quarters facing the sea.

Just before the war broke out, the 'C' Force[2] had arrived in Hong Kong and it was initially stationed here. Sham Shui Po Barracks was used as a POW camp during the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong. Possibly over 5,000 British, Canadian and Portuguese POWs were interned there at the beginning of the occupation. They were forced by the Japanese to construct the expansion of the Kai Tak Airport. Some POWs were later transferred to Japan as slave labor. Many of those who remained were unable to survive until liberation.

1 This was TWO barracks: Hankow Barracks and Nanking Barracks. In June 1941 the Middlesex were in Nanking Barracks.

2 They were the Royal Rifles of Canada (R.R.C.) and the Winnipeg Grenadiers. The R.R.C. went into Nanking Barracks and the Winnipegs went into Hankow Barracks.

Sham Shui Po Barracks (**Figure 9**) were used to accommodate Vietnamese refugees from the late 1970s and was completely demolished during the late 1980s to become Sham Shui Po Park, Lai Kok Estate, Lai On Estate, Yee Kok Court, and Yee Ching Court. I could not find any surviving barracks structure. The boundary stones (MOD BS No.10) at the entrance to Sham Shui Po Park are post-war installations (**Figures 10, 11 and 12**). Boundary stones at military sites before the war were made of stone instead of concrete and labeled "WD" (War Department).



Figure 7: *Sham Shui Po Barracks in 1956 (Portion enlargement of R.A.F. aerial photo No. 0103 81A 554) [Note that North is more or less upside down].*

Figure 8: *Sham Shui Po Barracks in 1932. Eagle's Nest and Beacon Hill are in the background (Tim Ko's collection).*

Figure 9: *Sham Shui Po Barracks in 1972. Note the pre-war multi-level married quarters on the right (Tim Ko's collection).*

Figure 10: *The boundary stones at the entrance of Sham Shui Po Park mark the old boundaries of the barracks on the Lai Chi Kok Road side (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 11: *Details of a boundary stone, the text of which reads: Ministry of Defence (MOD) boundary stones (BS) No.10 (photo by author in 2006).*

Figure 12: *Memorials Built at Sham Shui Po Park from 1989-1991 for the British and Canadian POWs Interned at the Camp (photo by author in 2006).*

FIRING RANGES

To provide firing practice for soldiers, the British built three large rifle ranges in Kowloon during the 1910s. Two are covered here below.

Kowloon City Rifle Range

Kowloon City Rifle Range, with an area of approximately 45 ha, was built under Lion Rock in the present Wong Tai Sin area (**Figures 13 and 14**). It was located near where Ma Chai Hang and Morse Park area today. The site is marked as War Department Lot No. 18 on an old map[3]. The facility had two rifle ranges constructed in a V-shaped configuration. The left range was up to 1,000 yards (914 metres) long, while the right range was some 600 yards (549 meters) long. Along the hillside were multiple shooting lines set at different distances (**Figures 15 and 16**). This well-constructed rifle range allowed soldiers to practice shooting from close to long distances of up to 1,000 yards. The British used it to host shooting competitions with soldiers visiting from other countries.

The firing range was used until the end of the 1950s. The site was demolished in 1960 to develop the Wong Tai Sin resettlement area. No remains of this site can be found today.

Figure 13: *1922 War Office map showing the Kowloon City Rifle Range under Lion Rock. Note the two ranges marked by length and the restricted "Danger Area" above them.*



Figure 14: *The Rifle Range below Lion Rock in 1945 (Portion enlargement of R.A.F. aerial photo No. 4114 681 5).*

3 Kowloon Peninsula 1947, scale 8 inches to one mile, Crown Land and Survey Office, Hong Kong.



Figure 15: *Kowloon City Rifle Range in 1949. The stop butts and galleries are at the top left. The built up firing points are at 100 or 200 yard intervals extending back to the maximum range limits (Portion enlargement of R.A.F. aerial photo No. 6056 81A 130).*

Figure 16: *Kowloon City Rifle Range in 1939. Much of the Lion Rock foothill was leveled to build the rifle range (Tim Ko's collection).*

Stonecutters Island Rifle Range

An 800-yard rifle range, with an area of approximately 2 ha, was built alone on the north coast of Stonecutters Island by 1902 (Editor: National Archive MFQ 1/1363/8) (**Figures 17-19**). The firing range, in the possession of the PLA since July 1997, now lies on Ngong Shung Road next to Stonecutters Island Sewage Treatment Plant (**Figures 20-27**).

This range was also used after the war, but the firing range was reduced to 300 meters long and further upgraded during the 1980s. Large gate-like concrete walls covered with wood plates built (during the 80s) along the range to capture stray bullets to prevent any damage outside the range. The site was further upgraded (in the middle of 90s) with concrete walls built outside the range to protect the new roads and nearby sewage treatment plant.

Figure 17: *1922 War Office map showing an 800-yard rifle range on Stonecutters Island.*



Figure 18: *Stonecutters Island Rifle Range is clearly visible on the northern coast of the island in 1963 (Portion enlargement of Hunting Surveys Ltd.'s aerial photo No. 6093 of 1963). [Note that North is upside down].*

Figure 19: *Stonecutters Island Rifle Range in the 1920s. A large stone wall was the stop butt (Tim Ko's collection).*

Figure 20: *The original stone wall behind the stop butt that stopped all bullets after they had hit (or missed) the targets (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 21: *The original target area of the rifle range is now disused (photo by author in 2019).*

Figure 22: *Stonecutters Island Rifle Range today. The white walls were added after 1990s (photo by author in 2019).*